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Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CHECHNYA

Yeltsin on Measures To Eliminate Chechen Crisis

95UM02174 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 95 p 1

[HEAR-TASS report: "Boris Yeltsin on Measures To Eliminate the Chechen Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am strictly monitoring the power structures. Each day I know the situation in Chechnya, and nothing serious will happen there without me." The President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin stated this at the Kremlin to a group of journalists. He added that "the Chechen question will be settled, it will be calm and normal, there is no need to make an uproar about it."

The head of the Russian stated pointed out that "soon we will we will end the armed actions in Chechnya and subunits of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] will operate there to maintain law and order, protect the Chechen populace, restore the buildings and structures, and organize normal life."

B. Yeltsin distinguished three key points at the current stage of settlement of the Chechen conflict. First of all, in his words, the issue is of an "integrated approach to negotiations. "We do not want to hold talks with Dudayev, who organized genocide against his own people," pointed out the head of the state. "We want to hold talks with the lower levels, field commanders, the regional and city level." Second, in the words of B. Yeltsin, a gradual shift of the conclusion of military actions by the Defense Ministry is needed, and transfer of maintenance of law and order in the Chechen Republic to the care of a subunit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and internal troops. Third, B. Yeltsin stressed that it is necessary to provide "all possible assistance to the Chechen people in all matters. We call upon citizens of the Federation to provide humanitarian assistance, and it is already moving very actively into Chechnya. Only it is necessary that it not be plundered, since such negative phenomena do exist. At times they receive the humanitarian aid, and then sell it through commercial structures," the President said.

'Power Leaders' Interviewed on Departmental Concerns

95UM0199B Moscow SLUZHBA in Russian
20 Dec 94 p 2

[Survey of Sergey Vadimovich Stepashin, director, Federal Counterintelligence Service; Aleksey Nikolayevich Ilyushenko, acting procurator general of Russian Federation; Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kruglov, chairman, Russian State Customs Committee; Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, Russian Federation minister on civil defense, emergency situations, and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters; Colonel General Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev, CINC Russian Federation Border

Troops; Lieutenant General of Tax Police Sergey Nikolayevich Almazov, director of Russian Federation Department of Tax Police; Viktor Konstantinovich Glukhikh, chairman of Russian Federation State Committee on Defense Sectors of Industry; Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense; and General of the Army Viktor Fedorovich Yerin, minister of internal affairs of Russia; by SLUZHBA under rubric "Official": "What Problem Today Can Be Called the Most Acute for Your Department and What Solution Do You See To It?; photographs of all those surveyed included]

[FBIS Translated Text] What problem today can be called the most acute for your department and what solution do you see to it? This question from SLUZHBA was answered as follows:

SERGEY VADIMOVICH STEPASHIN, director, Federal Counterintelligence Service

Born in 1952. In 1973 completed USSR MVD Higher Political School and in 1981 the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin (now the Armed Forces Academy of the Humanities); candidate of historical sciences.

From 1987 through 1990 repeatedly performed various assignments in "hot spots." From 1992 deputy minister of security of Russian Federation and from September through 21 December 1993, first deputy head of the Ministry of Security.

From December 1993 through March 1994, first deputy director, Federal Counterintelligence Service. From March 1994, director, Federal Counterintelligence Service.

Married. Son Vladimir is 18.

Above all I see my task as director of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service to lie in preserving a skilled, capable collective of counterintelligence personnel standing in defense of the interests of the individual and the state.

The solution to the problem lies in facilitating the creation of a legislative base (adoption of laws) corresponding to the command of the time; in adequate financing ensuring performance of missions facing the Federal Counterintelligence Service; and in relieving counterintelligence personnel of the psychological pressure which, in fulfilling a certain social order, the part of the press which lacks conscientiousness "heaps" on them for past mistakes by the entire state.

I would like to wish the new newspaper SLUZHBA that it not become lost in the present mass of papers, that it find its niche, that it revive the partially forgotten words "honor," "conscience" and "patriotism" and that it write not only about "businessmen without fear and reproach," but also about state employees and servicemen, by whom the state is supported by and large.

Best wishes to the editors and readers.

ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH ILYUSHENKO, acting procurator general of Russian Federation.

Born in 1957 in Siberia, to where his ancestors, St. Petersburg natives, were exiled after October 1917. He has behind him service in the naval infantry in the Far East and study in the juridical faculty at Krasnoyarsk University. After completing the university he came into procuracy organs, where he has worked for 15 years now. There was a year's interruption, when Ilyushenko headed the Control Administration under the Russian Federation President.

A State Adviser of Justice 1st Class, he has been acting procurator general of Russia since March 1994 in accordance with a Russian Federation Presidential Edict.

The most pressing problems for the procuracy coincide with those which trouble society, for the majority of them have their roots in the country's political, economic and social life.

The important thing for the procuracy today in our difficult time is to do everything dependent on it to see that every citizen of Russia feels himself protected, to see that his life, health and property are reliably guarded against any encroachments.

We see two primary tasks for ourselves here: an uncompromising fight against the most dangerous form of legal tyranny, crime, and reinforcement of the law-protection functions of our organs.

There is no doubt that this Gordian knot cannot be cut at a single stroke. We are dealing with ailments of society which yield only to comprehensive, lengthy treatment. Social corrosion has affected our society [sotsium] so deeply that it is impossible to correct the situation all at once. And as we know, the legal situation is directly dependent on the standard of living, culture and morality of the population.

Nevertheless, we believe that we have opportunities to influence it, that there are reserves for increasing the effectiveness of procurator oversight over execution of legislation called upon to ensure citizens' constitutional rights and interests. There is a program, including for fighting crime, there is a will and, most important, there are people on whom one can rely.

ANATOLIY SERGEYEVICH KRUGLOV, chairman, Russian State Customs Committee.

Born in Moscow Oblast in 1951. Higher education as lawyer. After Army service, came to work in customs organs in 1973. Worked in Sheremetyevo and Chkalovsk customhouses.

Appointed chief of Sheremetyevo Customhouse in January 1990. Appointed chairman of Russian State Customs Committee in October 1991 by Russian Federation Presidential Edict. State adviser of Russian Federation Customs Service.

Married, has two daughters.

Russia's transition to new economic conditions and the cardinal change in its geopolitical position after disintegration of the USSR substantially elevated the role of the foreign economic factor in the country's development. Economic and trade ties became foreign economic ties for Russia not only with the far abroad, but also the near abroad.

These circumstances required development of a new customs policy.

In our view, the important thing now is to ensure that level of our work which would correspond to the new political and economic conditions to the full extent. This presumes competence and discipline of execution in employees, principle and flexibility in work, and faultless moral makeup.

Success here largely will depend on an improvement in the technology of customs operations, which include in particular a determination of customs value, which is the basis of customs taxation, of the collection of payments and of control over their distribution and over timely transfer to the budget; they also include stopping socially dangerous, organized forms of smuggling.

SERGEY KUZHUGETOVICH SHOYGU, Russian Federation minister on civil defense, emergency situations, and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters.

He was born in the city of Chadan, Tuva ASSR on 21 May 1955. In 1977 he completed Krasnoyarsk Polytechnical Institute in the specialty of civil engineer.

From 1977 through 1988 he worked in Krasnoyarsk and Abakan as a foreman, section chief, chief engineer, and chief of a construction trust. In 1990 he was appointed to the position of deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee on Architecture and Construction. In 1991 he headed up the Russian Federation State Committee on Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Liquidation of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, and in January 1994 the Russian Federation Ministry on Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters.

Married, has two daughters.

The most acute problem for us consists of interruptions in financing. Falling behind the plan envisaged in the 1994 federal budget considerably complicated the ministry's work.

Another acute problem which we constantly encounter is the local authorities' use of any emergency situation as an opportunity to dislodge more money from the Center. On the one hand they can be understood—the financial situation in the regions is not an easy one. We all know how many months people have been sitting without pay. Nevertheless, it must be absolutely clear that money being allocated for compensating victims or for restoring housing must be used for that purpose. Today even

humanitarian assistance—and this sometimes means hundreds of thousands of dollars, including that coming from abroad—is expended by anyone however he wishes: for constructing airfields, purchasing agricultural equipment, paying off debts. The Sakhalin Oblast Administration, for example, decided to purchase two landing vessels with the more than a million dollars sent as humanitarian aid for the population of the Kuriles, which suffered from an earthquake.

And after this how is one supposed to look into the eyes of people who are transferring almost their last money on hearing about the misfortune, or of foreign partners who are helping us?

Today it is impossible to demand a full resolution of these questions under conditions of economic instability. But in that situation there must be directions which are financed first and foremost. In my view, the work of saving people, providing them with heat and food products and restoring housing specifically are among the priority directions. It was for these purposes that the Government Reserve Fund was established for eliminating the consequences of emergency situations. This year it was R360 billion. In August the fund was empty, which of course is impermissible, especially on the threshold of winter, which does not promise calm for our department...

ANDREY IVANOVICH NIKOLAYEV, Colonel General, CINC Russian Federation Border Troops.

Born in Moscow in 1949. In 1971 completed Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School (ment RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in 1976 Frunze Military Academy and in 1988 the General Staff Military Academy.

Served in various positions. First deputy chief of Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Main Operations Directorate from July 1992, and first deputy chief of the General Staff from December 1992.

In August 1993 he was appointed deputy minister of security of the Russian Federation and commander of Russian Border Troops by Russian Federation Presidential Edict. CINC Russian Federation Border Troops from December 1993.

Married, has two sons.

It is very difficult to respond unequivocally, but above all it is a problem of Federal Border Service growth, for with consideration of the different geopolitical situation, a fundamental perestroika of the entire Russian border security system is being carried out actively today.

In questions of conducting Russian policy on its state borders, we have set a course toward forming a civilized Russian border corresponding to the democratic, federal, rule-of-law state which our Constitution proclaims Russia to be.

I can declare with full responsibility that we have no doubts that where the Russian State Border runs, we

have a clear picture of the lines and zones of protection of Russian national interests.

The Russian Federation presently is bordered by 16 states on land and at sea and the overall extent of Russian borders is 60,900 km. Around 20 percent (14,000 km) runs along new sectors which have not been formalized in an international law aspect and which are unequipped.

The state's protective function for now still is in a rudimentary state at the new borders. At the old borders the protective function needs to be adjusted and brought into line with the new realities.

In the maritime expanses of Russia, which, by the way, comprise 42 percent of Russia's continental territory, we have encountered real maritime expansion threatening the country's vital interests.

Russia's interests on its borders and in the maritime expanses often conflict with interests of neighboring and other states and are a serious problem in the sphere of interstate relations.

Accomplishing necessary protective functions at the border demands considerable outlays of states, of which ours is incapable today. This transfers the problem to the plane of a search for nontraditional sources of resource support to Russia's national security system at its borders.

Russia's border and its maritime expanses presently are a sphere of responsibility and activity of a large number of ministries and departments. Overcoming the lack of coordination and dissipation of resources requires certain transformations aimed at forming a unified state system which brings together the capabilities and efforts of different agencies and structures.

These are only some of the most essential problems. All are interrelated and to a certain extent contradictory. Therefore they demand an in-depth, systems study, weighed political decisions and consistent practical work. The question of developing a state border policy is linked specifically with this.

SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH ALMAZOV, director of Russian Federation Department of Tax Police.

Sergey Nikolayevich Almazov is 50 years old. In the past he was a professional counterintelligence officer and began his career on the periphery, initially in Gorkiy and later in Novosibirsk. Then he headed up the Russian Federation AFB [Agency for Federal Security] Main Administration for Fighting Organized Crime. He stood at the origin of the creation of a new law-protection structure, the Federal Tax Police Agencies, which he headed up in August 1993. He is a lieutenant general of Tax Police.

We are very troubled by negative tendencies which have appeared in the sphere of taxation. Here are just a few

statistical data. During 1993 the Tax Police, in coordination with the Russian Federation State Tax Service, identified 32,000 tax violations and crimes. And in just the third quarter of the current year this figure for Russia was 13,700, with 2,341 being violations of tax legislation on a large or especially large scale. While we instituted over 600 criminal cases in the past year, we already have instituted over 700 in 9 months of the present year.

Money which is supposed to supplement the state budget often flows over into the criminal sphere. One of the most important tasks of Federal Tax Police Agencies is to ensure the inevitability of liability for tax crimes and prevent them in a timely manner. It is very difficult to perform this task by virtue of the circumstances at hand.

Here is the crux of the problem. According to law, the Tax Police have the right to carry out an investigation of tax crimes exclusively in the form of an inquiry. We do not have our own investigative body, and so materials are transferred to investigative bodies of the MVD or procuracy, which are overloaded even without that. For example, in Moscow today there are 70-80 cases per investigating officer. In addition, an acute shortage of skilled specialists is felt here in the area of tax legislation and finances.

It is the very same situation in the courts. The tax sphere is a new matter and cadre specialization also is required here.

As a result it turns out that many months go by from the moment a criminal case is instituted until it comes to court, and a criminal very often takes advantage of that "deferment" to evade punishment altogether.

A solution to the situation is seen in establishing the Tax Police's own investigative body. The excess load thus will be removed from the MVD and procuracy. It would be sensible to give Tax Police Agencies the right to conduct financial-economic, criminalistic and certain other kinds of expert examination. A number of developed countries have specialized tax courts. I believe this experience also would come in handy for Russia and would be in the interests both of the state and of the taxpayer.

Under present conditions it is impossible to fight tax law violations and crime effectively without having a unified, national information system, the basis of which, as shown by foreign experience, is an electronic data bank on each taxpayer, whether he be a legal or physical person. For example, a U.S. citizen who has just appeared in the world immediately is registered by tax entities and throughout his life a computer system records all changes in his property status and compares declared with actual incomes. Americans take a calm attitude toward "total electronic monitoring" and do not perceive this as human rights violations; they have their own psychology: work honestly, honor the law and you always will be under its protection.

Both the State Tax Service and we need such an information system as much as air itself. The longer its creation is dragged out, the more the state, and as a result also taxpayers themselves, will be the losers.

All these are acute, painful problems. You will not solve them by departmental measures. Recently I and the head of the State Tax Service reported personally to the President of Russia on the situation at hand, and we encountered understanding on his part. He issued an instruction to prepare a draft Edict on state support of the Tax Police. I believe this will permit solving many sore points.

VIKTOR KONSTANTINOVICH GLUKHIKH, chairman of Russian Federation State Committee on Defense Sectors of Industry.

Born in 1946, higher education, married, has an adult daughter and son. He began labor activity in 1964. From 1966 through 1990 he worked in the Leningrad Metal Plant Production Association, where he covered the path from lathe operator to chief engineer. In 1990 he was appointed first deputy minister of industry of the Russian Federation, in October 1992 chairman of the Russian Federation Committee on Defense Sectors of Industry, and since September 1993 he has been chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Defense Sectors of Industry.

I respond with pleasure to the request of your newspaper editors to appear in its first issue, inasmuch as those problems which SLUZHBA would like to discuss first and foremost in its pages are near and understandable to me.

Under conditions of the profound economic and social crisis which has affected the country, it was no accident that the question of Russia's statehood and its national interests became one of the main topics of the discussion being carried on in society today. It naturally affects in one way or another the situation in the country's military-industrial complex and its ability to create modern weapon systems for the Russian Armed Forces and high-technology civilian products which would find a demand both in the domestic as well as the foreign markets.

But it has to be stated that fewer and fewer chances remain for defense sectors of industry to maintain positions in these directions. Judge for yourself. In just the last two years aircraft production has been reduced by more than four times, that of armored equipment by more than five times, munitions by five times, and military electronic equipment by six times. Industry no longer will be able to renew or increase the output of certain models of armament and military equipment even if that is required. We realistically face the loss of a number of advanced technologies, which will substantially reduce Russia's export capabilities already in the 21st century. Thus we have a threat not only to the country's military security, but also to economic security.

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Just where does the solution lie? Above all in developing a precise national security strategy which also would include advanced directions of scientific and production activity of military industry in the form of programs for armament and military equipment development. The development of dual-purpose technologies will become the top priority within their scope. In the aggregate with realization of federal conversion programs, this could ensure Russia a worthy place in the high-tech markets.

One has to realize absolutely clearly that science-intensive technologies in our country need state protection and support, and not in upcoming years, but already now, today. Otherwise help will arrive too late.

In this issue of SLUZHBA we proposed to grant an opportunity to all heads of power structures to tell about the most important problems of their departments. Unfortunately, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs press services were unable to pass our question on to their chiefs for almost a month. Therefore as of this moment we cannot offer our readers anything except photographs and autobiographies of P. Grachev and V. Yerin.

PAVEL SERGEYEVICH GRACHEV, Russian Federation minister of defense.

Born 1 January 1948 in the village of Rvy, Leningradskiy Rayon, Tula Oblast.

He has been in the Armed Forces since 1965. He received a military education at Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Military Academy. He served in the Airborne Troops. He commanded a separate guards airborne regiment and guards airborne division, which were part of the limited contingent of troops in Afghanistan. He is a Hero of the Soviet Union.

After completing the General Staff Military Academy he was appointed first deputy commander of the Airborne Troops. From December 1990 through 23 August 1991 he was commander of the Airborne Troops. As first deputy CINC CIS Combined Armed Forces, he simultaneously headed the Russian Federation State Committee on Defense. From 3 April 1992 he was first deputy minister of defense and from 18 May 1992 minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

There are two children in the Grachev family.

VIKTOR FEDOROVICH YERIN, minister of internal affairs of Russia.

Born 17 January 1944 in the city of Kazan. General of the Army (1993). Completed USSR MVD Higher School in 1973.

Began service in internal affairs agencies in 1964 as operations representative of the militia department of the ispolkom of the Leninskiy Rayon Council of Workers' Deputies of the city of Kazan.

From 1967 through 1983 he worked in criminal investigation of MVD of Tataria and covered the path from operations representative to chief of administration. He took part in exposing especially dangerous crimes. He was on official business in Afghanistan during 1980-1981. From 1983 through 1988 he headed a department of the USSR MVD Main Administration for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation. During 1988-1990 he was first deputy minister of internal affairs of Armenia.

From 1990 he was deputy minister and from 28 February 1991 first deputy minister of internal affairs of RSFSR. In September 1991 he was appointed first deputy minister of internal affairs of USSR. From 26 December 1991 through 15 January 1992 he was first deputy minister of security and internal affairs of the Russian Federation. He was appointed minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation as of 15 January 1992 by Russian Presidential Edict.

Former KGB Chief in Chechnya on Weapons Left Behind

95UM0217B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with Maj-Gen Igor Kochubey by Irina Chernova; place and date not given: "The Order Came From Moscow - Leave Your Weapons!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **This sensational statement was made in a talk with our correspondent by the former Chairman of the KGB of Checheno-Ingushetia.**

Who is guilty of Chechen bloodshed? Who sanctioned the transfer to Dudayev of Russian weapons which today are shooting at our army? Who in general favored "sovereignty" of Chechnya? These questions probably will be the subject of all sorts of investigations for some time to come. The last chairman of the KGB headquarters and member of the council of ministers of the Checheno-Ingushetia Autonomous Socialist Republic, Maj-Gen Igor Kochubey, who today holds the modest position of deputy chief of the Volgograd headquarters of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] may become one of the witnesses in this case. His archive still has documents confirming the interest of the Russian leadership in Dudayev's arrival in power.

[Chernova] Igor Vasiliyevich, besides journalists, has anyone already tried to ask you questions about the reasons for the Chechen events?

[Kochubey] In the summer of '93, a service investigation was conducted at the instruction of Barannikov. Almost all of my former subordinates wrote reports on this topic, but they never saw the light of day. No one summoned me, and to the KGB leadership it was as if I had died after the Chechen coup. As I see it, an objective investigation was disadvantageous for Barannikov and his assistant Frolov, for it was they who had directed the USSR MVD in the autumn of '91. Essentially the very

same people with whose knowledge and connivance it had all started were still in power in the country.

[Chernova] Your dismissal from your post on September 6, 1991 coincided with the breakup of the Supreme Soviet of Chechno-Ingushetia. How should this be viewed?

[Kochubey] I am convinced that it was no coincidence, but a purposeful action. Our department was well aware of what the Vaynakhskaya democratic party was. The fundamental item in its program was the creation of an Islamic state independent of Russia. It was for that reason that we carefully monitored this movement and regularly reported about it to the center. At that time, in August '91, the deputies Gromov, Kobvon, Poltoranin, and Burbulis visited the republic. We showed them materials concerning the activity of the Dudayev movement, data about the arrival of weapons, preparation of a coup and detachment of Chechnya from Russia. But the deputies did not accept our arguments.

But literally two days before the breakup of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, I and its chairman Zavgayev sent coded telegrams signed by us both warning of the impending coup to Yel'tsin, Gorbachev, Khasbulatov, the ministers of the two MVDs, and also the chairmen of the KGB of the USSR and Russia. At the time these were Barannikov, Dudayev, Bakatin and Ivanenko. The response was silence.

Supervisors from the Russian KGB also behaved strangely. First they tried to convince me not to interfere in the events, not to hamper the activity of Dudayev and even to remove the guard of Zavgayev, against whom there had already been threats of terrorist acts. But if something happened to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, I would bear the responsibility. For that reason, I demanded a written order. Instead of that, on August 6 Ivanenko signed the order for my dismissal, and this immediately became known in Grozny. That same day the Dudayev followers dispersed the Supreme Soviet.

[Chernova] On October 5, a month after your resignation, the republic KGB building was captured with all of its contents: weapons, documents, operational equipment. How could that happen?

[Kochubey] We assumed that there would be an attempt to capture the building, but no one could imagine that it would be surrendered, essentially voluntarily. In the last days of my work I ordered that 18 of our associates be armed with assault rifles and transferred to round-the-clock stepped-up duty. At night we took out the most valuable items—documents having to do with agents. We also prepared weapons to be sent away, around 1000 of them. However I was not able to execute the plan. I was relieved of command and cut off from communication with Moscow. Soon the building guard was switched back to normal operations.

[Chernova] Can you at least roughly calculate what quantity of Russian weapons were handed over to

Dudayev? How did it happen that the Russian army left full warehouses in Chechnya?

[Kochubey] In 1991 a reduced-strength division was garrisoned in the republic. It included a training armored regiment, around one hundred combat vehicles. There was also an untouchable reserve of arms in case of combat actions—this was roughly 30 thousand small arms. These went to the Dudayev followers. The capture of the military warehouses occurred in February-March 1992. By this time there were no longer any conscript soldiers in Chechnya. Nearly all of them, 900, had deserted. Only officers remained. Nonetheless the division commander General Sokolov did everything possible to keep the weapons from falling into bandit hands. They hauled out everything they could, disabled tanks, taking the breechblocks from guns, and mined approaches to the warehouses. But the Dudayev followers, as they do now, forced women and children to go ahead of them. And soon the command came from Moscow: "Leave the weapons."

In a personal conversation, Pyotr Sokolov told me that the Deputy Commander of the SKVO [Northern Caucasus Military District] General Strogov passed on an instruction to him from Shaposhnikov to transfer 50 percent of the weapons to Dudayev at residual value. But of course not even the Minister of Defense could make that decision on his own. Only the highest leadership of the country could approve it, and in fact that head of government at that time was Yegor Gaydar. Besides this, the CINC of the Air Forces Deynekin had flown to Grozny for a meeting with Dudayev. After this, the Dudayev followers were left L-29 planes at three airfields belonging to the Stavropol Flight School.

[Chernova] Still, I don't understand why our leadership had an interest in Dudayev coming to power.

[Kochubey] The coup was prepared in Moscow by politicians from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Russia, and also from the President's circle. This was easy, since questions of inter-ethnic relations are run in our country by dilettantes. At that time, the "great specialist" in inter-ethnic relations was Starovoytov, with his ideas of sovereignization of Russian territory. I assume that the President was briefed like this: The leadership of Chechno-Ingushetia is on the side of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. This is held by party bureaucrats, and they must be swept out using the "democratic movement," the Vaynakhskaya Party. Under this pretext, the approval could be obtained to sweep out the old leadership. That was when interested people began to operate almost openly. And there were two "interests," political and economic.

The former lay in the fact that certain deputies of Russia and the Union from Chechnya had hostile relations with the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic Zavgayev. They hoped to eliminate him using Dudayev, assuming that the latter would be tractable, and like a bulldozer would sweep away the old power, and that the

necessary people would take their places. But they were mistaken. When Khasbulatov and Aslakhanov, confident in victory, came to a mass meeting in Grozny and announced: "We will appoint new and worthy leadership in the republic, Dudayev said "We don't need any help from Moscow."

[Chernova] So Khasbulatov had an interest in the Chechen coup?

[Kochubey] At first he supported Dudayev, and essentially brought him to power. But the economic background was that Chechnya had become a criminal zone of free enterprise. No borders, no laws, no authority. Counterfeit bank remittances. Oil which in the last three years went abroad through the Grozny petroleum distillation plants without hindrance.

[Chernova] But why, for all that, was it necessary to transfer weapons to the Chechens?

[Kochubey] I see no reasonable explanation for that. But I am certain that if a commission wants to look into it objectively, it would not be hard. The documents about the presence of arms, their sale and transfer do exist. If of course they are not being hastily destroyed right now. Many participants in the events of that period are alive.

IZVESTIYA Investigation 'Who Armed Dudayev' Continues

On 1992 Transfer of Russian Weaponry

95UM0195A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Jan 95 p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yuriy Bepalov under the rubric "Who Armed Dzhokhar Dudayev?": "Weaponry Was Surrendered on Moscow's Orders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rostov-na-Donu—Officers who served in Grozny in 1992 are unanimous about one thing: The hasty withdrawal of the Russian division from Chechnya was nothing but a panic flight, a betrayal of the interests of both officers and the Russian-speaking population and the Russian state itself.

In the fall and winter of 1991 the behavior of the troops of Dudayev, who had by then come to power, was arrogant and smug but did not go beyond insults and humiliation of the Russian-speaking population and occasional attacks on guards with the purpose of seizing arms. According to Militia Captain Viktor Kholmogorov, who served at the time in Grozny in the protection department, the authority of a man in a militia uniform still meant something. But literally every violation of the law that went unpunished added to Dudayev's supporters' confidence and resolve.

Once, protecting his unit from another raid, the automotive unit commander Vladimir Vashchenko was taken hostage. His body was not found until two months later, in a bog, with numerous stab wounds. This incident

literally shook up Grozny garrison soldiers and officers. It also went unpunished, however.

In the opinion of Captain Kholmogorov, at the time it was still possible to establish order without bloodshed, to force Chechens to respect Russian laws and constitution. For this purpose several planeloads of paratroops actually arrived in Grozny in November 1992. But the political leadership of Russia did not dare to take resolute measures. From that point on the situation of Russian servicemen, members of their families, and all Russians living in Chechnya began to deteriorate with each passing day.

Major General Petr Sokolov, former commander of the Grozny division, says:

"I personally was frisked twice a day when I entered and left staff headquarters. An ambiguous situation developed, until finally in the spring a decision was made to withdraw from the territory of the Chechen republic all troops stationed there. We had, of course, to make some concessions in order to defuse the situation and reach an agreement on the arrangements for withdrawal of troops, families, hardware, and weaponry. And then, like thunder from a clear sky, Russian television announces that if any obstacles are created to the troop withdrawal from Chechnya, paratroops may be sent in to impose proper order. This announcement was made on the air four times—and all the agreements collapsed.

The clumsy and obviously belated threat from Moscow had exactly the opposite effect. This was a decisive factor in the hasty evacuation of the last Russian troops from Chechnya and the fact that practically all weaponry and hardware were left for Dudayev. In this respect many officers are convinced that the absurd demarche had been specially planned precisely with the purpose of leaving the arsenals on the territory of a republic clearly hostile to Russia.

On 31 May 1992 Chechnya's civil defense chief, Colonel Isa Vagapov (by the way, a former regiment commander in the Grozny division), delivered an ultimatum to Major General Sokolov: Russian servicemen must leave Chechnya within 24 hours. Lieutenant General Ivan Strogov, deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, attempted to negotiate with Dudayev, but to no avail.

Thus, in the first days of June 1992 the last officers of the Grozny garrison left Chechnya. The fate of most of them was unenviable: After the division was disbanded they were assigned to different places, most of them to dead-end assignments—without apartments, position, or prospects. From the protocols compiled by Major General Petr Sokolov during the division's disbandment we also know the precise quantity of armaments, ammunition, and military hardware left as a gift to Dudayev.

It was not that difficult even then, in 1992, to foresee the current development of events. Especially considering

that decisions at the time were made by the same people who now with enviable resolve have jumped to correct their own mistakes.

On the evening of 12 January Minister of Defense Grachev arrived in Rostov. The purpose of his brief and completely unpublicized visit, according to sources in the North Caucasus Military District headquarters, is to look for those responsible for the military debacle of 1994-1995, as well as those responsible for the fact that in 1992 entire arsenals were left as a gift to Dudayev. Also, during Grachev's trip to Rostov a decision probably will be made on the fate of General Mityukhin, the North Caucasus Military District commander, who, as is known, has family ties with the minister of defense (the general's and the marshal's wives are sisters).

General Ochirov on 1992 Involvement

95UM0195B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Jan 95 p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Valeriy Yakov under the rubric "Who Armed Dzhokhar Dudayev?" "It Is Best To Remove a Witness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 12 January IZVESTIYA (No. 5) published the article "One Version: Armaments in Chechnya Were Plundered." It quoted some documents and named some generals who were directly involved three years ago in the Russian troops withdrawal from the territory of Chechnya. Among those mentioned was General V. Ochirov. After the publication of this material, Valeriy Nikolayevich called our editorial offices, clarified some details, and shared his opinion on the problems raised in it.

According to the general, on 3 June 1992 he was indeed sent by Minister of Defense P. Grachev to Chechnya to personally study the situation on site, discuss it with D. Dudayev, and upon returning to Moscow write a detailed report with concrete proposals. In the course of his trip V. Ochirov read the already-existing documents on the state of Russian units in Chechnya and gathered that by that time "80 percent of the vehicles and 75 percent of the firearms had already been stolen."

Not fully relying on the written word, the general, as he told us, on arriving at the Grozny garrison personally inspected all the compartments and storage facilities, checking the remaining vehicle inventory. But even what was left at the garrison was completely blocked by the Chechens. More than 30 fire engines filled with high-octane B-95 gasoline surrounded the military bases. The crews of these trucks were issued flare pistols and told on behalf of Dudayev: If the Russian military attempts to take the vehicles out, pour gasoline from the fire engines on them and ignite it.

Garrison commander General Sokoiov (not Sorokin, as was erroneously mentioned in the previous material) and General Strogov, the district's first deputy commander who also was there, drew Ochirov's attention especially

to the blockade conditions "Do you want this place to turn into a Brest Fortress?" they asked the Moscow inspector "Then set such a task for us, and we will all die here like in the fortress. But first answer this question: Who needs this?"

The same day, Valeriy Ochirov met with the president of Chechnya. General Dudayev told him: "The armaments and vehicles were squandered by your own warrant officers and officers—some sold, some bartered... But according to our agreement (signed at the end of May by Dudayev and by Strogov on behalf of Grachev) you are to leave me 50 percent."

Having learned all this, Ochirov stated in his report to Grachev that Chechnya is proceeding full speed with the formation of its own armed forces, drawing, among other things, on the Russian garrison. For instance, the Shakiyskiy regiment, manned with Chechen first-year draftees, was already practically fully under Dudayev's command. At the same time, there were 28 armed formations operating in the republic, equipped with armored vehicles and artillery, systems and without a unified command. All D. Dudayev's orders to disarm—and at the time he still tried to do something—were ignored by them.

During the meeting with V. Ochirov, General Dudayev also asked that Russian troops be withdrawn as speedily as possible, accusing the division's officers and leadership of provocations and creating instability in the region.

Taking into account this whole situation and describing it in his report, General Ochirov proposed: "...I believe it expedient to withdraw the Grozny garrison personnel to the territory of the Russian Federation, in keeping with the signed agreement. Dudayev undertakes an obligation to deliver 50 percent of the remaining vehicles, munitions, and property to the North Caucasus Military District command after the withdrawal." A week later—on 11 June 1992—Grachev attached a resolution to the report: "Agreed."

After that, the withdrawal and transfer of armaments began—at least of the firearms, because the automobiles and armored vehicles were blocked and in the final analysis seized. But soon the Chechens also blocked the take-off strip, preventing firearms being taken out by air as well. So we had to settle for just getting the people out.

The national leadership was fully informed of all this, but at the time emphasized most of all the need to get the people out. The public also was well aware of the situation, since the press regularly reported on all incidents surrounding the Grozny garrison. And all these events were no longer perceived by anyone as extraordinary, because similar things were happening at the time in different corners of what had recently been the Union.

More strange, according to Valeriy Ochirov, is the current desire of the authorities to have a specially created

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commission examine all circumstances of the withdrawal of the Grozny garrison and the reasons for the transfer of weapons to Dudayev. The commission's work would have no serious meaning—not least because many participants in those events are no longer in military service, and it will be totally impossible to establish individual facts and details of the time. Accordingly, the obvious conclusion that comes to mind regarding the reasons for creating such a commission: In General Ochirov's opinion it was created in order to distract the public's attention from a more topical question: Who was arming Dudayev's opposition last fall and on the basis of what laws.

Questions also arise about other little-known deeds connected with Chechnya, which many probably would rather not bring up now. For instance, Valeriy Nikolayevich related some rather interesting facts Dzhokhar Dudayev told him during their last meeting. It took place at the end of 1993 on the eve of President Yeltsin's visit to Ossetia. Dudayev was discussing with Ochirov the possibility of negotiations with the Russian leadership and suddenly said: "I think war between us is nevertheless inevitable," and explained: "Do you know that a special air route runs through Grozny to Turkey, the Arab Emirates, Jordan, and other countries? We do not have customs or border control; the airport officially is not listed as an international airport, but airplanes flying to and from Russia make a stopover here. Who boards them here, who deplanes, what they are carrying—nobody knows. And only after that, as if nothing had happened, do they land at Sheremetyevo or another international airport, where the remaining passengers go through normal legal formalities. It means that somebody needed such a route very much if over a period of three years nobody in Russia seemed to notice, although this is practically impossible without cover from the highest level. Especially considering that these were officially flying aircraft, bearing Russian markings, with all the necessary permits and route approvals, from which only one small detail was missing—a stopover in Grozny."

In addition, Dudayev cited the example of train robberies on the territory of Chechnya. According to his information, over a period of two years gangs robbed trains following clear directions from Russia. As a rule, of the entire train they took only two or three railcars carrying the most valuable cargo. And only during the third year, intoxicated by impunity, did they begin to clean out entire trains. "All this cannot go on forever," Dudayev told Ochirov. "The time will come soon to cover tracks and eliminate witnesses, and that is why Moscow, to which all the trails lead, will not leave us alone. They will blame everything on me."

These examples cited by Dudayev do fall within the general line of unpublicized but obvious interests many circles have in oil and transportation routes going through Chechnya.

For some reason, neither are questions being raised today as to how much weaponry had been coming to Chechnya over the past years and through which channels, although these channels were operating practically continually. Valeriy Ochirov recalled how in the summer of 1993 in the airport near Vladikavkaz he detained two helicopters that suddenly arrived from Abkhazia. One was civilian, and the other belonged to the North Caucasus Military District. One helicopter contained a 1.5-tonne air defense system, and another—a set of extra tubes for it. As soon as they attempted to confiscate this weapon, Galazov and the Ossetian leadership jumped into the fray, and they had to look the other way on the arms smuggling. Thus, the channel from Abkhazia, which Russia actively supplied with weapons, was operating reliably.

During that fairly recent time these and many other analogous operations were no secret to the Russian special services, military leaders, and the national leadership. However, they too in some strange manner seemed not to notice what was going on and did not take any perceptible steps to prevent these operations or create a commission to follow the trail while it was hot. All sorts of conclusions may come to mind regarding the causes for such passivity. Including this: Either the Russian side during that period of endless reorganizations and internal struggle for power indeed had its hands too full to pay attention to individual schemes unfolding on the outskirts of the state, which is not very likely, or these dealings were conducted with Moscow's tacit consent and not without secret participation in them on the part of high-ranking Kremlin schemers.

RF Government Appeal to Illegal Armed Formations

95UM0203A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jan p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Government of Russia Has Asked the Chechen Fighters To Show Reason and Lay Down Their Arms"; "Appeal to the Participants of the Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to prevent further bloodshed and ensure conditions for moving the settlement in the Chechen Republic to a peaceful channel, the Government of the Russian Federation, at the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation, is proposing to the participants of the illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic:

That they cease fire starting at 0800 hours on January 10 to 0800 hours on January 12, 1995, leave their positions and combat equipment, lay down their arms, and return persons taken prisoner during the armed confrontations.

The Government of the Russian Federation guarantees free passage of participants of the illegal armed formations who voluntarily lay down their weapons to their

places of permanent residence, and their return to peaceful labor and absolute compliance with the decree of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of December 13, 1994 No 386-1-GD "On the Declaration of Amnesty With Respect to Persons Who Have Participated in the Illegal Deeds Associated with the Armed Conflicts in the Northern Caucasus."

The Government of the Russian Federation expresses the hope that the participants of in the illegal armed formations will show reason and will comply with its proposals for the sake of restoring peace and tranquility in the Chechen Republic.

The Government of the Russian Federation has given the necessary instructions to the command of the federal troops to cease fire within these deadlines, and also to ensure the procedures to implement the proposals put forward in this Appeal.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

City of Moscow
January 9, 1995

Gromov on Disagreements Over Chechen War

95UM0208A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 1, 8-15 Jan 95 pp 1, 5

[Interview especially for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI with Colonel-General Boris Gromov, deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI military observer Aleksandr Zhilin; place and date not given: "Boris Gromov: 'The Operation Was Prepared in Profound Secrecy....'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zhilin] Since 26 November, you have sharply opposed a power solution of the Chechen problem. But why did you not state your protest before the start of the military operation?

[Gromov] The operation was prepared in profound secrecy, and I simply knew nothing about it.

[Zhilin] You mean that the Ministry of Defense Military Collegium had not discussed a plan for the use of troops in the Caucasus?

[Gromov] In the past two years, the activity of the Military Collegium has assumed a formal nature. Critical decisions affecting the fate of the country have increasingly been adopted by a limited group of officials. And the more serious the mission, the smaller the group of these persons. The Military Collegium was essentially sidelined from discussion of the problems connected with the START II Treaty, the Partnership for Peace program, and other documents that are very important for the Ministry of Defense. The decision to employ troops in Chechnya was also adopted in secret and was not considered by the Collegium.

I would like to emphasize that I am not opposed to order being brought to bear in Chechnya and in the country generally, but to methods that are incompatible with the concepts of "constitutional order" and "democracy."

[Zhilin] Observers note that the Army has displayed very low professional proficiency in Chechnya....

[Gromov] The Army should not be performing police or gendarme functions—this is not its "profession." Whence the deplorable results. Attempts have been made repeatedly in our history to employ it for power pressure on the "unruly"—it is sufficient to name Novocherkassk, Vilnius.... But it has never used against its own people the entire arsenal of combat weapons intended for a full-scale war. In addition, the Army's intervention in domestic political showdowns has not once produced positive results; it has only intensified the crisis.

[Zhilin] How would you evaluate the strategy and tactics of the Armed Forces in the Chechen operation?

[Gromov] There is nothing to evaluate in this case, inasmuch as neither strategy nor tactics are observed. The Afghan experience should have taught us something, it might have seemed. Specifically, if only the fact that when a decision on military operations is being made, it is essential to take account of all local singularities: historical, national, religious, geographical, meteorological, and so forth. Nothing of the sort was done. The decision was adopted spontaneously, by all accounts. The troops taking part in the combat operations had not been prepared for this either morally or physically or professionally. The Armed Forces are not today distinguished by a high degree of training of the personnel, and they lack a sufficient quantity of equipment that is in good working order and combat-ready, communication and control facilities, technical and rear support, and so forth. All this condemned the military campaign in Chechnya in advance to big casualties on both sides.

[Zhilin] You are contradicting the official evaluations of the minister of defense, announcements of the government press center....

[Gromov] Disinformation is an indispensable attribute of war. But in our case it is being directed not against the "enemy" but exclusively against our own people. Overseas television companies are showing the nature of the war without cuts. Compare the destruction of the cities of Argun and Grozny with the consequences of the strikes against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, and you will understand everything.

[Zhilin] Is the use of salvo-fire missile launchers and the intensive bombing of localities justified from the viewpoint of operational efficiency?

[Gromov] From the viewpoint of operational efficiency you may justify whatever you like, the use of nuclear weapons included. If you proceed from the condition

that victory must be achieved at the price of the destruction of each and everything. It is this condition that is operative in Chechnya, it would seem. A barbaric choice of means of combat is a sign of the uncivilized nature of an Army.

[Zhilin] Have you attempted to offer your plan of a solution of the crisis?

[Gromov] I reported my considerations to the minister of defense. I believe that it is essential for a start to halt the combat operations immediately. If only to assess what line we have reached, what we have achieved, and what we have lost. And, most important, to understand, finally, what lies ahead for us. No one has yet formulated the strategic goal. Voices are being heard: As soon as the irregulars take to the mountains, we will finish them off there. This is either an illusion or a deliberate lie. It is sufficient to recall how many victories we won in the mountains of Afghanistan. It will be the same in Chechnya also....

I see no solution involving violence. However difficult and offensive to both parties, it is essential to sit down at the negotiating table, because there are no winners in a civil war, only losers.

[Zhilin] The minister of defense does not share your viewpoint, it would seem.

[Gromov] I sincerely do not understand what is happening. Pavel Grachev has himself acknowledged repeatedly that he chose for himself deputies from the ranks of those with whom he fought in Afghanistan. There should be no misunderstandings in our team, it would seem. I, at least, have tried to do everything possible to help Grachev become firmly established in the position of minister of defense. Nonetheless, some distrust of his deputies began in time to arise on his part. I suppose that the minister's attitude toward me personally changed after I did not take part in the events of October 1993. I was pursuing no political goals; I did this exclusively from moral considerations. But subsequently, this decision of mine was presented to the country's leaders from a political viewpoint.

[Zhilin] What is behind the minister of defense's decision to downsize the offices of three of his deputies?

[Gromov] An endeavor to rid himself of people to whom he objects, I believe. Inasmuch as simultaneously removing three deputies just like that is difficult, an excuse was thought up: reform of the ministry's managerial staff.

[Zhilin] Have any complaints been made to you?

[Gromov] There was a telephone conversation, in which Grachev set forth his complaints about me. The first concerned my interview in connection with the events in Chechnya on 26 November, in which I spoke against a power solution of the conflict, and also my appeal to Dudayev requesting the release of our prisoners. The minister did not like this.

The second reproach was connected with my condolences in connection with the death of Dmitriy Kholodov. I was told that I had in this way caused the minister moral damage.

The third was due to my presence at a charity hockey match in honor of servicemen who fell in Afghanistan, at which I was asked to perform a symbolic dropping of the puck. Our superstars Fetisov, Bure, and Mogilnyy took part in this game. I was charged with links with "traitors to Army sport" and with discrediting the Army, as it were.

The fourth complaint concerns my close friendship with a person whom Grachev himself has recently ceased to consider his friend. To this I replied that I choose my friends without regard to the opinion of the minister....

[Zhilin] If you are, for all that, deprived of office "for links with traitors to Army sport," what will you do?

[Gromov] I shall not leave the Army, in which I have served since the age of 12, when I became a student of the Suvorov Military School.

Critique of Early Botched Tank Attack on Grozny

95UM0199A Moscow SLUZHBA in Russian
20 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by journalist Konstantin Merezko under rubric "How It Began": "Caucasian Prisoners, or Pawns Are in the Hands of Amateurs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In publishing this article by a correspondent who specializes in "hot spots," we wish to stipulate that this is the opinion specifically of this journalist and we by no means wish to pass it off as the absolute truth. He saw and keenly felt the situation in his own way, and someone has all grounds to assert that this opinion is erroneous. In any case, we will figure that the goal of publishing it has been achieved if our readers continue the conversation, desirably from professional positions.*

A great deal already has been written about the underlying political reasons for the capture of our servicemen in Grozny: who is guilty, what goals were pursued, to whom is it advantageous and so on. These and other questions absolutely deserve the attention both of the press and the public. Possibly an appropriate state commission will publish answers to them at some time. By the way, there is nothing surprising if it does not publish them. But considering the vector of our newspaper's interests, it would be interesting for it to focus its attention on certain strictly military aspects of the "Chechen scandal."

For some reason it seems to me that the tank assault on the city of Grozny on 26 November 1994 will not go down in the history of military art. But I would very

much like to learn the names of the staff geniuses who developed such a brilliant military operation.

I will not be surprised if it is learned that the operation was prepared exclusively by efforts of opposition military specialists. In the final account it is even somehow terrifying to imagine that "professionals" of such a level can be sitting on the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. But you know, on that morning it was also for the most part professionals who were sitting in the T-72 armor. Where were they looking?

Here is what the State Duma deputies were told by Major Valeriy Ivanov, senior in rank out of the entire group of prisoners. He is a deputy company commander for work with personnel at the Vystrel Officer Courses. "The Federal Counterintelligence Service representative with whom I signed a contract for participating in this operation assured me that everything had been worked out on the General Staff and in the Federal Counterintelligence Service. Before the tanks enter the city, Army special forces would be at work there and helicopters would provide fire support from the air. Infantry would be attached to the tanks." That is, everything was more or less according to the rules. In words. In fact, everything turned out precisely the reverse: there were neither special forces nor helicopters; the infantry scattered "to their own affairs" in the very first minutes and the tanks blindly poked along unfamiliar streets and hung around squares in expectation of at least the slightest intelligible command from a certain "Orion." Three hours later Dudayev's guardsmen, who had come to their senses, began placing heavy, almost point-blank fire on them. They practically did not hide themselves after quickly catching on that the tank machineguns were silent. And the tankers could not respond with machinegun fire for the simple reason that the machineguns were not loaded; they had not even taken ammunition. Lieutenant Dmitriy Volfovich in particular attests to this.

The situation of the column that met an attack on approaches to the city also did not prove to be the best. Prior to the march itself crew commanders received an order to paint tank turrets white, allegedly so aircraft would not begin working against their own in error. But in fact everything turned out the other way around—Dudayev's artillerymen, who met the tanks in the field on one of the axes, mentally thanked the authors of the idea, inasmuch as, in the words of the chief of Dudayev's personal bodyguard, firing against "white caps" against a gray background was like "firing in a shooting gallery; only a blind person would miss."

Options for withdrawal and for falling back to previously prepared positions had not been thought out. Without guides from among local residents, the crews found themselves entrapped in courtyards and dead-ends. Practically all tankers who were captured spoke about the disgusting communications, which essentially was absent. Under these conditions the only lucky ones were those who had not "crawled" too far into the city.

Well, just who directed the operation? A military specialist, a professional, or one of the "civilian generals" whose numbers have multiplied of late, and not just in the North Caucasus? A "general" who relied exclusively on his own political flair, which suggested to him that "the tanks only have to enter the city and Dudayev's personnel will flee and the people will come out to us with flowers." Those were the very words with which "Federal Counterintelligence Service representatives" saw off volunteers back in native Podmoskovye.

And in this situation the main question arises: How could it so happen that Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen ended up at the disposal of amateurs, to put it mildly? Amateurs, even if they were wearing general's shoulderboards. Inasmuch as, in addition to all else, it occurred to no one to run a preliminary simulation of the city-dwellers' reaction to the invasion and the behavior of the so-called infantry, composed primarily of poorly trained reservists from the rural area. We entered Afghanistan at one time, and reliable knowledge about this country and this people came to us at a dear price. It seems the Afghan lesson was not learned by all our "specialists."

It is no discovery to anyone that a state resorts to methods from the arsenal of special services for the sake of protecting its constitutional foundations, territorial integrity and national security. That occurs in any country. And there is no cause for hysterics and demagogic philippics about human rights and other democratic values. But such delicate missions are performed by chosen professionals of an extra class. In our case you do not know what to think, everything was done so clumsily and unskillfully.

We will not stir up the "hive" of questions concerning present national policy in Russia. There is not a question here that does not sting painfully, and right on the mark. But the approach to resolving the "Chechen problem" does not stand up to any criticism. With this approach such a miserable involvement of the Army in the Chechen-Russian conflict probably was inevitable. A defect in policy ended up as a drama for real people in shoulderboards, people who swore to serve the state and who completely believed in their president and government and in their commanders.

And so it turns out that just as the military person was unprotected against improvisations of politicians, so he is unprotected to this day. At the deciding moment no law was found which would block the path of an obscure "Federal Counterintelligence Service representative" (let alone a hirer from the opposition) to Major Ivanov and his present comrades in misfortune. No special barriers were found: an office was assigned to the "representative" on the unit grounds, leave papers were formalized, and commanders delicately did not ask superfluous questions such as "Where are you taking my subordinates?" It is good only that some later turned in their resignations after the fact, but still after evaluating

all the baseness of the situation. But just as there were no guarantees that such a thing would no longer be repeated, so there are none now.

Meanwhile, it is not a question about very much: to ensure that a military person is protected by law against the whim of politicians and amateurs, that professionals are commanded only by professionals, that a state, in sending its son off to very remote places, later does not disavow him. Not under any circumstances.

MVD Role in Chechnya as Military Action 'Win's Down'

MM2501102395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jan 95 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Stanislav Kavun, deputy commander of Russian Federation MVD Internal Troops, by Sergey Knyazkov; place and date not given: "This 'Hot Spot' Is Hottest of All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Knyazkov] The Russian Federation President recently informed Russia's citizens and the world community that the military stage of restoring the operation of the country's constitution in the Chechen Republic is practically over. In this connection, Stanislav Fedorovich, what tasks now face the Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops?

[Kavun] As is known, fighting in downtown Grozny has ended, but the gunmen's resistance is far from broken. Detachments of Dudayev's supporters have taken to the mountains, and exchanges of fire also break out from time to time in Grozny itself. This means that the task of disarming all the illegal armed formations, including the separate groups of gunmen operating in the rear of our troops, remains the Internal Troops' most important task. In addition, the Internal Troops have been entrusted with guarding important life-support installations in Chechnya and escorting humanitarian aid columns. In individual rayons and population centers servicemen have started maintaining public order by patrolling. Our forces deployed a bakery 19 January.

[Knyazkov] The Internal Troops have rich experience of operating in "hot spots." Is it applicable to the situation in Chechnya?

[Kavun] Many of our officers have not only been to "hot spots" on the territory of the former USSR but also fought in Afghanistan. So, they believe that the fighting in Grozny has surpassed everything they encountered earlier in terms of intensity and fierceness. The illegal armed formations' concentrated use of artillery, salvo fire systems, and armored hardware attests that the Internal Troops would hardly have coped on their own with the task of disarming gunmen and mercenaries by means, without the assistance of the Defense Ministry's troops.

In peacetime each Internal Troop unit has its own strictly defined purpose unconnected with conducting

combat operations against a force equipped with heavy arms. Therefore the Internal Troops together with fighters of the OMON [Special-Purpose Militia Detachment] and the SOBR [Rapid Deployment Unit], located behind the combat formations of the Defense Ministry troops, waged a struggle against gunmen and professional mercenaries sheltering in basements and apartment blocks and percolating to the rear of our troops. But anything can happen in combat, and it repeatedly happened that Internal Troop servicemen had to operate in the front line.

[Knyazkov] How is cooperation with Defense Ministry subunits carried on?

[Kavun] Our envoys [napravlentys] are permanently at the staff of the North Caucasus Military District, so the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Russian Federation MVD Internal Troops always knows which tasks the Ministry of Defense is tackling. In addition, the command post of our units and subunits is located alongside that of the Army corps, so it was repeatedly the case that Defense Ministry artillery and aircraft were employed at the request of, and in the interests of, our troops.

[Knyazkov] Some publications declare that this is a war without exploits or heroes....

[Kavun] In my opinion, there is no armed conflict that does not produce genuine examples of courage and heroism. Your newspaper has already written about the exploit of Hero of the Russian Federation Private Yevgeniy Ostroukhov, an Internal Troop serviceman. Here are a number of other examples. Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Alekseyevich Ye..., though shell-shocked and injured, continued to direct combat operations. Ensign Aleksandr Anatolyevich Sh... received two injuries, one after the other, but still refused point-blank to go to the rear and he is continuing to command a platoon.

To date over 500 Internal Troop servicemen have received state awards for fulfilling official combat tasks on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

[Knyazkov] What is your attitude to the Russian press and television coverage of the combat operations in Chechnya? What are fighters and officers reading now?

[Kavun] The troops receive KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, SLUZHBA, and SHCHIT I MECH. Unfortunately, many Russian press publications cause bewilderment here, in Chechnya. IZVESTIYA, for instance, published an unchecked list of our servicemen held captive near Khasavyurt. Some of them had already been released. Can you imagine what pain such publications cause in the hearts of soldiers' and officers' near ones and dear ones? In general, you get the impression that many journalists are simply up in arms against our Army, against their own state....

[Knyazkov] How are medical support for the injured and the removal of the dead organized?

[Kavun] A joint medical center has been set up, based on the Central Hospital of the Internal Troops in Mozdok. Working there are such professionals at their trade as Medical Service Colonel Oleg K harkovyy, who has been to all the "hot spots" on the territory of the former USSR; Medical Service Lt. Col. Boris Vasyuk; and Medical Service Major Vadim Matsarskiy. Defense Ministry servicemen, women, and even gunmen are also taken to the medical center. They are all given medical first aid, and then the fate of each one is decided individually. If an injury is serious and further operations are required, injured people enter the field hospital which the Burdenko Main Military Hospital has deployed nearby.

Chechnya Displaying Soldiers 'Best Qualities'

MM2401165395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Belichenko: "The Russian Soldier. He Is Also Displaying His Best Qualities in Today's Drama"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Footage of a Chechnya shooting, burning, and sinking in the mud churned up by caterpillar tracks and in political strife are appearing daily on the television screens of the country and the world. Demonstrating an "objectivity" that is incomprehensible to the heart and mind, television journalists are showing the combat actions in Chechnya as a kind of tragic game of chess—from both warring sides at the same time. Voluntary or involuntary sympathies toward the participants in this "game" are showing through, however. Compare the cheerful faces of Dudayev's gunmen, full of energy, during the first few days of the combat actions with the confused, leaden faces of the Russian officers and men, and the bodies of those who have been killed and burned, lying in the streets and squares of the Chechen capital. Add to this the hasty comments about how the federal authorities and generals have apparently thrown untrained first-year soldiers into the attack on Grozny, putting them in armored vehicles under the murderous fire of the "volunteers." We are obsessively being shown a weak, inefficient, untrained army, as if it were no longer our own common army but some foreign one, by creating at the same time the picture of a weak, helpless, dead Russian soldier....

Is this the same army which was used to intimidate us, which we were frightened of for so many years?!—some Western commentators are exclaiming emotionally. We have not had an army for ages, Russian democratic voices echo them from the newspaper pages; there is only an armed, badly trained mass of people.

Is it not a bit too early to bury the Russian Army, gentlemen?!

"Our intelligentsia is demanding so much from the Army, but what is it giving in return?! Contempt, indifference, and—let us be truthful—sometimes even hostility.... Where can love and respect for the Army come

from when there is no cognition of it?" These words, which were spoken by M.S. Galkin, a military theoretician at the beginning of the century, seem to have been written today—everything is being repeated and everything is coinciding. Perhaps the subtly expressed complaints made by Galkin should now be replaced by tougher and stronger words.

Yes, the Russian Army is engaged in heavy fighting. Those who underestimated the strength and perfidy of Dudayev's men have turned out to be wrong. Yes, much now has to be done in a way different from that propounded by the military classics, and much now has to be learned in combat. Specialists will find far more strictly military aspects of the problem, which we should reflect on and which should be borne in mind during the training of troops in the future. Yet there is another side to the question—and it should be addressed to the public and to the politicians.

For instance, how can you engage an army but put restrictions on the use of weapons? An army cannot and should not be flexible or "delicate," it exists for the purposes of war, it is an army. How can you consider well-trained and well-armed gunmen and mercenaries to be a sort of home guard?

There is no doubt that the Russian Army's actions in Chechnya have brought to light its many problems. But where do they come from?

Is the Army poorly manned, and is it sending first-year soldiers to Chechnya?

I'm sorry, but how can it be well manned if draft dodging has become normal practice for today's replete city youth, and the law-enforcement organs turn a blind eye to this with the full approval of a child-loving "democratically minded" public.

Boots with holes in them? Obsolete armored equipment? Officers lacking confidence?

And what about the Army budget, dear legislators? Is it possible that you do not know that the Army is barely making ends meet, that the life of an officer sometimes resembles the life of a refugee—when he and his family take shelter for years in a cold barracks-like building, when he regards being paid on time as a piece of good fortune, and he has virtually no hope of obtaining a normal, decent apartment. And has anyone thought about what will happen to his family if, God forbid, an officer who is the breadwinner is maimed or killed? It is naive to think that this misfortune could be compensated for by insurance.

And that is not all. The Army went into Chechnya not because it felt like it but because it received an order from the country's top leader. An order! This concept is sacred for the Army. But the responsibility for the order given should be equally sacred. Both legal and moral responsibility. The latter consists in supporting the actions of the Army by force of public opinion in every

possible way. But what is public opinion like in our country? Politicians at all levels will never agree among themselves in their assessments of the Chechen events, while the mass media, removing responsibility from "their own" politicians, are transferring it onto the shoulders of the Army.

That is all true. But let us cast at least a cursory look at our history. Russia has fought many wars, it has many glorious victories in its history, but these wars have never been show-wars, or the victories show-victories, American style. Although I do make the reservation that I am speaking very, very conditionally about the American show-victories. But that is a separate subject. The wars in which Russia has gotten involved started in a difficult situation, as a rule, often with defeats and losses. Any war would immediately expose critical military and social problems and would subsequently have a cardinal effect on their solution. God knows whether it will ever be possible to break with this Russian tradition, which is not of the best. Let sociologists and historians judge the reason for it. But it is hard to deny that, historically, such a tradition exists.

But despite all of these problems, the Russian Army always had one indisputable advantage over any other army, which made it invincible in the end. This advantage was the Russian soldier. The armies and commanders defeated by him always found him to be an enigma. This enigma was in his courage, fearlessness, steadfastness, and his ability to withstand any hardship of war, in his ability to learn to fight, increasing this skill from one battle to the next.

Do you remember the sullen, sometimes confused soldiers' faces on the television screens at the end of last year and the beginning of this year? Yet could they have looked any different then? There are no combat skills and few training skills. The mass media are in an anti-Army frame of mind and are trying to instill in the soldiers the idea that they are fighting against their own people. People understand what defending the fatherland is—at the level of the heart, at least—but it is by no means clear to everyone what it means to defend the Constitution. A soldier cannot shoot at civilians, but what is he supposed to do when people are shooting at him, using civilians as a cover? How can a young, inexperienced boy not lose his head?

But the days are going by, and everyday military life teaches the soldier its cruel lessons. Armored vehicles burn. Comrades die. The soldier fights increasingly skillfully and carefully, the commanders lead the fighting more and more effectively. In place of yesterday's timidity, that special combat zeal which is called a growing feeling of one's military worth enters the soul. In some cases it is even transformed into fearlessness. For several days paratroopers surrounded in the ruins of a station fight to the bitter end and maintain their line despite everything. To avoid being captured the crew of an infantry fighting vehicle being pressed from both

sides on a bridge across the Sunzha River launch their vehicle into the river from a height of three meters into the river and swim out to rejoin their own men. Lists of awards for the living and the fallen relate how the soldiers sacrifice themselves saving their comrades, how they provide cover for their commanders in battle, and how, summoning up frontline alertness as if from nowhere, they confidently withstand combat with a numerically superior foe. Examples of such courage and self-sacrifice are our own purely Russian characteristics unknown to the soldiers of many other armies. So, from where did young boys who until recently had a nihilistic view of the world and amused themselves with videos and rock music acquire such stern masculine qualities? From the same place as their great-grandfathers, grandfathers, and fathers did—from Russia. Even in today's contradictory conditions a Russian soldier is still a Russian soldier.

Look at the soldiers' faces today on the television screen. They are completely different people from what they were two weeks ago. They are fighters. Listen to what they are saying into the microphones of the television journalists and how they say it—these opinions are far clearer and more mature than the speeches of certain politicians. And no matter how historians and politicians in the future assess today's events in Chechnya, the Russian soldier is increasingly clearly showing in these events that he is still the great Russian soldier today, no worse than his illustrious forefathers.

And if the Russian soldier is alive and well, this means that our Russian Army is alive and well.

Role of Special Services in Chechnya

95UM0204C Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 10 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Feliks Babitskiy: "Have Dudayev's Fighters Outplayed the Professional Special Services?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chief of the Center for Public Relations of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], Aleksandr Mikhaylov and retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin talk about the role of the special services in the Chechen conflict. They were asked the same questions.

When the Amin regime in Afghanistan was overthrown, first the special KGB subunits captured the Afghani leaders, and then the troops went in, so that the victory was won with "little blood." Why wasn't the same tested tactic used in Grozny?

A.M. That's a question that should be asked of those who have such special subunits today. We have been stripped of them. We got rid of "Alfa" back in 1991—it went to the Main Directorate of Security. Then in September 93, "Vypel" was also transferred to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. From the professional standpoint, this was an insult and the soldiers began to get discharged singly and sometimes in groups and went over to security

services for large companies. In light of the new trends, many are happy that it was possible to destroy the powerful machinery of the former KGB. However, events have demanded their restoration. In September of last year, the order came out to form an FSK combat subunit to fight terrorists. Thank God, the former commander of "Vypel" became its chief, and others who had served with him previously also joined. However, in order to truly become a combat detachment, the new subunit will have to train for a long time. We are starting from zero, after all.

O.K. The FSK has no special subunits at all—that's the truth. And in general, we are not doing well with professionalism. Our losses in Grozny prove once again the low combat effectiveness of the army, and the need for immediate creation of quick-deployment forces

Dudayev's special services have been very successful in the conflict. We know of cases when the families of officers sent to the Caucasus have been phoned at home with threats by unknown persons. So it appears Dudayev's fighters have outplayed our professional special services.

A.M. Well, you don't need a diploma from intelligence school to accomplish that. You only have to intercept one army postman to learn the addresses and names of officer wives. And with that data, anyone can learn the home telephone number. I know that journalists also do such things. The secret of success of Dudayev's special services does not lie in their professionalism (incidentally, hardly any of our former colleagues are there, only militia), but in the fact that they know what they want, and they are not impeded. That can certainly not be said of us. You see, if Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation, there should be a territorial directorate of the FSK there. But it was eliminated three years ago, and in its place Dudayev created his own security department, operating against us as if we were the special service of a hostile state. A new FSK directorate for Chechnya has been formed only now, already in the course of combat actions. So it turns out that the counterintelligence service now, all of a sudden and on an emergency basis, is forced to perform purely intelligence functions, for which we naturally are not prepared owing to the specifics of our work.

O.K. Alas, Dudayev's department of security did indeed outplay the FSK. But first of all, it has a clear goal, stopping or weakening the attack on Grozny at any cost. Especially since this goal coincides with their personal desire to survive. Second, the successes of the Dudayev special service may be explained by the fact that there are many professional KGB associates remaining there, while professionals continue to leave the FSK.

Historian Argues There Will Be No 2nd Caucasian War

95UM0219A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Historian Lev Dumnov, under the rubric: "An Expert's Opinion": "There Won't Be a 'Second Caucasian War'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government troop military operation in Chechnya has caused a sharp outburst of ideological disputes. They are being conducted most ferociously and on the largest scale in Moscow. It seems that some of Moscow's mass media also have that most "strategic weapon" which Dzhokhar Dudayev mentioned.

It's interesting that not force of arguments or logic of evidence but the traditional ignorance of both the ideologues and the consumers of ideology are providing the most acute ideological "offensive against Moscow". Some journalists and politicians with that ambition are accusing the army and the country's leadership of "disregarding the lessons" of Afghanistan and the Caucasian War of the past century, as if they themselves are all Orientalists or military historians. Alas, the level of knowledge demonstrated by them does not withstand any criticism whatsoever. In order to see that, we must turn precisely to the lessons of war in the Caucasus and in Afghanistan.

The irrelevance of the hints of a "second Afghanistan" immediately become obvious. The matter is not even that Afghanistan is 33 times larger than the administrative Checheno-Ingushetiya. The essence of the problem is the fundamental distinction between the conflict in Chechnya and the Afghan war. The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was a presence in a foreign independent state. But the presence of foreign troops on foreign territory is a temporary phenomenon. The participation of Soviet troops in combat operations on Afghan territory was also temporary in nature. Afghanistan remained Afghanistan and its national, social, economic and religious specific features constantly recalled the struggle of the Mujaheddin against Soviet troops. That struggle against foreigners has been traditional for Afghanistan. What is more, the Afghans have had the experience of a successful struggle against the British.

There is a fundamentally opposite situation in Chechnya. Chechnya, just like the entire Greater Caucasus, was conquered by Russia in the 19th Century. But then again, it was not conquered as a colony. It became part of the parent state. Already in the 19th Century, the Greater Caucasus (and Chechnya as part of it) had been integrated into the enormous Russian organism. And the further development of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus in the 20th Century proceeded in the direction of all-Russian development and all-Russian problems. By 1991, Chechnya was an integral and even a privileged part of the Russian State. This was also demonstrated in Dudayev's adventure with the "independence" of Chechnya. Chechnya was not dependent on Russia for a single hour either economically, socially, or even in a cultural-information context.

The mission of the government troops in Chechnya is a continuation of Moscow's state policy that consists of the development and consolidation of the ties between

the regions to ensure the prosperity of all Russia. Accordingly, the mission of the military personnel—is to eliminate those people who stand in the path of all-Russian integration and development. Their activities correspond to the needs of the development of Chechnya itself because development is possible only within the framework of the all-Russian socioeconomic mechanism. Which, incidentally, Dudayev has proven through his "experiment" while reducing Chechnya to total ruin through isolation from Russia. And that was only partial isolation. A complete break with Russia would be a national catastrophe for the Chechens that would have a greater impact than Stalin's deportation. So, putting it mildly, it is a mistake to compare Chechnya with Afghanistan.

But even if there was a comparison with Afghanistan for a primitive designation of the threat of partisan warfare in the North Caucasus, even here the ideologues who frighten the population with the apparition of an Islamic partisan should initially begin with a glance at the map.

A large part of Afghanistan is covered with mountains that reach a significant elevation. But in Chechnya, high mountains rise only in its extreme south. The northern bank of the Terek River—this is in general steppe that turns into semi-desert. For a comparison with Afghanistan, we must note the absence in it of railroads at the same time that two main rail lines that are important for all Russia pass through Chechnya. Furthermore, Chechnya is surrounded by Russian territory on three sides and, on the fourth—is nestled against the Greater Caucasian Mountain Range beyond which lies Georgia where Russian troops are also based. Finally, Chechnya itself is Russian territory. Consequently, Russian troops will not have supply problems while conducting operations in Chechnya like those that they had in Afghanistan.

We must also note that the assistance of all three of Afghanistan's neighbors—China, Iran and Pakistan—and a number of other Islamic countries who supported the Mujaheddin, was "fighting" against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. But perhaps the main thing is that the United States, which provided the most modern weapons systems to the Afghan opposition, conducted the war against the Soviet Union through the hands of the Afghans. So, from this aspect, a comparison with Afghanistan is irrelevant.

It is just as irrelevant to compare the current conflict in Chechnya with the "Caucasian War" of the last century. Because in fact the process of the transition of the mountain peoples to a new level of socioeconomic development is called the "Caucasian War," only one of the aspects of which was the war of the mountain peoples against Russia. The distinctive "civil war" which occurred within the association of mountain peoples occupied a much more important place in this process. And no less blood was shed in this war than in the encounters with Russian troops. It's sufficient to recall

the destruction of the tribe of the Avarian khans by Imam Gamzat-bek. As for Shamil and his Naibs* (transliterated), they maintained their power not only through methods of persuasion but also through very brutal coercion that cost the mountain peoples rivers of blood.

For the most part, two phenomena prompted the "Caucasian War". First of all, the "raiding system", that is, the chronic war of the mountain peoples against neighbors both as a specific form of economic activity and, second, the implanting of Islamic law—the shariah and the struggle against the common law of the mountain peoples—adat [unwritten Islamic law] that developed based upon language traditions. Shamil created his imamate" using precisely that which united the mountain peoples of Dagestan and Chechnya based upon the shariah and it is the shariah that imparted the new, religious meaning to the "raiding system," having directed it against the "non-believers." Implanting the shariah among the mountain peoples took the form of a genuine class struggle when a mass of rank and file commune members led by elders and mullahs waged a war of extermination against the traditional tribal aristocracy. Shamil led this struggle. So, the "Caucasian War" was caused by the internal reasons of the development of the mountain peoples and not at all by "Russian aggression." If Iraq and Turkey had been neighbors with Dagestan and Chechnya instead of Russia, the war would have been conducted against them as the attacks of the mountain peoples fell upon them in the 18th Century.

The "Caucasian War" was terminated due to the active assistance of Russia in military, administrative, economic and cultural relations. The irreconcilable bearers of the ideology of the "Caucasian War" who did not manage to become integrated into Russia voluntarily emigrated to Turkey. Incidentally, there some of them successfully resurrected the "raiding system" which the Turkish authorities had already had the opportunity to combat.

But in Russia the "Caucasian War" was ended once and for all. Its socioeconomic ("raiding system") and ideological ("murjatism"**) bases exhausted themselves. The mountain peoples shifted to a new level of social development which totally conformed to integration into the Russian multinational social organism. Therefore, it is the mountain peoples who ultimately left Shamil. And therefore it is he, surrounded by Russian troops, who surrendered and was taken prisoner. Settled in Kaluga after a meeting with Tsar Aleksandr II and having become familiar with Russia and its technical development, Shamil assumed the position of a Russian statesman. This does not signify that he "betrayed the ideals of his youth". Nothing of the sort. Shamil simply survived the "Caucasian War"—from the beginning to the end, that is, until the logically caused integration of the Greater Caucasus into Russia.

The Osetian Historians Bliyev and Degoyev cite astonishing evidence on an assessment by Shamil of those

mountain peoples who still continued the senseless struggle against the Russian throne after him. He called these irreconcilables "a flock of rams that had been scattered to various places..." who due to "the inadequacies of their minds and a lack of common sense" "will give us trouble and give us trouble and then stop"...

But maybe the situation has changed so much at the end of the 20th Century that the revival of the imamate in the North Caucasus is possible? Will Dzhokhar Dudayev not become the new imam?

The imamate became the design of the new social system that developed among the mountain peoples of Dagestan and Chechnya based on the "raiding system" and the ideology of Murjitiism. The revival by the Dudayev regime of certain vestiges of the past and the criminal lawlessness that reigned in Chechnya has resulted in a certain restoration of the "raiding system" in its new forms. But there is not and cannot be a revival of the ideology of Murjitiism in Chechnya. Incidentally, in the 19th Century attempts by the Chechens themselves to create a Murjitiism movement on their territory were not crowned with success.

As for elements of Chechen teyps [tribal communes], with all of the habit to utilize Islamic slogans they are inclined to live not according to the shariah but according to the adat. Under these conditions, Dudayev can only call for a national struggle of the Chechens and the mountain peoples in general against the Russians which appears to be a hopeless vestige of the past. Islamic slogans are being utilized more to attract assistance from without, from the Islamic countries, than to mobilize the mountain peoples.

In other words, the conflict in Chechnya is not religious in nature. And if Dudayev declares himself to be the imam, he will not help himself with this but, on the contrary, he discredits both himself and his supporters because he will not be excused for profaning the title of imam. In this case, just who is Dudayev? This is a leader who completely blends in with traditional Chechen notions—a "bayachchi" [transliterated]. A "bayachchi" is a leader [predvoditel] of Chechens on a raid, that is, a military leader [vozhd]. Under specific conditions, "bayachchi" are capable of leading not only a detachment of one or several teyps (tribal communes) but even a large part of the Chechens. In this regard, Dzhokhar Dudayev reminds us not of Shamil, like whom he very much wants to be, but "Bayachchi" Beybulat Taymazov who led the Chechens in their struggle against the Russians in the 1820's. This coincidence is also striking: initially Beybulat Taymazov enlisted in the Russian service and held the rank of poruchik [lieutenant, pre-rev.]. Dudayev, as is well known, completed an army career and only later led the Chechens.

So, Russian government troops are not provoking a second "Caucasian War". On the contrary, such a war on part of the Greater Caucasus is possible only if the Russian government army withdraws from the North

Caucasus under pressure from an actually powerful pro-Dudayev lobby in Moscow. Then the peaceful order established by Russia at one time will collapse and Dagestani, Kabardian and Karachai "Dudayevs" will thirst for power, a war of "all against all" will begin and the mountain peoples will restore the "raiding system" on the ruins of a normal economy. And then a real imam, who will attempt to stop the "criminal revolution" and to terminate the fratricide instead of Russia, will actually appear. But he will not be able to do that while Russia itself confronts the mountain peoples.

That is what awaits the Caucasus if government troops withdraw from Chechnya according to the demands of some Moscow politicians. Everyone in the Caucasus knows that. What do these politicians want to achieve? Do they need to understand a second "Caucasian War"? In any case, a second "Caucasian War" is impossible without the political interference that is sabotaging government policy in the North Caucasus.

When they posed the question to Shamil, do the proper preconditions for Murjitiism exist in the Caucasus, he responded with the famous aphorism: "No, now the Caucasus is in Kaluga." Times have changed a lot since that time. The response that would be forthcoming to a similar question today is: Now the Caucasus is in Moscow...

Footnotes

*Naibs [transliterated]—empowered by Shamil and who carried out military-administrative rule on a definite territory. **Imamate—a form of Moslem theocracy. ***Murjite—in Islamic countries, a man who wishes to devote himself to Islam. In Russian 19th Century literature, murjitiism signified the national-liberation movement of the mountain peoples.

Press Service Statement on Latest Appeal

95UM0203B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jan 95 p 1

[Statement from Press Service of the Government of the Russian Federation]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appeal to participants of the illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic, made in the name of the Government of the Russian Federation at the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation, is one more step of good will on the part of the Russian leadership, a new attempt to bring to reason those who are defending the criminal regime of Dudayev with weapons in hand.

By the end of January 9, despite the still remaining pockets of resistance, the defeat of the forces of Dudayev has already become quite evident. The humaneness of the proposals put forward at the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation by the Government

expresses the will and the hope of progressive, democratic forces of the county, and of all Russians, particularly mothers, fathers and loved ones of those soldiers and officers of the Internal Troops of the MVD, the Ministry of Defense and Border Guards who today are doing their military duty on Chechen ground, ensuring the integrity of the Russian state.

In its Appeal, the highest leadership of the country, has proceeded from the desire to halt the bloodshed and once again try to resolve the Chechen problem peacefully.

The President and the Government, by creating the conditions and granting strong guarantees for the return of those involved in the military resistance to peaceful labor in their home locales, rightly expect a manifestation of reason and wisdom on the part of all the Chechen people.

The leadership of Russia is also counting on the common sense of the participants of the armed formations involved in the fratricidal conflict as a result of the adventurous policies of Dudayev.

Unconditional compliance with the terms proposed in the Appeal should be seen as a last chance for Dudayev and his circle, and for those who were forced to execute the criminal will of the dictator, as a reliable path toward peace on Chechen ground.

Chechnya: 18 January Chronicle of Events

95UM0222A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jan 95 p 1

[Article based upon reports from the RF Government Press Service and information agencies: "Today It Is Very Difficult for Russian Soldiers, Russians, Support Your Sons! Chechnya: A Chronicle of Events"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation remains complicated in the Chechen capital and in separate areas of Chechnya, federal troops continued operations to seize buildings and structures in the central portion of Grozny and to blockade and destroy illegal armed formations and also carried out a thorough clearing of the territories liberated from them. The Russian State Flag, which will be hoisted over the former presidential palace, has been delivered to Grozny.

A Northern Fleet naval infantry battalion, which was sent into the Chechen conflict zone from the Polar Region on January 8, participated in combat operations in Grozny during the recent days off. The Northern Fleet naval infantrymen are performing their military duties in a fitting manner. They are confirming their high combat proficiency. However, there are already casualties among them, including dead and wounded.

According to military intelligence information, the command authorities of the Dudayev armed formations consider their main mission to be preserving their forces until a spring-summer offensive. Simultaneously with this,

Dudayev guerrillas continue to offer stubborn resistance. They have created a defense disposed in depth on the Chemulga—Bamut—Arshty route where up to 1,500 guerrillas are concentrated whose formations have been reinforced by artillery and armored vehicles. A stronghold defended by 500 members of a popular, untrained volunteer military force has been organized at Achkhoy-Margan. Large formations are also operating in the area of the village of Assinovskaya and the populated area of Bamut.

Due to the lack of total control of the air border with Georgia, the possibility has not been excluded that Dudayev and his immediate entourage will depart Chechnya by air through Abkhaziya or Adzhariya to Turkey.

According to Federal Border Service data, a critical situation is developing around Russian border troops subunits on the border with Ingushetiya and Dagestan. So, on January 13, unknown individuals killed three Russian border guards who were traveling in an automobile to the village of Assinovskaya. Outrages were committed to their bodies. A concentration of up to 500 Dudayev guerrillas has been noted on the Kizlyarskiy and Khunzviskiy axes (the administrative border with Dagestan) between Grebenskaya and Shelkovskaya (Chechnya). According to available data, in the near future they intend to begin aggressive operations to support the NVF withdrawal on the southern axis through the territory of Dagestan into Azerbaijan.

Chechnya: 10 Jan Chronicle of Events

95UM0204D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 95 p 1

[Report based on reports from the Russian Federation Press Service: "Chechnya: A Chronicle of Events of Recent Days"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

- Groupings of Russian troops continue to perform their missions of splitting the armed formations in the center of the city of Grozny, blockading the roads in order to prevent the advance of fighters and to isolate them. Russian troops are maintaining blockade posts within the city limits, clearing the streets and passing through troops, conducting transport operations, and guarding bridges on the Sunzha River. They are occupying strongpoints along Lermontov and Popovich streets, and in the area of the hospital and Ordzhonikidze square. They hold the railroad station building, the depot, the building complex of the military college (the former petroleum institute), libraries, and two military camps, in which a large amount of food, small arms, ammunition equipment and weapons were captured. Six battalions of forces opposing the Dudayev regiment, under the leadership

of Gantemirov, are in a suburb of Grozny and providing patrol and guard services.

- The Internal Troops continue to blockade the village of Dolinskoye, and to perform their former functions of guarding lines of communications and escorting columns. They are conducting operational military measures to detect areas sheltering fighters and weapons storage areas.
- The Chechen command, striving to shift the center of resistance to the Russian troops from Grozny to the periphery, continues to withdraw its subunits from the capital of the Chechen Republic southward. For this purpose, they have created centers of resistance in populated areas south and southwest of the Chechen Republic. Detachments of peoples military are being organized, and youth of draft age are being recruited, including in the neighboring republics of the region. Partisan bases continue to be created in hard-to-reach mountain areas bordering Dagestan.
- Despite the outflow of bands and formations from Grozny, Dudayev's fighters continue to control several areas of the city. Armored equipment is sheltered in housing developments between buildings. According to intercepted radio transmissions, several groups of fighters have been ordered to leave Grozny and move toward the city of Argun. It was found that Dudayev and his personal guards had left Grozny in the afternoon of January 6, 1995, and were headed for the populated area of Galanchezh. Reliable data has been obtained indicating the flight from Grozny of the Minister of State Security of Chechnya, Geliskhanov. Today he is in the city of Gudermes.
- From the very start of combat actions against the illegal armed formation, around 2.5 thousand fighters have been destroyed in the Chechen Republic by units of the RF Defense Ministry, including: tanks - 26; IFVs [infantry fighting vehicles] and APCs [armored personnel carriers] - 40; artillery and mortar pieces - 63; trucks - 129; helicopters (Mi-8) - 3. In that same time, more than 150 planes have been destroyed, including Tu-134 - 6; AN-2 - 14; L-29 and L-39 - 145. More than 100 L-29 and L-39 have been damaged. Fire points and positions suppressed and destroyed - 167; prisoners captured - 108. Confiscated: small arms - 340; tanks - 9; IFVs and APCs - 27.
- The Dudayev regime continues an active publicity and propaganda campaign among the Muslim population of the Near East in order to expand assistance and support on the part of the Muslim states and organizations. However, the recruitment work of Dudayev's emissaries has brought no tangible results. For instance, a total of 60 fighters left from Jordan at the moment of the start of the conflict. In Herat (Afghanistan), several demonstrations were held in support of Dudayev, at which calls were heard for all "faithful Muslims" to join in the "holy war on the Chechen and Tajik fronts," to "create a new Afghanistan for Russia." Finally, there is information that a significant number of mercenaries have gathered in bordering areas of Azerbaijan, arriving

from Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Afghan mercenaries sent to Chechnya are crossing the border of Iran from Azerbaijan in groups.

- Subunits of railroad troops in the zone of the Chechen conflict continue their restoration work. They have been assigned the mission of restoring the railroad to Grozny. Thanks to the selfless work of the mine specialists, railway engineers, and soldiers of other specialties, as of today 102 kilometers of different kinds of track have been put in commission, and the Ishcherskaya, Alpatovo, and Naurskaya stations are operating. A train with a humanitarian cargo has arrived at the Ishcherskaya station. The railroad troops, working to clear mines and restore rail traffic, are moving in the direction of the Gudermes station.

Chechnya: Operations Renewed After Cease-fire

95UM0204E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1

[Report of the RF Press Service and information agencies: "Things Very Tough for Russian Soldiers Today. Russians, Support Your Sons!"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

- After waiting out the 48-hour cease-fire, Russian troops have renewed actions to blockade Grozny streets abutting the building of the former party oblast committee, over which "roving" military formations of Dudayev followers get to the oblast committee building, to supply the fighters there with weapons, ammunition and food. In addition, [Russian] troops are moving in reserves, and replenishing ammunition, food, fuel and other materiel. Aviation is conducting aerial reconnaissance and transporting troops and cargoes.
- Illegal armed formations continue to withdraw to the southern areas of the Chechen Republic over the routes of Achkhoy-Martan, Bamut and Shali, Serzhen-Yurt, and Vedeno.
- Gantemirov detachments opposing Dudayev continue to monitor the situation in Urus-Martan, Valerik and Gekhi. Local residents stand guard at entries to these populated areas, thus blocking the movement and deployment of armed pro-Dudayev formations there after they have left Grozny.
- The territorial immigration service has registered 1,444 persons leaving Chechnya in the last twenty-four hours. Since December 8, a total of 104,678 persons have left Chechnya and have been registered by the Federal Immigration Service of Russia. According to the data of this service, the main flow of refugees headed for Ingushetia and Dagestan, and their number is being clarified. According to unverified data, more than 130 thousand persons have left Chechnya.
- To ensure normal food supplies for the Chechen populace, food shipments have begun from various areas of Russia. In the near future, 50 thousand tonnes of grain, 1.5 thousand tonnes of butter, and more than 4 thousand tonnes of fish products will be delivered to Chechnya.

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MILITARY POLICY

Col-Gen Rodionov Criticizes Legislative, Executive Efforts on Military Reform

95UM01494 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Dec 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Col-Gen Igor Rodionov, chief of the General Staff Military Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: "We Do Not Want To Militarize Society Again: On Military Reform and Reform of the Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Who Is To Blame?

The article "Will Russia's Armed Forces Hold Out?," published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA not too long ago, was the beginning of a serious discussion on its pages of a problem truly important for the country. In this regard, I would like to express my attitude toward it, shared by scientists of the General Staff Military Academy. This is especially necessary because the military reform being conducted in the country is experiencing great difficulties, if it has not reached an impasse. As always in such cases, a question traditional for Russia arises: "Who is to blame?"

Attempts are already being made to shift all the responsibility for the state of affairs to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, guided by primitive logic in doing so: if military reform does not progress, the military is to blame for this. We do not set for ourselves the goal to protect the military leadership, which certainly bears its own share of the responsibility for the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, but for the sake of fairness, we consider it necessary to examine more thoroughly the question of who is conducting military reform in the country, what its content is, and is it identical to reform of the Armed Forces.

With What Does Reform Begin and Who Participates in It?

We are convinced that the lack of an immediate threat of war for our country today does not at all rule out the existence of a potential danger of war for it, which is hidden in the aspiration of some countries to resolve contradictions that arise and to ensure their interests are achieved by using force. From this ensues the urgent need to prepare the country to repel possible aggression, especially since this preparation takes quite a long time. The question of military reform should also be approached based on this situation.

Let us begin with the fact that any reform, including military reform, has—or at least should have—a goal of improving the state of affairs in some or other sphere of activities. Military reform—in the area of defense of the state, military policy, and military organizational development as a whole. Reform of the Armed Forces, as a

component part of military reform—in the area of creating and improving the Army, Navy, and other military formations.

Military reform concerns the country's entire defense sector and assumes the conduct of political, economic, military, social, legal, and other measures to ensure the state's readiness to protect against attack and the very protection of the population, territory, and sovereignty of Russia. It is perfectly obvious that very many of the above-mentioned measures go far beyond the functional duties of the Ministry of Defense and are the prerogative of the President and the legislative and executive power.

They are the ones, the legislative and executive power, that have the ability to reorganize the entire system of preparing the country to repel possible aggression, using all the state's resources for this. Therefore, the responsibility for conducting military reform lies with these state structures.

Goal

Reform of the Armed Forces, as a component part of military reform, is aimed primarily at bringing the Army and Navy in line with the changed nature and conditions of waging armed conflict and their successful accomplishment of their missions during the course of military operations. During its development and implementation, the military leadership bears responsibility for it, naturally being under control of the president, government, and legislative power.

After the collapse of the USSR and the fairly logical system of national defense that existed at that time, the radical change in Russia's geopolitical and military-strategic situation, the change in the state's political structure and society's economic structure, and after introduction of the market economy, conduct of military reform in the country was an objective necessity. It was required not only to create the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which will be discussed below, but also to work out a clear policy for interacting with states of the near abroad on matters of collective security and defense, guarding the borders, with respect to former Warsaw Pact allies, other states of the so-called distant abroad, the NATO military bloc that continues to exist and expand its borders, and on many other questions of a military-political nature.

It was necessary to develop a series of economic measures for ensuring the country's defense capability during peacetime and in the event of war. For it is one thing when deliveries of armament and military equipment to the troops were accomplished on a planned basis, and something completely different when not only state but also private enterprises and joint-stock companies, moreover in which foreign capital may be present, will engage in this.

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A carefully thought out military production conversion program was also required that takes into account the needs of the Armed Forces during peacetime and in the event of war.

Coordination of Efforts

A coordination of efforts of research centers in various fields of science associated with military problems, with organizing scientific research and experimental design work in the interests of defense, and with the development, production, and improvement of armament and military equipment should be conducted on other bases.

To prepare the country to repel aggression with respect to the new conditions, we should also develop a wide range of internal political, ideological, legal, and other measures supporting and regulating the activities of various bodies, organizations, and the country's population.

In particular, it should provide for organizing the activities of socio-political institutes, the mass media, and institutions of science, education, and culture associated with forming the people's so-called "defense" consciousness, fostering patriotism, and propagandizing the combat traditions of the country's Armed Forces. Let them not reproach us for attempts to militarize society again, for a systemic approach to safeguarding the country's military security is characteristic of any democratic "civilized" state of the West.

Basis of Reform

In other words, we need an integrated, multipurpose program of reorganizing the state's entire defense sector, including the Armed Forces and other troops.

Is there such a program that covers all preparation of the country for defense in a unified system? Is there an agency that directs and coordinates the multi-plan activities of many state and public structures in the area of defense? Unfortunately, no. And this is precisely what should be at the basis of military reform and constitute a special concern of legislative and executive powers.

It cannot be said that the legislative and executive powers have done nothing in the area of military organizational development. There is an attempt to place under military reform the legislative legal base it needs so much.

However, in the beginning, a general concept of military reform was not developed, the basic reference points in various spheres were not defined, and the duties and responsibilities for carrying out planned tasks were not allocated.

Weaknesses of the Security Council

By the present time, a "military package" of laws of Russia has been passed: on defense, status of servicemen,

military obligation and military service, military pensions, and certain others. But, first of all, we still do not have the most important laws on martial law, mobilization, civil defense, and territorial defense. Second, the fundamental law on defense needs to be brought in line with the Constitution and needs significant changes in a number of fundamental provisions.

In connection with the fact that organizing defense includes an extensive series of measures to be carried out not by one, but by many departments, the law on defense must clearly define the body accomplishing overall centralized planning and control of all forces and assets involved in defense.

The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, in accordance with existing laws, cannot perform such a function. They are responsible for the state and the use of the Armed Forces, that is, the Army and Navy. Other troops are outside of their jurisdiction. In essence, we do not have a Ministry of Defense, but a Ministry of the Army and Navy.

I can say that the President of the Russian Federation, who heads the Security Council, organizes, controls, and coordinates all activities for safeguarding the country's military security. But it is perfectly clear that in the existing form, the staff of the Security Council is unable to perform this task.

Who Is Defending the Country?

In this regard, a question is appropriate: What body now exists that plans and really coordinates the organization of Russia's defense? After all, in accordance with the law, in addition to strictly military measures, the organization of defense includes legal regulation in the area of defense, development of military policy, mobilization preparation of the economy, territory, and lines of communication, creation of stocks in state and mobilization reserves, and so forth.

And the organization of strictly military measures for defense of the country is regulated the same. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff only have the Armed Forces available for organizing defense. In accordance with the law, other troops may also be used for defense (Border Troops, Federal Counterintelligence Service, Railroad Troops, Government Communications Troops, Ministry of Emergency Situations).

In our opinion, large units and units of these troops not only can but must participate in the defense of the country. The order of their involvement, the time when they transfer to the subordination of the Ministry of Defense, the composition of the forces and assets being allocated, the missions to be performed, and a number of other questions, without which it is impossible to have real planning by the General Staff, must have a specific legal basis that is secured in law and in the appropriate edicts of the president and decrees of the government.

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Departmental Isolation

There is an urgent need for a clearly thought out, balanced military organization of the state. All the numerous so-called "other troops" existing besides the Armed Forces must, in our opinion, be part of a unified national defense system. Today, for questions of defense they are controlled only by edicts of the President, and every department strives to operate in an isolated manner, not in coordination with others.

Now, Internal Troops districts have appeared in addition to the earlier existing military districts and Border Troops districts. Do we need them, what caused their appearance, and how are they entered in the overall administrative and military-administrative division? Why is the numerical strength of the Internal Troops increasing so rapidly, and have they become comparable in personnel strength to the Ground Troops of the Armed Forces?

Departmental isolation is also demonstrated in the fact that the "power" ministries and departments reform their own troops without coordination with the general tasks of national defense and military organizational development. It is difficult to enter the large units and units being created by them with a different personnel strength and structure into the overall scheme of command and control of the Armed Forces when repelling aggression.

In addition, the leadership of these departments strive to "hammer out" special benefits and privileges for the personnel of subordinate military formations. As a result, the servicemen of these troops are in an incomparably better position when it comes to pay and allowances, billeting, and comfort of service than personnel of large units and units of the Armed Forces. This does not contribute to uniting all servicemen on the idea of protecting the homeland, but serves to alienate them.

The Heart of Reform

The examples cited above and many others indicate that many problems in military organizational development and in organizing the defense of the country are the result of unfinished work by the legislative and executive powers. Therefore, we should not shift all the responsibility for the course of military reform on the Ministry of Defense. We must try to find a way out in the joint work to refine legislation, make the necessary corrections to the acts and practical activities of the executive power, and also step up the work of military bodies in this area.

Let us now move to the reform of the Armed Forces, which comprises the heart of military reform. Here a question immediately arises: What kind of an army do we need? We should base the answer to this on the types of wars which the country may be forced to wage, despite the peace-oriented foreign policy it pursues. Our society is beginning to free itself of the euphoria of the start of

"perestroika" and of recent years, when certain politicians and certain circles of the intelligentsia persistently introduced into the consciousness of the people the idea that during the period of "new political thinking" all contradictions between states can be resolved by peaceful means, that no one needs us, and that no one will attack us. Reality refutes these dreams, and although wonderful, alas, they are still dreams.

Yes, we must strive to settle disputes in relations between states by peaceful means, by means of political negotiations. But many subjects of world politics have not refused to use force to achieve their interests and are spending vast resources on development of their armies and arms, on creating new weapons based on the latest scientific achievements. War is a bilateral or even multilateral process, and it may be unleashed on us in spite of our peaceful aspirations.

Therefore, determining the types of wars and the smallest scale of armed conflicts into which our country may be drawn must be the starting premise when reforming the Armed Forces.

One-Sided Situation

Today, in accordance with the adopted military doctrine, primary attention in organizational development of the Armed Forces is given to preparing them to conduct local and regional wars and small armed conflicts. In our view, this is a one-sided orientation. The Armed Forces must be ready to repel aggression of any type and scope, including to participate in a wide-scale war. The danger of such a war continues to remain, although, of course, all possible measures to prevent it must be taken.

Orientation on the readiness of the Armed Forces to prevent war and to repel aggression of any scale does not mean it is mandatory that they be maintained at a large personnel strength in peacetime.

This personnel strength, first of all, must ensure the combat-ready status of the minimum necessary number of formations and large units of various branches of the Armed Forces to deter and repel aggression; second, to ensure accumulation of the necessary reserves and their deployment in the event of war; finally, it should not be burdensome for the state.

Today, certain deputies of the State Duma and a number of journalists in the press suggest establishing a fixed personnel strength for the Armed Forces of 1 percent of the country's total population and defense spending at 5 percent of the gross national product. These figures supposedly are average for West European countries and quite acceptable for Russia.

In our opinion, such a mechanical transferring of foreign experience is impermissible. The principle of adjusting the personnel strength of the Army and Navy to set, arbitrarily established figures cannot be considered scientific.

Based on the numerous complex calculations conducted by the General Staff, taking into account the different variants of operations of the sides, one can establish the minimum necessary personnel strength, armament, and military equipment. Then the cost of maintaining the minimum necessary troops and forces is calculated.

One cannot consider the arbitrarily established figure for the 1995 draft military budget of 45 trillion rubles, which is \$15 billion at the market exchange rate, to be sufficient or well-founded.

It is clear that the expenditures for military needs planned by the draft budget are clearly insufficient and will lead to the collapse of the Armed Forces. The expenditures will have to be increased in 1995, no matter how much we would like to economize on the Army. Even if there is an avalanche reduction of the Army and Navy in the coming year, the funds specified by the draft budget will still prove to be insufficient for normal development of the remaining troops and naval forces. Significant amounts will be required for setting up those being discharged.

But the country's economic capabilities are also limited. What is the solution?

How To Reduce the Army?

Certainly, we need to reduce the Armed Forces. But it is impossible to do this in one or two years. We need a well thought out program for the coming five-year period, strictly coordinated by years with the state's economic and financial capabilities. The funds being allocated here must be distributed among the branches of the Armed Forces not according to established tradition, but taking into account the priority directions on which development of the country's defense capability will depend.

Under all circumstances, we must maintain the strategic nuclear forces in a performance-capable state, ensure purposeful development of military-space programs, and protect the country and Armed Forces against surprise strikes from aerospace.

As far as the branches of the Armed Forces are concerned, reducing their personnel strength cannot be accomplished in equal proportions. Each needs its own approach. Some will have to be reduced quite decisively. The common thing here, apparently, will be the fact that we will have to retain the necessary part of formations and large units in the event the situation suddenly worsens and it is necessary to increase the mobilization capabilities for troop deployment. All training of reserves must be put on a new basis, especially given the existence of a contract system for manning the Armed Forces, which to a certain extent limits the accumulation of trained reserves.

A Look into the Future

The overall Armed Forces structure that the country will have in the 21st century and that must be put

together already now also is in need of an in-depth scientific substantiation. Opinions are already appearing in the press about the feasibility of moving to a three-branch organization (Army, Aviation, Navy) similar to the Americans. But does this structure appropriate for our conditions, how is it better, and why must we reject our own rich military experience and tradition? Why, for example, do we have to eliminate the National Air Defense Troops as a branch of the Armed Forces with the unified system created for command and control of them?

Our territory, unlike the American territory, is surrounded by numerous air bases from which aircraft of the opposing side can fly to our borders unimpeded and make strikes against installations located at any point in Russia. Is it worthwhile to thoughtlessly copy the American experience for completely different conditions?

Or, say, it is suggested to divide the functions of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, giving the ministry administrative control and the General Staff operational control of the troops. For the sake of what should we destroy the existing system, which is not inferior and in a number of matters is superior to the structure existing in the West? After all, no one has proved and no one will prove that questions of organizing the troops and their mobilization deployment (and these are administrative questions) being accomplished by the General Staff in the closest coordination with operational-strategic planning will be accomplished better and more effectively by some administrative structures of the Ministry of Defense that are isolated from real operational command and control of the Armed Forces.

Why Do We Need a 'Civilian' Minister of Defense?

Some representatives of our intelligentsia of a pro-West orientation are again bringing up the idea of creating a civilian Ministry of Defense. What is the need for this? There is only one reason—to do it like in the United States, like in the West. Is it not time we live by our own mind? If there is doubt as to the trustworthiness of some or other leaders—remove them and put in others. But it is mandatory that we have competent people who know the job perfectly and are devoted to the homeland, and not to some party or even worse—to some personality.

The supreme bodies of state power that supervise military organizational development and the country's entire defense sphere must have in their staff people who have a deep understanding of questions of military security and in the military-political and military-strategic areas have a clear picture of the work of the military-industrial complex and the capabilities of the Armed Forces.

The General Staff Military Academy came out with a proposal to organize such training on its base back when M.S. Gorbachev was president of the USSR and has also posed this question to the present leadership of the state a number of times. But so far there has been no decision.

The only thing that it has been able to achieve is the creation of a three-month Higher Courses at the academy, where workers from a number of ministries study, often from an insignificant position level. But this is still a half-measure. We must create a special department with full-scale comprehensive study of problems of national defense.

If it seems unacceptable to someone from the "civilian" ministries to send his personnel to the General Staff Military Academy subordinate to the minister of defense, it can finally be called the Academy of Defense and Security and be subordinated to the president as supreme commander in chief and chairman of the Security Council. It is not a question of the name, but of content. This academy would instruct students who are intended for position assignments in the operational-strategic level of the Armed Forces (one department) and also for work in the Federation Council, State Duma, Security Council, presidential structures, and the government (another department). Students in the second department could be sent by the corresponding ministries from among promising workers who have given a good account of themselves and are worthy of filling supervisory positions in structures of the executive or legislative power and the military-industrial complex.

The state's supreme leadership would be given the opportunity to speak before the future leaders of the defense sphere with guidelines on military-political, economic, and other problems of national security.

The creation of such an educational institution would contribute to increasing the quality and effectiveness of work in one of the most important spheres of the state's activities.

On Question of Separating Defense Ministry, General Staff

954F0927A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 13 Jan 95 pp 1,3

[Article by Ilya Bulavinov, under rubric "Military Reform in Russia": "The Chair Is Being Prepared, and the Matter Will Not Depend on a Buonaparte"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sensational news concerning the proposed separation of the powers between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff [GSh] has evoked heated responses from the interested parties. General Staff Chief Mikhail Kolesnikov, in particular, has stated that the proposal to remove the General Staff from the system of the military department was for him a "complete surprise," but still Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president's press secretary and the future ambassador to the Vatican and the Maltese Order, has explained that no specific decisions concerning military reform, including those dealing with the General Staff, in the course of a meeting with the president on Wednesday evening "were discussed or made." However, despite the entire discordance in the upper Russian levels, it is already clear that

a certain reorganization not only of the army, but also of all the power structures and the system of their interactions among themselves and with various branches of authority is becoming practically inevitable. The situation is analyzed by KOMMERSANT-DAILY special correspondent Ilya Bulavinov.

In an Interfaks [interfax] interview, a cautious Kolesnikov stated that "this question was never previously discussed with him at any level." Apparently he was being slightly deceptive, since, after information concerning the intentions of the country's leadership to withdraw the General Staff from subordination to the Ministry of Defense leaked to the press in December 1993, Pavel Grachev for some reason accused precisely Kolesnikov of playing a game behind the scenes. And it is well known that the rumors about the possible reorganization of the General Staff circulated throughout the government for the past two years. Incidentally, keeping in mind the mechanism by which the Russian political leadership makes decisions, it cannot be precluded that, when giving assignments to his analytical services and to the apparatus of the Security Council, Boris Yeltsin did not inform the object of reorganization itself.

Recently the question of separating the powers of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff was raised at least twice. On 17 September 1991, at the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense, then General Staff Chief, General of the Army Vladimir Lobov, directly posed to Minister of Defense Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov the question of such a reform. True, he was soon released from the Armed Forces. In December 1993, military experts in the president's administration, acting in revenge for the army's October indecisiveness and the "incorrect" voting by the military on 12 December, proposed leaving the minister only his personnel, economic, and political powers, and creating in the administration a military political administration, and in the government the position of vice-premier for "power questions." But in both instances first Shaposhnikov, and then Grachev, succeeded in defending the principle of one-man command.

In the autumn of last year, when the operation in Chechnya was being prepared, it seemed for a while that Yeltsin had issued Grachev an unlimited vote of confidence for conducting the reorganizations in the Ministry of Defense that he needed and for eliminating the unsuitable generals, in exchange for which the minister was supposed to guarantee, by using the army forces, "the restoration of constitutional order" in Chechnya. But apparently Yeltsin decided, as usual, to provide himself with additional insurance, by instructing Grachev (simultaneously with the public announcement of Grachev as being the "best minister in recent decades") to develop different alternatives for restructuring the system of administering the army.

It is easy to assume that the untalented actions of the highest military command element in the Chechen campaign are only bringing closer the organizational outcome, and this definitely is not causing rapture for everyone. The response dropped by Vladimir Shumeyko concerning the decision to withdraw the General Staff immediately from the Ministry of Defense system threw into confusion even the zealous supporters of that idea. Both the employees of the Ministry of Defense central apparatus, and the General Staff officers, today speak in a single voice about the need for "painstaking work" to distribute the functions and powers, since the existing system has been operating many decades and the military do not have any experience in existing separately. In their opinion, hasty decisions will lead to an even greater disintegration in administering the Armed Forces. Concern for the "immediateness" of the reform was also expressed to a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent by an employee in the Security Council apparatus, who is specifically engaged in working out this question. Incidentally, the generals, all things considered, to the accompaniment of a chorus of similar statements are already quietly reckoning the alternatives for the future. One of the most authoritative military leaders—Vladimir Semenov, commander in chief of ground forces—in an Interfaks interview expressed the opinion that the General Staff should concentrate on questions of combat readiness, and during the period of military actions should assume the coordination of the actions of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the Armed Forces. In the general's opinion, the minister of defense should retain the responsibility for political questions, problems of the military budget, and other conceptual questions, such as the purchase of arms for the army. In the event that such a reorganization is carried out, Grachev (if he continues to have the position) should engage in unfamiliar questions. Incidentally, his influence will also be sharply reduced. That is, the minister "reigns, but does not govern." It is the General Staff that will govern. It can be assumed that this will be followed by some kind of redistribution of funds within the framework of the power structures.

It is also obvious that the military debacle in Chechnya will once again cause discussions about the creation of a professional army in Russia. Of course it cannot be precluded that some authoritative general will propose to Yeltsin his services in this arena. But the president will scarcely be delighted at the prospect of having right next to him a charismatic military leader (who can easily become a political leader). Incidentally, information about the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense can prove to be only the tip of the approaching iceberg of the reform of all the country's power structures. Their present inability to coordinate their actions in the face of the growing internal frictions and disloyalty with respect to the authorities is prompting those authorities to make decisive actions.

The idea expressed by Ivan Rybkin—the idea of creating a single staff to coordinate their actions (which idea has been rumored for a long time)—in this situation, most probably, will receive the president's support. As a result there may be formed a kind of "united committee of chiefs of staffs" from the representatives of the military department, the FSK, MVD, MinChS [Ministry of Emergency Situations], GUO [Main Security Directorate], and the border troops at the level of chiefs of staff who are deputy administrators. Which, incidentally, in the Russian context does not preclude a resubordination to one another of those structures under the vigilant eye of a new "superpower agency" under the direct guidance of... But of whom? The president? Or some other "especially close retainer"?

Shakhrai: 'Russia Lacks Combat-Capable Army'

95UM0204B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 10 Jan 95 p 2

[Article: "Sergey Shakhrai: Localize the Role of the Military"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The failure of the military operation in Chechnya testifies that Russia lacks a combat-capable army." Such was the opinion expressed by Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhrai, recently appointed director of a governmental commission for fact-finding and analysis of the crisis situation in the Chechen Republic. Based on this conclusion, Sergey Shakhrai predicted that "the Chechen crisis possibly will give the impetus for real reforms in the army."

The Vice-Premier of the RF government did not rule out the possible transformation of the army "into an independent political force which will begin to make demands on the President and the Cabinet of Ministers."

In the words of Sergey Shakhrai, "in the army they long ago developed two techniques for getting rid of unsuitable military leaders. One of them is sabotage of execution of orders. The other is their idiotic execution. Today in Chechnya we see a manifestation of both methods."

The Vice-Premier stressed that he was giving his own view of the causes for the loss of combat effectiveness of the Russian Army at sessions of the State Duma, the government, and the Security Council. He believes that one reason was the "rivalry of the power structures, when the Defense Ministry, for example, tries to earn dividends from the mistakes of the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]."

As for the participation of the federal army in the Chechen crisis, in the opinion of Sergey Shakhrai, it is necessary as quickly as possible to "localize the role of the military, to shift to the creation of a popular chamber in the Chechen Republic, formed from respected representatives of the population, and to get to work restoring the railroad and creating transitional institutions to prepare for free elections, which might be held within one-and-a-half to two years."

Defense Ministry Reform as Possible Response to Chechnya Crisis

95UM0212A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 3, 15-22 Jan 95 p 7

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, State Duma deputy, Yabloko Faction: "In Search of a 'Switchman'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is strange at first glance that at the height of the bloody crisis in Chechnya, talk has once again started in Moscow about reforming the Ministry of Defense. When the war is going on and spreading, is it time to talk about a separation of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, the subordination of the latter directly to the president, and the appointment of a civilian to the position of minister? But in a certain sense, these high-level considerations that are filtering in to the press are quite symptomatic.

To resolve the problem "with a little blood and a powerful strike" proved unsuccessful once again. Instead of a swift and impressive military action—a grave and inglorious war that is already dragging on for the second month. In addition, the outcome of the operation from the standpoint of an officially assigned task—the disarmament of illegal military formations—is insignificant. (According to official operational summaries, in a month of heavy fighting, 340 (!) firearms were confiscated and several dozens of heavy weapons were destroyed.)

In complete contrast to the purposes of the "Chechnya campaign," the political and economic stability of Russia, its statehood, constitutional law and order, federal mutual relations, and prestige in the near and far abroad—all of this has suffered enormous damage under conditions where the hopelessness of the situation has become more and more obvious—and a search is starting for the "switchman," a scapegoat. And, as always, the first thing you can lay your hands on is the Army. And from this comes the usual surge of discussions about "radical reform" of the military department, although the catastrophic situation in the Armed Forces has been known to everyone over the course of the last three years.

It is possible that even less significant considerations stand behind this. To simply dismiss Grachev for the failure of the operation would mean also to directly admit the guilt of the political leadership that sanctioned the military action and directed all of the "phases" of its execution. But to distance oneself from it under "reform" might seem to some to be a much cleverer move.

Meanwhile, the Army in itself is not only and not so much the protagonist as it is a victim of the Chechnya venture. After August 1991 and October 1993, the third and most disastrous blow was delivered to the Army. It stands to reason, the lack of talent of the high command, the foolish bragging of the minister of defense, and the complete unpreparedness and lack of coordination of the

operation, plus the traditional indifference and ruthless treatment of its own soldiers, cost the Army additional sacrifices and deprivations.

However, it is not the Army that is to blame for the carnage that is occurring, but the politicians and their appointees in uniform who charged the Army with the execution of tasks that are alien to it. Given the whole gravity of the situation in the Armed Forces, given all of the failures of military reform in the last three years, the Army is capable of defending the country from aggression from outside and thereby of performing its true purpose.

The politicians unleashed this war, they irresponsibly misled the Army, and they must immediately stop the senseless slaughter—through an agreement on an unconditional cease-fire and through the subsequent resolution of all questions by means of negotiations. The Politicians are obliged to pull the Army and the whole country out of this bloody swamp to which they brought it.

As for reform of the Ministry of Defense, this question was pressing long ago (and it is overdue), but it should not be done at the present moment, not without rhyme or reason, and not in order to save oneself from someone under a plausible pretext, or to put the whole blame on somebody as an afterthought. The reform of the Ministry of Defense, including the institution of a civilian minister and his staff, are necessary for the establishment of democratic political control over the Armed Forces and military policy on the part of the president and parliament. This is necessary for the conduct of a real military reform that would save the Army, and the defense industry, and that would guarantee the Army a worthy place under the new political and economic conditions.

The subordination of the General Staff to the president would disorganize the Armed Forces even more. The president is already the commander in chief according to the Constitution, and in wartime he is called on to direct the troops himself through the General Staff. But in peacetime he should manage through a civilian minister of defense who would answer for general military policy, the elaboration and purchase of weapons and equipment, and questions of manning and social problems. The General Staff conducts operational planning, it draws up specific military needs, it ensures the combat readiness of troops, and it directly manages their activities in peacetime and in wartime.

But this is not enough. There is a need for an extensive revision of the entire mechanism for making state decisions, correction of the defects in the system of dividing authority in the country, a "demonopolization" of power, and consolidation of the rule-of-law state. Without this, there will be no guarantees against authoritative arbitrariness, with all of its pernicious consequences. And this is a much broader question than the Army and even the Chechnya crisis. This relates to all aspects of Russia's state policy.

Chechnya Question in State Duma

95UM0204A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "State Duma Considers 'Chechen Question'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday the State Duma approved an agenda entirely devoted to the situation in the Chechen Republic. Besides the declarative portion, which must conclude by the adoption of another decree on Chechnya, there are also plans to discuss and possibly to adopt draft laws "On Prohibition of Combat Actions by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Territory of the Russian Federation," and "On Procedures for Publishing Lists of Service Members Who Have Perished, Are Missing In Action, or Have Been Wounded During Military Service" and "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Federal Law 'On Financing of State Expenses From the Federal Budget in the First Quarter of 1995.'"

The Parliamentary Defense Committee has prepared a draft law on amendments and supplements to the Law "On Defense." It contains two main points: first, the use of the Armed Forces for tasks Unrelated to their prior purpose is permitted only on the basis of an Order from the RF President, ratified by the Federation Council, and if allocation of additional budget appropriations is necessary, on the basis of a federal law of the Russian Federation. Second, the RF Law on Supplemental Guarantees and Compensation of Service Members Serving on the Territories of the States of the Transcaucasus and Republic of Tajikistan also applies to service members performing their duties in the zone of armed conflict in Chechnya. There is of course another version: equate the Russian soldiers and officers put in action in Chechnya to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War or the Afghanistan War, and apply to them the corresponding articles of the Law "On Veterans." It is true that, after being adopted by the State Duma and going through the Federation Council, this law still awaits the signature of the President, and it has not gone into force.

Besides this, a decision was adopted almost unanimously (two votes against) to create a parliamentary commission to investigate the causes of the current crisis in Chechnya. It is expected to answer the questions of how effectively the federal government has tried to restore legality on the territory of Chechnya, who gave Dudayev weapons, and many others.

After rejecting the proposal that a Day of Mourning be established in connection with the Chechen tragedy, deputies honored with a minute of silence the memory of all those who have died in recent days in Chechnya, both Russian service members and the peaceful populace.

Impact of Chechnya Crisis on Relations With West

95UM0209A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 1, 8-15 Jan 95 p 9

[Commentary by political scientist Andrey Kortunov: "The Quasi-State and the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The events in the North Caucasus so far have not resulted in a perceptibly serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the West. If we discount the symbolic gesture of Denmark, which froze its military cooperation with Moscow, our leading Western partners overall accepted the "pacification" in Chechnya with Olympian calm. All they came up with was a modest proposal to involve the CSCE mechanism in the resolution of this problem, several indignant editorials in the liberal press, and biting cartoons of Boris Yeltsin. At the same time as ordinary people in the West watched on CNN the "little Christmas war" in Chechnya, the Council of Europe put off once again the question of Russia's entry into the "family of civilized European peoples."

There are more than enough reasons for the restrained reaction on the part of the West. First of all, for the West, Chechnya is something at the far end of the world, or maybe even beyond. I once read in a respectable German newspaper that the "Chechen mafia originates in the faraway Siberian city of Chita...."

Chechnya is not Hungary, Poland, or Lithuania; it is not on geographic maps, and hence not among Western politicians' priorities.

Besides, following the lead of the Russian propaganda, Moscow's actions in Chechnya are frequently perceived as a battle against criminal elements, "bandit formations," and on top of that Islamic fanatics. And the West does not have a particular liking for Islamic fanatics: Not too long ago, fundamentalists attempted to blow up the World Trade Center in New York, killed hostages on a hijacked French airplane, and terrorized civilians in Israel. So the green banner of Islam, which Western television companies' footage frequently shows fluttering over General Dudayev's positions, acts upon Westerners as a red rag does on a bull.

Finally, it should be noted that separatism is a double-edged issue. Few among Western states can boast complete absence of separatist movements. Spain and Great Britain, France and Canada are dealing with this problem, albeit not in such an acute form. And in the United States, too, there is no guarantee that two or three decades from now the Spanish-speaking majority in California will not demand separation of territories in the past forcibly annexed to the United States. If you live in a glass house, do you want to throw stones at your neighbor's windows?

As to those democrats who had hoped fervently that the West would hand down a moral judgment on the events

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in Chechnya, they would be well advised to recall how the West reacted to the storming of the Russian parliament in October of last year. Call it whatever you wish—cynicism, realism, indifference, but if nobody in the West got really upset over the supreme legislative authority of Russia getting pounded into dust, it is silly to hope that a punitive operation in the remote foothills of the Caucasus will tremendously impress Western liberals.

All of the above does not mean at all that the West does not draw any conclusions from the Chechen events. Because these events are not just an excuse for political demarches or moral admonishments. A much more important point is that Chechnya diagnosed the condition of the Russian military, Russian president, and Russian Constitution.

Let us begin with the military. The course of the Chechnya operation by itself graphically demonstrated to the world that the Russian military is, first, not combat-worthy, and second, is uncontrollable. When over a period of one month the joint efforts of enforcement ministries cannot break the resistance of the Chechen micro-state; when they have to bring troops from almost as far as Khabarovsk to conduct military operations in the North Caucasus; when deputy ministers of defense openly criticize their superior—Western politicians and military men have serious reasons to contemplate whether they should be dealing with Grachev and his team in the first place in trying to implement such joint programs as Partnership for Peace. If the Russian Army's leadership is incapable of keeping it under control, where are the guarantees that it will be able to fulfill the international obligations and agreements reached with the West?

The same goes for the Russian President. No matter how much the Kremlin spin masters may want to prove otherwise, the Chechen crisis exposed in Russia what the West has long suspected: Boris Yeltsin no longer has control over the actions of his enforcement structures and in general has a very vague idea of what is happening outside the Kremlin. And since this is the case, what is the point of the current summits, talks at the highest level, international conferences and consultations, and so on? Talks with the president become a meaningless exercise in rhetoric.

Finally, the Constitution. Only a year ago, the West enthusiastically welcomed its adoption as the guarantee of Russia's forward movement toward democracy and observance of human rights. Has Russia become a more democratic state over the past year? When the overwhelming majority of the population is against the operation in Chechnya and demands a stop to the bloodshed, while the government calmly ignores all protests and demands, it means that there is no separation of powers and no democracy in Russia today. And a leadership that is willing to ignore public opinion and bomb its own citizens is unlikely to be a reliable partner

in international affairs. Overall, the Chechen diagnosis is abundantly clear for the West: Alas, today there is no state as such—as the West understands it—in Russia. Instead, what has emerged over the three post-Soviet years is some sort of "quasi-state," and until a real state grows out of it, nobody in the West will treat Russia as an equal.

Defense Committee Chairmen Interviewed

95UM0201B Moscow SLUZHBA in Russian
20 Dec 94 p 7

[SLUZHBA interview of Sergey Yushenkov and Aleksandr Yepimakhov; place and time not given: "Parliamentarians for the 'Man in Uniform'"; under the rubric "Word and Deed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Materials under this rubric will keep readers informed on all the news of the legislative "kitchen" having to do in one way or another with the life of the power structures. Today the Chairman of the Committee of the State Duma for Defense, Sergey Yushenkov, and the Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council for Questions of Security and Defense Aleksandr Yepimakhov will talk with our correspondents.

[Correspondent] Sergey Nikolayevich, is your committee working only on the Armed Forces?

[Yushenkov] It would probably be more accurate to say on the Armed Forces and structures associated with it. We are working closely with the Security Committee. In the final analysis that same RF Law "On the Status of Service Members" affects not only the army. Just as you wouldn't call the laws "On Defense" and "On Compulsory Military Service" and a number of other legal documents of the "military package" strictly departmental.

[Correspondent] So what exactly is in the portfolio of your committee? What draft projects are "approaching?"

[Yushenkov] The draft law "On Alternative Service" is completely ready for a discussion in its first reading. It has already been considered at a session of the State Duma Council. Basically all factions support the draft in terms of its concept. There are certain proposals directed toward stiffening the conditions for granting the right to alternative service.

The draft law on supplements and amendments to the RF Law "On Defense" is ready for a second reading. The law will be made to accord with the current RF Constitution. The "Vybor Rossii" faction has prepared a proposal to make the RF Defense Ministry a civilian department. More precisely, such a possibility must be provided for in the law. The essence lies in the division of functions. Operational command and control of the Armed Forces is exercised by the General Staff, while the ministry will retain administrative and political functions.

A draft law regulating sale of used military equipment and recycling of weapons is ready for discussion at a plenary session. We hope that with this law the conditions for corruption in the army will disappear.

[Correspondent] The Law "On the Status of Service Members"—the main question here is, will it keep the benefits in the full amount?

[Yushenkov] In the government draft law on the introduction of amendments and supplements to the Law "On the Status of Service Members," the articles aimed at social protection of service members are retained. Only the norms are eliminated, which at any rate are not being met. For instance, free installation of a telephone, supply of military shops at reduced rates and a number of other "good intentions," doomed to failure under market conditions. But I repeat, much remains. The same 20 [months] pay at discharge. But this free travel on public transportation, there are various opinions about that. Transport providers are suffering losses now that no one is making up to them. In general, I will say for myself that I know many officers who prefer to buy their own travel ticket. Ultimately, I think, the family budget of the military person will withstand the purchase of the travel ticket. But then, these and other questions will be finally decided by deputies in the plenary session.

But the most persistent "headache" for our committee is the defense budget for 1995. We are in favor of increasing expenditures for national defense, at least up to 55 trillion rubles. But it is important that the Ministry of Defense make public not five, but 50 to 100 items of expenditure (for comparison, in the U.S. there are 700 such defense items). Then it would be clear to those same deputies what the military intend to spend the money on. Unfortunately, for now the Defense Ministry is displaying no interest in this sort of openness.

[Correspondent] Sergey Nikolayevich, one "chronic question" has arisen for military people in recent years. It appears regularly and disturbs them—will our pay be raised or not?

[Yushenkov] A natural enough question, but one that is hardly resolvable under our conditions. If we automatically raise pay, that means we automatically ratchet up inflation. The military themselves will lose, for prices will grow faster than their wages. But look, we do have to find ways to raise the income of the military. For instance, by granting a free plot of land. The military person must have his share in the distribution of state property, i.e. must participate in privatization equally with the other citizens of Russia. The corresponding studies are under way in the Duma.

The Committee of the Federation Council for Questions of Security and Defense consists of 15 deputies, of which only four are permanent. Among them is one of the deputy chairmen of the Committee, Deputy Aleksandr Yepimakhov.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Leonidovich, the first session of the Committee was held in January, 1994. The calendar reads November now. What has been done?

[Yepimakhov] In the first six months we held 12 sessions of the Committee and 2 parliamentary hearings on the problems of internal and foreign security of the state. We considered 15 laws adopted by the State Duma and presented to the Federation Council. The majority of them were approved. We considered 19 draft laws which to one degree or another affected the interests of defense and security of our state, and 8 "tax" draft laws.

[Correspondent] Strictly speaking, Aleksandr Leonidovich, any law must directly or indirectly safeguard the defense and security of Russia.

[Yepimakhov] I agree. Precisely from that standpoint, the Committee gave a negative conclusion for example to the law adopted by the State Duma "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to Individual Laws of the RF on Taxes and on the Establishment of Benefits Respecting Mandatory Payments to Non-Budgetary State Funds." As we saw it, the law quite without grounds freed foreign legal persons and certain enterprises and organizations from taxes on profits. In saying "no" to this, we were guided first of all by the interests of the economic security of Russia.

[Correspondent] And the problems of the military industrial complex, the drain of qualified personnel from it, the chronic nonpayments, the lack of cash flow, are these the problems solely of the military industrial complex and of the army?

[Yepimakhov] Concerned by the economic situation in the country and by the state of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, we held parliamentary hearings "On the Problems of the Aerospace (Air) Defense of the Russian Federation and Measures to Improve It" and "On the Status and Prospects for Development and Production of Military Equipment in the Russian Federation." Recommendations were made to the government that it speed up the development and adoption of a state weapons program to the year 2010, define the terms for preferential credits for conversion programs, and provide state support to the social sphere for enterprises of defense branches of industry. We asked the State Duma first of all to consider the drafts of "military" and "defense" laws.

[Correspondent] You have a lot of office work, Aleksandr Leonidovich. How often do deputies of the Committee visit the line units and the defense enterprises, and meet with veterans of the Armed Forces? You went, you looked and you talked with people. But then what?

[Yepimakhov] I will answer your question like this. We visit the line units quite often, but we could do it even more. But the fact is that we must coordinate with the Defense Ministry, which demands that we deputies

provide a plan for such trips scheduled for six months in advance. This does not coincide with our ideas on effective deputy work, hence the coordination takes up a lot of time. Still, these trips are a great help to us.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Leonidovich, what draft laws does the Committee intend to consider in the near future?

[Yepimakhov] On problems of the aviation industry and shipbuilding, on veterans, on construction of housing for service members. And this is by no means all of the points in our work plan.

Shumeyko, Rybkin Become Permanent Members of Security Council

95UM0204F Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 95 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Chairmen of Chambers of Parliament Now Have Vote"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairmen of the Federation Council and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia, Vladimir Shumeyko and Ivan Rybkin, have been made permanent members of the RF Security Council by Order of the President of the Russian Federation.

In May 1994, the leaders of the chambers were made members of the Security Council. In accordance with the Statute on the Security Council, at that time they had the right [only] to a deliberative vote, since permanent members make a Council decision. The Order makes Vladimir Shumeyko and Ivan Rybkin voting members. The chamber leaders explained the grounds for the proposed changes as "the development of the situation in Chechnya and environs in light of the influence of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly and personally of the chairmen of the State Duma and the Federation Council on questions of domestic, foreign and military policy in the area of safeguarding the security of Russia."

On Possibility of Alternative Service

95UM0205C Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 5 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Igor Slivkin: "Wouldn't You Like To Become a Soldier, Vanya—Better To Become an Orderly. A New Law May Provide That Opportunity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At first glance, there was nothing special in that announcement. The head of the "Birzh truda" [Labor Exchange] television show reported that the Novosibirsk City Employment Center is conducting recruiting for courses at a medical school. But the words after that sounded very unusual. The announcement was addressed to those young men who wish to perform "alternative service in the Army".

We have placed that portion of the sentence in quotation marks on purpose. And this is why. First of all, the

conversations about alternative service that had subsided somewhat have perked up once again. And there are weighty grounds for that. In the near future, State Duma deputies plan to begin the procedure of adopting that law. As they say, by hook or by crook, several years after official assurances on "the initiation of military reform," legislators recognize the de jure right of each conscript to not take up arms for religious or other motives. And, consequently, it only remains to welcome the fact that the appropriate city services have begun to prepare for the predicted situation in a timely manner.

Secondly, an actual error, and a quite substantial one, was permitted in that sentence. Let's dwell on it in somewhat more detail and not just for the sake of nursing. Like the head of the television labor exchange, many city residents and VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK readers cannot thoroughly imagine the essence of its specific nature. Therefore, let's explain. The combination of words "alternative service in the Army" is basically incorrect because it will not at all be military. Therefore, I think that the words "alternative service outside the Army" sound more accurate.

Of course, right now it's hard to say how the law will look in full. We can only talk about proposals. And they intend for "alternative service personnel" to repay their debt to the homeland, for example, at medical institutions as orderlies or in other work that society needs but in which vacancies can't be filled due to the total absence of prestige of these professions, that is, miserly wages, the absence of proper working conditions, and so forth. Figuratively speaking, young men who did not wish to enter the military ranks with arms in the time period prescribed by law will become distinctive "serfs" for a longer period of time (up to six months longer) than army service.

It's difficult to assume how this will develop and what the end results will be. Life experience indicates that not all examples from the so-called civilized countries become well acclimated on Russian soil.

Even if we talk on a city scale, the "alternative" is advantageous. In the middle of December in Novosibirsk, there was a shortage of nearly 200 orderlies and 100 caretakers. And this problem will be easily eliminated by sending "alternative service personnel" to those jobs. That is why they want to begin training "male nurses" at the medical school.

Of course, that's a good idea. Better to take care of the seriously ill and to clean up the streets than to enter the ranks of the "draft evaders" and to hide from responsibility.

The issue is something else. Will "alternative service personnel" be able to do that in a qualitative manner, won't they be enrolled in that only on paper? And we will have to create yet another bureaucratic structure—to organize and monitor their activities. No one is thinking about that yet. And in vain. Those personnel who are

involved with conscription right now are of the opinion that not the most decent and educated people will join the ranks of those who wish to serve alternatively as volunteers "under the banner" of various religious movements and the feeling of pacifism that has been engendered. One acquaintance, a section head from the city hospital where the seriously injured are treated, frankly stated:

—Among my patients are quite a few future conscripts with traumas after drunken brawls, fights and automobile accidents involving foreign cars. I have observed their habits and I have listened to their conversations. I have difficulty imagining these lads as orderlies and nurses. There weren't any junior medical personnel and we don't need these types.

Well, and how do military personnel regard alternative service? A Novosibirsk military commissariat officer expressed this point of view. Not only our but other oblasts are ultimately fulfilling the conscription plan. However, now no service of the Russian Armed Forces is fully manned by compulsory service military personnel. And the percentage of the shortage will become even larger after the introduction of alternative service. At the same time, the number of "draft evaders" will be drastically reduced. That is, the situation can turn out to be paradoxical. Conscription indicators in the regions will increase but that will hardly have a positive impact on combat readiness as a whole.

The Chechen crisis and the number of killed and wounded soldiers in that war will frighten an even greater number of young men from army service than right now. Family councils will discuss not only "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] but also the possibility of dying in Chechnya, in the Pamirs, or in Abkhaziya. And where is the guarantee that the mother's words will not ring out:

—Better, son, to become a believer... Perhaps God will forgive you...

The question arises: who will gain the real benefit from alternative service? For now, neither civilians nor military are happy with its prospects.

Right now, laws are being adopted nearly every day and not just a few in our country. Unfortunately, there is a real return from far from all of them. Won't it turn out that way with this law?

Incidentally, in Novosibirsk, there is a shortage not only of orderlies and nurses but also of metalworkers. And this is in spite of the quite perceptible unemployment. City residents won't take those jobs. Maybe "alternative service personnel" can help here, too.... And the boss only needs to dream about these metalworkers. The boss cannot distinguish each one from a scraper but then again he doesn't have any rights at all—only an obligation.

Statute on Commission on Servicemen's Social Questions

95UM0218A Moscow ROSSISKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 5

[Text of Statute on the Government Commission on Social Questions of Servicemen and Citizens Discharged From Military Service and Members of Their Families: "If You Left Military Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. The Government Commission on Social Questions of Servicemen and Citizens Discharged from Military Service and Members of Their Families (hereinafter called the Commission) is a coordinating body that provides for the coordinated work of federal executive agencies in the resolution of the social questions of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service and members of their families.
2. The Commission is guided in its work by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, edicts and directives of the president of the Russian Federation, the statutes and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, international legal norms in effect in the territory of Russia, and also the present statute.
3. The basic tasks of the Commission are:
 - coordination of the participation of interested ministries and departments in the drafting of legislative and other normative acts, federal and regional programs for the provision of pensions, housing, and medical services, and other measures for the social protection of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service and members of their families and also measures for their realization;
 - organization of interdepartmental and interregional cooperation in the preparation of proposals on address social support of various categories of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service and members of their families under the conditions of economic and military reforms;
 - elaboration and implementation of national measures aimed at raising the prestige of military service and improving the socioeconomic, legal, and social-psychological conditions of induction into military service and the course of that service;
 - guaranteeing the interaction of the executive authorities with nonstate organizations and public associations in the resolution of questions of housing construction, professional retraining, and the training and employment of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service;
 - elaboration on the basis of intergovernmental agreements of measures in the area of the social protection of Russian servicemen performing military service

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under the conditions of an emergency situation and beyond the boundaries of the Russian Federation;

—coordination of work performed to perpetuate the memory of those who perished in the defense of the Fatherland in the execution of the Law of the Russian Federation from 14 January 1993 "On the Perpetuation of the Memory of Those Who Perished in the Defense of the Fatherland";

—participation in the resolution of questions having to do with the distribution of resources of the federal budget allocated for the social needs of citizens discharged from military service and with the monitoring of their specific use;

—presentation of reports to the Government of the Russian Federation on questions of the social protection of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service and the members of their families.

4. To realize the tasks entrusted to it, the Commission:

—brings in the ministries and departments represented in it for a comprehensive analysis of the social needs of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service and their family members and for the development of proposals to satisfy them;

—examines at its meetings questions within its competence on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation and on its own initiative;

—receives from federal executive agencies the information necessary for its work;

—if necessary, forms expert commissions and brings in specialists for consultation and scientific investigations on the problems in the social defense of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service and the members of their families;

—establishes provisional working groups made up of specialists of interested departments on questions in the competence of the commission;

—issues an information bulletin of the Commission;

—makes proposals in the established manner on questions requiring the decision of the Government of the Russian Federation.

5. The Commission is headed by a chairman. The composition of the Commission is affirmed by the Government of the Russian Federation as submitted by the chairman of the Commission, who guides its actions and bears personal responsibility for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it. The members of the Commission participate in its meetings without the right of substitution.

If necessary, officials of ministries and departments not included in the Commission and representatives of public organizations may be involved in the work of the Commission.

6. The decisions of the Commission are compulsory for executive agencies under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation and are presented to them in the form of excerpts from the minutes of the meetings of the Commission.

7. The organization of the work of the Commission is determined by rules affirmed by its chairman.

8. The technical organization of the work of the Commission is accomplished by the Department for Social Questions of Citizens Discharged from Military Service and Members of Their Families of the Ministry of Social Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation (hereinafter called the Department).

The director of the Department is the responsible secretary and is a member of the Commission.

In the technical organization of the work of the Commission, the Department:

—correlates the proposals of the federal executive agencies and the executive agencies of the subjects of the Russian Federation on questions in the work of the Commission and prepares and coordinates the materials for its meetings;

—requests from government agencies information necessary for the examination in the Commission of questions in its competence;

—studies in the regions and executive agencies the situation with respect to questions presented to meetings of the Commission;

—organizes the activities of working groups established by the Commission;

—analyzes and monitors the course of the implementation of the decisions made by the Commission;

—maintains ties with public organizations and the mass media;

—performs others functions as decided by the Commission or its chairman.

9. In its practical activities, the Commission is accountable to the Government of the Russian Federation.

[Boxed material]

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation

From 30 December 1994, No 1459, Moscow

On the Affirmation of the Statute on a Government Commission on Social Questions of Servicemen and Citizens Discharged From Military Service and Members of Their Families

The Government of the Russian Federation decrees: affirm the attached Statute on a Government Commission on Social Questions of Servicemen and Citizens Discharged from Military Service and Members of Their Families.

[Signed] Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin

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STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

RVSN: No Strategic Missile Personnel in Chechnya

95UM0205A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 95 p 1

[RVSN Press Center article, under the rubric: "From the RVSN": "There Are No RVSN Troops or Weapons in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Because of reports that have appeared in the mass media about Strategic Missile Troops weapons that are allegedly on the territory of the Chechen Republic, the RVSN [Strategic Missile Troops] Press Center has been authorized to state that there are neither RVSN troops nor weapons on the territory of Chechnya.

In the 1970's, a missile division armed with the R-12 missile system was deployed on the territory of the North Caucasus (in the city of Ordzhonikidze). A subunit of this division that consisted of four launch silos was located near the populated area of Damut. The division was removed from combat alert in 1980-1981 and all RVSN weapons and military equipment were hauled to arsenals and destroyed within the framework of the INF Treaty. All of the launch silos were reduced to a state that excludes their utilization as designed.

Importance of New Missile Development

MM2301111795 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jan 95 p 4

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "...Nonetheless We Are Making Missiles! Details of Russia's New 'Topol-M' Missile System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the ins and outs of the armed conflict in Chechnya, an event whose importance is being widely discussed by serious military analysts on both sides of the Atlantic has somehow gone virtually unnoticed.

This event was the recent successful launch from the Plesetsk missile test range of Russia's silo-based "Topol-M" solid-fuel single-warhead strategic missile.

A great deal lies behind this. Whereas, for instance, prior to December 1994 Russia had no multipurpose solid-fuel missile reliably protected and silo-based, now it does. Moreover, all seven of the strategic nuclear missiles currently on combat standby should have reached the absolute end of their service life and ceased to be a deterrent by the end of this century. They now have a replacement in the promising new missile developed exclusively at Russian plants and design bureaus.

To all intents and purposes the "Topol-M"—whether our politicians want to admit it or not—has "shut down" Ukraine's missile industry. There will now be no sales for its output.

The "Topol-M" complies fully with all the restriction parameters of the Russian-U.S. START I and II strategic offensive arms reduction treaties. And, although the missile was assembled in a shop at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, whose output is monitored around the clock by U.S. inspections, the development of the new missile system came as a complete surprise to our transatlantic partners. Specialists of my acquaintance claim that, in terms of a number of parameters, the "Topol-M" is five-six years ahead of its foreign counterparts.

Just what is the modernized "Topol-M" missile system? As we have said, it is a single-warhead, three-stage, solid-fuel, silo-based strategic missile. Incidentally, a mobile version is also planned. The system is classified "A," which means that the missile is kept permanently on a transport in a launch tube. Incidentally, these tubes guarantee that the missile will be ready for combat use without factory servicing for 15 years. The previous version came with just a 10-year warranty.

The missile is 22.7 meters long including the warhead. It is 1.95 meters in diameter. Its launch weight is 47.2 tonnes. Its throw weight is 1,200 kg. Its range is more than 10,000 km. We were not told the precise yield of the nuclear warhead, but from certain indications we could judge that it will be in the megaton class of nuclear warheads.

The nuclear warhead for the missile was developed, as were all previous warheads, by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Arzamas-16, which is now headed by Candidate of Sciences Georgiy Dmitriyev, a student of Academician Yuliy Khariton's. The warhead-carrying reentry vehicle was developed by a collective at the Moscow Thermotechnics Institute—the lead developer of the entire "Topol-M" system—under the leadership of Academician Boris Lagutin. Thanks to its new aerodynamic, ballistic, and design features the vehicle is able to penetrate any ABM defenses, keep to its planned trajectory, fly on to the target under any conditions, and hit the designated target with a maximum error probable of a few hundred meters.

We can judge how high these specifications are merely from the fact that the accuracy of the current "Topol" system in service with Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces is half this level, and the error probability of the most sophisticated U.S. strategic missile—the MX—is 350 meters, which is again worse than the "Topol-M." Moreover, our missiles' survivability on their trajectory and their ability to withstand the kill mechanism of a nuclear burst (the shock wave and x-ray, thermal, gamma, and neutron radiation—V.L.) used to be reckoned at a maximum distance of 10 km (this was one of the reasons why

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we used to make warheads with 10 or six MIRV's—V.L.), whereas the figure for the MX, with a launch weight of 88.4 tonnes and 10 MIRVed warheads, is 5 km.

But now, specialists claim, it will only be possible to disrupt the trajectory of the "Topol-M" if its nose section is hit by another missile. Such an outcome, in their opinion, is virtually impossible.

Moreover, the time taken to ready the system for launch will now be a matter of seconds rather than tens of minutes. Whereas a U.S. MX leaves its silo 30 seconds after receiving the "launch" command, the "Topol-M" will be away a few seconds faster.

All 150 testbed tests and equipment system checks—which used to be carried out solely at plants and design bureaus—were this time carried out by the military and the designers directly at a missile silo on the Plesetsk test range. This cut the time required to develop the system by almost two years and reduced the missile troops' financial expenditure by 21 billion rubles [R] in 1994 alone. The development of the entire "Topol-M" system from drawing board to test launch cost the country R142.8 billion.

Is that a lot or not? "Depends on what you compare it to," missile troops say. "Compared to the repair of the White House or the State Duma building, it is considerably less."

By the end of the century Russia plans to maintain a strategic ground-launched grouping of 700-800 systems. Approximately half of these (the "Topol-M") will be silo-based, while the rest will be mobile.

Ninety of the silos used by the world's heaviest missile—the "SS-18" ("Satan"—V.L.), which we call the RS-20—will be reequipped for the "Topol-M." Under the START II Treaty, five meters' worth of concrete will be poured in, a narrow restrictive collar will be fitted on top, and the rest of the 30-meter-high silo together with its equipment can be reused. The savings from this solution will come to R1 trillion.

It is only now becoming clear why our participants in the START talks with the Americans "gave away" the RS-20 heavy missiles to our partners so relatively easily and why they were so uncompromising in their desire to keep 90 of the 360 "Satan" missile silos. And, we recall, they succeeded.

Although the missile people did not tell me where their new missiles would be deployed, it is not hard to guess that they will be based where "Satan" (RS-20 or SS-18) regiments and divisions are currently based. That is—Uzhur, Kartaly, and Aleysk in the southern Urals and

Altay, and again, clearly, in central Russia, at Valday and in Saratov Oblast, replacing the SS-19 "Stiletto" (RS-18) or UR-100N UTTKh.

The modernized "Topol-M" missiles should enter service in 1996.

NAVAL FORCES

Nuclear Submarine 'Kursk' Joins Fleet

95UM0202A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 95 p 1

[Item from Severodvinsk by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Gundarov: "The Fleet Has Become One Ship Stronger"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In January the St. Andrew's Ensign will be hoisted smartly over the new Russian nuclear powered submarine Kursk. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written repeatedly about her construction progress. The report on her transfer to the Navy was signed on 30 December in the center for building nuclear powered ships.

Navy representatives highly praised the work of Severodvinsk shipbuilders, who made a number of improvements to the ship's life-support systems and also improved everyday conditions. The year of 1995 which has arrived promises to be a "bumper year" for the Russian submarine fleet. The Northern Machine Building Enterprise Production Association began trials of one other new cruiser submarine, Vepr. Transfer of the nuclear powered submarine Tomsk to the fleet also is in the shipbuilders' plans. In the current year another "undersea animal," the nuclear powered submarine Gepard, will be set free from the enterprise shop. If only there were enough money for the prestige of the naval power...

Submarine Docks for Pacific Fleet

95UM0202B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jan 95 p 1

[Item from Kherson by Anatoliy Polyakov: "Construction of Drydocks for the Pacific Fleet Has Been 'Frozen'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two enormous drydocks, each 150 m long, were laid down at Kherson Shipyard. They are intended for taking apart nuclear powered submarines which have served their term, and they are to be sent to the Pacific Fleet.

But as heads of the yard declared, turnover of the first dock is being postponed from 1995 to 1996, and the period for completing construction on the second one is entirely unknown. The reason is simple: financing has stopped.

Questioning Value of Joint Exercises

95UM02004 Moscow SLUZHBA in Russian
20 Dec 94 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Chepigin, under the rubric: "Our Still Ocean Navy": "These Joint Exercises: Who Needs Them—Us or Our 'Probable Partners'?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On March 13, 1986, two U.S. Navy ships—the cruiser Yorktown and the destroyer Caron, intruded into the USSR's territorial waters in the Black Sea. The super-modern navigation systems installed on the American ships excluded an error in determining position. To the demands of the Soviet side—leave our waters, the Americans responded with casuistic references to International Maritime Law. The incident thus acquired a show of force, provocative nature. The USSR Navy command authorities were compelled to take adequate measures: the commander of the "Ladnyy", a Black Sea Fleet escort ship, was ordered to make physical contact with the side of the Yorktown. The "Ladnyy" approached the uninvited guests and, using the sharp "iron" of the stern, "glided" along the side of the cruiser and damaged its guided missile launcher.

The echo from the grinding of Zaporozhye steel against Pittsburgh steel swept over the entire world. The foreign mass media, true to its principle—let the facts speak for themselves—directed primary attention to the numerous details, without losing sight of the location, time and participants of the event, the comparative tactical-technical specifications of the American and Soviet ships, the names of the commanders and many other things. But then again, the "free press" left one fact without commentary and it was: what were the American ships doing in the territorial waters of another country. Soviet newspapers in turn, placed first of all ideological accents, accustomed to assessing what had occurred as a manifestation of the forceful, aggressive nature of U.S. foreign policy (which, incidentally, even today sounds quite plausible).

On Moscow's Bolshoy Kozlovskiy Pereulok (the USSR, currently the RF, Navy Main Headquarters is located here), they did not delve deeply into political assessments but they arrived at a professionally calculated conclusion: the American ships were conducting a reconnaissance cruise in the Black Sea, during the course of which they studied, in particular, the USSR Navy's reaction to the violation of the maritime border.

A view on the incident from the distance of today sheds light on yet another of its meanings, already symbolic: two superpowers and two great naval powers, two "bastions" armed to the teeth—communism and capitalism—had once again irreconcilably collided at sea using steel sides. Several years later the gigantic battleship with the name "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" went to the bottom. The unsinkable "aircraft carrier" with the inscription "United States of America" on its side remained afloat.

The "latest history" of the mutual relations already between Russia proper and the United States consists of several lines so far. Their content remarkably reminds us of the entries in the Book of Distinguished Visitors in which a place is allotted only for assurances of sincere respect and wishes for success and prosperity.

We must cite the fact that the preoccupation and ardor with which "imperialism" was exposed in the USSR are shifting to political flirtation with a rich "uncle" from across the ocean and to attempts to establish an equitable partnership with him in Russia today. "Uncle" only promises money—with the condition that we will behave ourselves and obey the latter-day rich "relative". And you can see based upon everything that he doesn't need a full partner, it's enough to have a dependent hanger-on. This is especially clearly traced based upon the results of several naval exercises in which Russian Navy ships have participated.

The largest of them, "Joint Operation-94," took place under the aegis of NATO in September-October in the Baltic's Skagerrak strait, in the northeastern portion of the North Sea and Norway's territorial waters. Two Russian escort ships, the "Druzhnyy" and the "Neustrashimyy", joined the intricate conglomerate of ships of the navies of Denmark, Germany, Italy, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, England, Canada, Belgium, Lithuania and Poland. And although the participation of American Navy ships was not envisioned at first, the destroyer Conolly [transliterated] rapidly arrived in the exercise area from the Red Sea. America, the holder of NATO's "control actions package," naturally could not remain on the sidelines of the first exercises within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" Program. The goal of the exercise was formulated as the improvement of naval skill in the issues of the conduct of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and search and rescue activities at sea.

As for the two Russian ships, their participation was reduced to only maneuvering in general formations and to rehearsing refueling and cargo transfer on the move. On the whole, this is what Russian seamen do during the course of their own combat training and on long cruises. The "Druzhnyy" and "Neustrashimyy" were essentially removed from the primary exercises, and in a very insulting manner. At the time when the multinational squadron was rehearsing joint missions, the exercise leader "herded" the Russian escort ships and the Lithuanian corvette "Zhemaytis" into a fjord "to rehearse cruising in a single line formation".

A multinational naval exercise under the code name "Naval Partnership" occurred in the Black Sea in October. Maneuvers were initiated by Vice Admiral Joseph W. Puer [transliterated], commander of the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Ships from the United States, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet (the escort ship "Bezukoriznennyy") participated in it. And here the maritime episodes of the exercise were not distinguished

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by instructiveness and complexity which would have justified the expenditures of the country that sent the ship. And here the Americans and NATO controlled the ball. When journalists at a press conference at Varna posed the question to the leader of the exercise, what caused the U.S.'s interest in the Black Sea and don't U.S. Navy ships come here too often, Captain William Slocum responded: "This is caused by the U.S.'s interest in regional stability." "Isn't the exercise an intelligence information gathering system?"—asked meticulous journalists. William Slocum: "That's a negative."

Meanwhile, the most sensible Russian political scientists arrive at the conclusion that if in the future these exercises are structured based upon the bloc and not the regional principle, Russia's participation in them is not promising for its prestige. But on the other hand, the U.S. role is increasing which as before will impose its vision of the structure of the world in any of its corners. Competent Russian Navy experts have arrived at yet another conclusion that is associated with these exercises. They think that the intelligence services of the U.S. and other NATO country-participants conduct active and comprehensive reconnaissance activity against "non-NATO members" during these exercises. And, more precisely, they are continuing many years work under new conditions which permit the manipulation of the object of the exercise, they are frequently at the exercises as guests or communications officers and conduct personal surveillance of the operation of technical systems, weapons systems, the professional qualities of the ship captains and leading experts, the agenda, everyday life, and coordination among crew members. Port calls (NATO ships visited Bulgaria and Rumania only during exercises in the Black Sea) provided quite a bit of additional material to the intelligence services.

In this regard, I will say that Chief Marshal of Aviation Michael Stir, deputy supreme commander of NATO's Allied Armed Forces for the Central European Theater of Combat Operations (of course with a group of officers, some of whom very well understood that they were not included in the marshal's retinue for an excursion), Italian Brigadier General Luigi Zimma (with the appropriate escort), the commander-in-chief of the Netherlands Navy (of course with an entourage worthy of a vice admiral), a Swedish Navy flag-captain, an English communications officer, and many other persons of various ranks and professional interests visited the Baltic Fleet's latest ships—the escort ship "Neustrashimyy" and the destroyer "Nastoychivyy"—during the course of two exercises. A U.S. Naval special forces group landed on the "Neustrashimyy" at the "Baltops-94" exercise, according to the plan of its organizers that was compiled, naturally, without the participation of the Russian side. The Bundesmarine commander-in-chief took off in a Russian ship-based helicopter this year at a joint German-Russian naval exercise.

If from the sea you set foot on Russian soil, here you can also see cavalcades of automobiles overloaded with representatives of foreign departments drive through the

entry control points of our units which at one time were inaccessible for the majority of mortals. This year, the head of the intelligence directorate and the head of the targeting directorate of U.S. Strategic Command visited Strategic Missile Forces units (including Plesetsk Cosmodrome). American "specialists for the recultivation of land after the dismantling of missiles" have been working for a long time at an RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] formation. The commander-in-chief of NATO's Allied Armed Forces in the Northern European Theater of Military Operations visited the restricted capital of the Northern Fleet Severomorsk. During the visit, he inspected a nuclear missile cruiser. A team of inspectors from the United States, Norway and Denmark visited a coastal defense division in the Northern Fleet. In the process, our "competent persons" have noted that they were interested in information beyond the program on the deployment and number of personnel, arms and equipment.

A management school under Harvard University is operating for the fourth year where the highest-ranking Russian army and navy officers complete a two-week "retraining course." Prominent U.S. political scientists conduct the lectures. One of our generals who completed the "retraining" mentioned a number of the topics offered. One of them sounds something like this: "U.S. National Interests in Ukraine". Just who travels to the States to "be trained" on issues of government? Here are several examples: The RF Navy chief navigator and the Strategic Missile Forces operational directorate chief and cadre department head. I don't think that I will offend a general's or admiral's honor if I say that this presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. intelligence departments to augment their dossiers on the general officers of the Russian Armed Forces based upon the "originals". Incidentally, the Americans are paying the expenditures and, tell me, when have they invested money in something that does not promise a profit?

I want to be correctly understood. This is not a question of fanning spy mania hysteria. But I must note that a psychological stereotype is gradually being formed in the people and in the army: we are surrounded by only friends and well-wishers and that the voltage in the force field that was created around Russia decades ago has been removed. Yuriy Skokov, former RF Security Council secretary, a man who undoubtedly knows a lot, recently stated: "Today it is very complicated to talk about Russia's current security. The situation here is as catastrophic as in the economy. In principle, we are wide open. Today we ourselves transfer to our former enemies what they previously obtained with great difficulty and with enormous financial expenditures. Whether or not anyone likes it, state, economic and military secrets have always existed and will exist. We have suddenly become exposed..."

That's what a retired politician thinks. And what about those politicians who "tend" to our security today? What do they think? In December 1994, Yuriy Baturin, assistant to the President for national security, while commenting on statements in the press with regard to the

intrusion of a foreign submarine into Russia's territorial waters in the area of the Kola Peninsula, called incorrect the assertions of RF Naval experts that this was a U.S. Navy submarine. Yuriy Baturin thinks it is impossible to assert that it is the Americans who were involved in reconnaissance in our waters while citing only an acoustic contact and without summarizing the entire basis of evidence.

Does this signify that one of the most informed people in Russia does not have the "entire basis of evidence"? Or in this case is the highest priority to act politely with regard to "friendly America"? Be that as it may, there is sufficient indisputable evidence even without the latest incident on "the basis" of which we know that American submarines conduct reconnaissance not only at our combat training ranges but also penetrate territorial waters.

Discussion on this subject would be incomplete without a reference to the President of Russia's speech to the Armed Forces command staff on November 13, 1994. In the kind old manner, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief stressed the complexity of the international situation that has deteriorated due to the victory of the American Republicans in the mid-term elections. It is understandable what Boris Yeltsin had in mind: the Republicans can take a stricter foreign policy course that is directed at a further strengthening of the U.S. role in establishing a "new world order".

Only after we understand that will we understand with whom we are still conducting business—with yesterday's "probable enemy" or with today's "probable partner".

Narcotics Found on Pacific Fleet Ship

95WD0170A Vladivostok VLADIVOSTOK in Russian
26 Jan 95 p 2

[VLADIVOSTOK news department report: "Irtysh Under General Anesthesia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Customs inspection of hospital ship Irtysh, which arrived on 23 January from Vietnam, continues.*

The vessel, which is part of the Pacific Fleet, made a run to the fleet's materiel and technical support base Kamran, where it delivered another duty shift of military base service personnel. After a call at Saigon, Irtysh was to bring back to Vladivostok Pacific Fleet servicemen who have served out their term. As of yesterday the floating hospital was anchored at Point 18 of the Vladivostok roadstead.

As it turned out in the course of customs inspection, in addition to scheduled cargo the soldiers also brought from Kamran many items prohibited from crossing Russia's customs border. According to Pacific Fleet military counterintelligence personnel, who organized the operation, during the first two days of the customs inspection alone counterintelligence and customs personnel, together with the kray Administration of Internal Affairs Department

division for combating illegal drug trafficking, discovered in various hiding places more than 650 factory-packaged packs of hemp. The total weight of the drugs confiscated over two days exceeded 30 kg.

According to detained servicemen, one can purchase a 50-gram package of hemp on average for \$1.5 in Kamran, while in Maritime Kray the price of such a package is more than \$10.

The operation organizers do not rule out weapons in hiding places on the ship, since they too can be purchased cheaply in Vietnam. As of yesterday morning, however, no firearms had been discovered.

In the opinion of specialists, detailed inspection of the ship may take another two or three days.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Vehicle Repair Plant Refuses Price Cuts on Reconditioned Trucks

95UM0220A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Captain First Rank Valeriy Gromak and Col Aleksandr Gusev: "A Three-Year Salvage Job"; "More Than One Hundred Trucks Reconditioned Three Years Ago Rust in the Open Instead of Being Sold"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Just a few years ago, at the 94th Automotive Repair Plant located in Kaliningrad and the 112th, located in Tallin, they repaired motor vehicles not only of the Baltic Fleet, but also of the former Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts, units of the Moscow Military District, and the Leningrad Naval Base. Trains of defective equipment came to the plants from the groups of Soviet forces. In 1989, for example, the Kaliningrad plant alone repaired 70 motor vehicles and up to 240 engines per month.

Today there are no groups of forces abroad, and no Baltic or Belorussian Military Districts. But two areas on the grounds of the 94th Automotive Repair Plant, where more than a hundred reconditioned old-model GAZ-66 trucks are stored out in the open, are a reminder of them.

Once the former Chief of the Armor Service of the Baltic Fleet, Col Vladimir Larionov, went to the Main Technical Directorate of the RF Defense Ministry with the proposal that the unwanted, reconditioned trucks be sold to army and navy warrant officers and officers being discharged to the reserve. Moscow did not object. But the prices they "handed down" were such that scarcely ten officers together could acquire one GAZ-66. A year ago, the new chief of the 94th Automotive Repair Plant, Lt-Col Vyacheslav Burletov attempted at his own risk to sell several trucks for 1.5 million rubles apiece to the domestic economy. For which to this day he is defending himself before various authorities, and cursing himself for his initiative.

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Today the price of the trucks which have been stored in the open for three years, according to estimates of the Main Technical Directorate of the RF Defense Ministry, has jumped to seven million each. What simpleton is going to buy them, if he can acquire a truck of foreign manufacture with a diesel engine at a lower price? Especially since after long storage in the open, the GAZ-66 will again require repairs, and the plant does not have the money either to pay for their repair, or even to store them. Who needs a years-long salvage job?

The 94th Automotive Repair Plant [ARZ] of the Baltic Fleet is today the only automotive repair enterprise of the RF Defense Ministry in the region. In June of last year, the 112th ARZ in Tallin ended its existence. At that time, also in Tallin, four other military enterprises with central subordination ended their existence: a plant for repair of communications equipment, a plant for reinforced concrete items, a ship-repair plant, and the "Arsenal" plant. Data I have obtained allows me to state that the fleet automotive specialists left Estonia without losses: just the spare parts they brought out amounted to around 500 tonnes. At Tallin they repaired KamAZ, MAZ and "Ural" trucks, and all of the equipment brought out for these purposes is today being thriftily stored on the grounds of the 94th ARZ. Consequently, the plant is in need of immediate reconstruction and refitting, in order to support the repair both of automotive equipment of the UAZ, GAZ, and ZIL families, and of engines of the YaMAZ and KamAZ types. Especially since in connection with the stiffening of the customs system by the Baltic countries, and the increased expense of railroad shipments, difficulties have arisen in delivering repair items for automotive equipment from the Kaliningrad oblast. A year ago, understanding the complexity of the prevailing situation, the Chief of the Automotive and Armor service of the Navy, Maj-Gen L. Kirshin turned to the chief of the Main Engineering Directorate of the Navy requesting that 3.24 million rubles (at 1991 prices) be allocated to the 94th Automotive Repair Plant for reconstruction and development. These funds would allow the plant to activate a shop for repair of passenger cars, whose construction was halted, a shop for the repair of diesel engines and a repair section for KamAZ, MAZ, and KrAZ trucks, for which they have the equipment. The plant has drawn up a plan for reconstruction which was approved and confirmed by the Deputy CINC of the Navy. If this plan is fulfilled, the plant could repair all types of trucks for the navy, army, and border troops of the region without exception.

However at the end of August of last year, they received a letter signed by the acting Chief of Construction and Billeting of the RF Armed Forces, Lt-Gen A. Kosovan: "In connection with unsatisfactory financing of capital construction of the Defense Ministry by the Russian Ministry of Finance . . . it is not possible to find the funds to do this work at present."

In other words, they have written off the only automotive repair plant in the region. But the allocated funds

would also make it possible to revive the production equipment hauled out of Estonia, the cost of which at present is estimated at roughly five billion rubles.

In reflecting on all of this, I have to wonder: Do we know how to count money? After all, more than a hundred trucks which could long ago have been sold, and the realized sums used to reconstruct the plant, continue to rust on the grounds of the plant. And on this point, won't the Baltic Fleet and units of the 11th Army have to spend considerable sums to send their diesel engines and diesel trucks to Kiev and Engels for repairs?

ARMED FORCES ISSUES

Terekhov Speech to Officers' Union

95UM0193A Moscow POZITSIYA in Russian
3 Nov 94 pp 2-4

[Speech by S. N. Terekhov at All-Russian Meeting of Officers' Union, 17-18 September 1994; place not given: "Theses"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

On the Political Situation in the Country, the Situation in the Armed Forces, and the Tasks of the Officers' Union

1. The lull in operations is coming to an end, and direct preparations are taking place to prepare the main forces for fall operations. The lines of resistance are formed, plans for operations for September and October are worked out, missions are assigned, and accomplishment of the first stages has begun (Chechnya, "Chernyy Oktaybr").
2. With all its outward stability, the situation in the country is characterized by a considerable increase in the degree of uncertainty and in the degree of risk associated with this. These are the main signs: rejection by the main political forces of the methods and modes of psychological warfare as the main means of achieving their goals and, connected with this, the relatively neutral reaction of political forces and the populace to the rather "zharenyye" facts: polarization around two main centers of power and completion, on the whole, of the process of political orientation of the active segment of the populace; an increase in the degree of "political independence" of the main state structures, especially the power structures. The distressing conditions of the troops removed from Germany and the Baltic states play a rather considerable role in this. Here is the result: an increase in the significance of chance - even a relatively insignificant incident could cause the situation to blow up and put it out of control.

3. These are the main sociopolitical features of the situation:

A. In the economic sphere - an expansion of the sphere of "impact on economic interests." Added to the strata of the population whose interests are hit hard or who are seriously threatened are the management personnel (including boards) of governmental and private enterprises, and also the stockholders in major commercial organizations.

B. In the sociopsychological sphere, "the people are silent"; the populace has lost faith in the possibility of solving their own problems by legal methods of struggle. This is the threshold of a social explosion. This is confirmed by the trend toward extremism in the populace, an orientation toward leaders who declare themselves to be extremists. The trend has been evident since December 1993.

C. In the ideological sphere the majority of the populace is rejecting serious ideological ways of thinking and shifting to those with a primitive orientation toward practical actions. There is a growth in the popularity of the idea of dictatorship.

4. The structure of the political spectrum. Two main leading political blocs have taken shape in Russia: the bloc with pro-Western orientation of those in power - a bloc of national betrayal; and the opposition bloc oriented toward the renaissance of Russia as an independent geopolitical center of power - a bloc of national renaissance.

The base of the national betrayal bloc is made up of three groupings competing among themselves, those of Yel'tsin, Luzhkov, and Yavlinskiy.

The nucleus of the national renaissance bloc is made up of the left and national-patriotic forces, whose main component and, in many regions, cementing nucleus is the Officers' Union.

As a result of the political struggle in the spring and summer, the remaining political groupings on both sides have, at this stage, lost their significance as leading forces and have been forced to side with one of the political groupings indicated. However, one cannot rule out that, as a result of a further struggle, they will again acquire decisive significance and will again determine the political process.

In each of the main political blocs a united center of control has formed. The national betrayal bloc is directed chiefly from the other side of the ocean. Centralized control of the national renaissance bloc has taken shape by coordinating the actions of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] and the OU [Officers' Union], of other left and

national-patriotic organizations, and by mutual inclusion of the leaders of the organizations in the leadership of an interacting structure.

5. Trends in the development of the political situation in Russia:

—growth in the mass character of political demonstrations by the populace against the regime in the fall and winter. The main cause is the economic difficulties and the growth in the realization of the majority of the active segment of the populace of the fact they have been deceived and the continuation in power of a regime that is disastrous for the country and for themselves;

—predominance in the political demonstrations by the populace of those that come about by chance or are organized by traditionally nonpolitical organizations, change of the latter from making economic demands to making political ones. The main cause is the realization of the populace that the regime is unable and makes no effort to carry out its own promises. Solution of economic problems is determined exclusively by solution of the political question - removal of the regime from power.

—growth of "political independence" at all levels of governmental administration, which makes the consequences of any radical solutions in the area of economics and politics practically unpredictable. The main cause is the realization on the one hand of those who serve in governmental structures at all levels of the instability of their position in conditions of the ruin of the state and, on the other hand, realization of the impunity with which the laws of the state are broken and of the failure on the part of the higher leadership, including the President, to carry out any acts of government.

—increase in the degree of readiness of the regime to use force to preserve its authority, both in the moral and the organizational-technical aspect.

It is revealed in the taking of a series of major measures for concentrating significant forces in and around Moscow, in the shift to open use of force to resolve political differences, as distinguished from past stages, without any sort of ideological or legislative concealment or simulation of it.

Police troops have become a reality. A ring of elite divisions of Internal Troops and Armed Forces has formed around Moscow. They are enveloped by a unified network of control that is autonomous of the General Staff.

The Internal Troops alone number 52 thousand men, and they are armed with attack helicopters and armored equipment. By 21 September five auxiliary regiments of OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] had been brought into Moscow. Even measures at the Totskoye range were taken under the

security of an IT [Internal Troops] regiment and an independent OMON battalion.

Result: In the coming months there will be a sharp increase in the probability of mass disturbances in Moscow and other cities in Russia, mainly those with developed industry, and with the country's Armed Forces being drawn into them. The main grounds may be the economic burdens of the populace, provocation by individual extremist political groupings, and inconsiderate actions by the authorities.

6. The situation in the Armed Forces and trends in its change:

A. In the sphere of the place of the Armed Forces in the state and the relationship with the political leadership, the situation with the Armed Forces may be described as "the Armed Forces are being written off." The essence is that on the one hand the regime does not consider the Armed Forces a reliable executor of punitive functions against the people, and, on the other, they are an obstacle to direct introduction of foreign armies onto the territory of the country for support of the regime. Defense of the country from an external enemy - the main function of the country's Armed Forces - clearly is not needed by the regime, for, as we know, it has friends on the other side of the ocean, while the main enemy is in the country. That is why there cannot and will not be any talk about maintaining combat readiness. The main thing is not to permit the Armed Forces to come out against the regime to the point that they will be ruined completely. The 87 trillion rubles requested by the MoD [Ministry of Defense] leadership as the minimum necessary for combat readiness was cut to 47, while the budget that passed was implemented at less than 40 percent, that is, there is not enough even for payment of officers' salaries and feeding of personnel. Under these circumstances there is no sense in talking about the terrible facts of the literal destruction of the army.

The prospects are that the regime's confidence in the Armed Forces will, in the main, decline constantly, and at the same time there will be attempts to "buy" individual units or larger formations for performing punitive functions, to stain them with blood and thus to bind them ultimately to the regime, making them their servants. With respect to the Armed Forces, a policy of economic suffocation will be conducted more and more openly, directed at self-dissolution of the Armed Forces, combined with mass dismissals at the most favorable times.

The facts testify to all this. In 1992 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation numbered 2.8 million. In 1993, 300 thousand were discharged, and, in 1994, 200 thousand have already been

discharged, with prospects of 400 thousand. Yel'tsin has set a goal of limiting the army's strength to 1.5 million. According to date of the Main KOU [Billeting and Maintenance Directorate] of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, in 1993 there was a shortage of 20 thousand apartments received, while, of the 61.4 thousand slated to be allotted in 1994, only 18 thousand have been given out. In three years the volume of production of arms and military equipment has decreased by 78 percent, and the rate of defense orders of the MIC [Military Industrial Commission] has been reduced by 80 percent. There has been an announcement on introducing a tax on officers' salaries and on doing away with free public transport.

B. In the sociopsychological sphere, there has been a change in the stratification of the officer corps: from being primarily horizontal, it has become primarily vertical. The criterion of sociopsychological identity of the officer has been replaced. Not long ago the determining factor was the place on the professional ladder, military rank, while now it is the attitude toward material values and the job. One may now distinguish three main groups of officers in the officer corps in terms of this criterion: the group of "parasites," those who see in service in the Armed Forces a chance to get rich and hold on to thievery, for whom the concepts of honor, duty, Motherland, and the Oath do not exist. Fortunately this group is not very large. It is mainly made up of officers who are in charge of material means or who are taking part in illegal commercial activities. They are ready to cast prudence to the winds, even to the point of firing on their unarmed people, as long as they can hold on to what they have stolen and the chance to keep on stealing. The most glaring examples of their representatives are those who fired on the Supreme Soviet in 1993 or the "Grachev Nucleus" in the highest leadership of the Armed Forces;

—the group of officer-patriots, those who, conscious of their responsibility to the Motherland, the people, and their own children, remain the loyal Armed Forces of the country and try, each one in his place, to do everything possible to prevent their final breakdown and conversion into a punitive organ of the criminal regime, a curse of the people. For them the concepts of duty, Motherland, and the Oath are sacred. This is now the fastest growing group, judging by how the attitude of the regime toward the country's Armed Forces has changed this year. Judging by the results of summer tours around the regions, the main motives for the shift of officers to these positions are a clear realization that the present authorities, in destroying the country's Armed Forces, are doing this, not out of error or ignorance, but purposely; that our children have no

future under this regime; that the degree of destruction is great and there is no way to get away from it; that there is no one but we ourselves who can save the country. All those who were shining on the political Olympus a year ago and before are not gods at all, but primitive dilettantes or direct enemies. This group's representatives are at all levels of the military hierarchy, although they are mainly grouped in the milieu of the senior officer corps and the regular general officers;

- the "swamp" group, those who hope to sit out the "evil time" or hope that the shocks will not touch them; those who consider themselves "pure military men and do not want to get soiled in politics." This group is now getting smaller at the expense of the filling up of the ranks of the patriots. The base of this group is young officers who have only a little experience with life.

On the subject of the sociopsychological situation in the Armed Forces, one cannot help but notice the growth in social tension in the officer corps. There are a multitude of reasons for this, but let us single out the following:

- the realization by the officers of the personality of the political leadership - not a single one of the lavishly dispensed promises to the officer corps from the moment of the First Army Conference have been kept;
- the realization by the officers of the fact that the regime is not accepted by the people, that the mass demonstrations are not the result of "subversive activities of reaction," but a manifestation of the people's view of the regime as a hostile one. On the whole, the "August 91 syndrome" has disappeared.
- the progressive stratification of the officer corps on the basis of property, the formation of a "military mafia," the growing antagonism between the main mass of officers and this mafia;
- the beginning of officers' understanding the fact that the only way to preserve the state and the Armed Forces and to assure a future for their children and all the people is organized joint actions.

Not more than 10-15 percent of servicemen now support Yel'tsin, mainly those who combine service with commercial activities, while 50 percent are for the radical patriotic idea. Support is bought with money. An officer of the Main Presidential Security Directorate receives two to three times more than a General Staff officer.

On the whole, two main trends predominate in the sociopsychological sphere:

The first - a strengthening of the patriotic wing of the officer corps at the expense of "the swamp" will intensify, and the troops who were brought back from Germany and the Baltic states will play a significant role in this.

The second is an increase in the risk of a social explosion in the army and navy.

On the whole, as the majority of analysts note, the Armed Forces are inclined to a rather great degree to oppose the regime, and a patriotic mood is becoming more and more influential among them. However, the regime has the chance once more to "buy" several scoundrels who will spill blood as a routine and stain the honor of the country's Armed Forces, put them into collision with the people, thus finally destroying them, turning some of them into punitive police formations.

7. Factors that determine the development of the political process in the coming one and a half to two months:
 - A. Degree of organization of political forces, decisiveness of goals, and readiness for action. These characteristics clearly come to the foreground, pushing mass back. This factor creates favorable conditions for forces to come to power that possess the highest level of organization, clear-cut planning, and readiness to risk everything for the sake of power. The forces with greater mass but that are less organized and decisive have considerably less chance of success. The analog is September and October 1917.
 - B. The influence of economic managers. Because of the damage to their economic interests, they are ready for active deeds and can exert a decisive influence on effective stirring up of the laboring masses at the necessary time and in the necessary place.
 - C. The influence in the power structures, primarily in the army and the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. This factor will determine, in the final analysis, the outcome of the struggle for power because of the shift of the struggle primarily to the sphere of politics and force.
 - D. Political power. The role of this factor is growing rapidly and pushing the role of financial might to the background. The role of the latter will decrease, mainly at the expense of the beginning of the "confrontation between capitals" (coming about as a result of the damage to the economic interests of large and middle private enterprise) and the increase in the role of power components in the political quarrel.
 - E. The qualitative-quantitative makeup of the active segment of the population. The social base of the

opposition expands and is reorganized structurally. Added to the most important sociopolitical groups of the population that may merge into the ranks of the active fighters, in addition to the "traditionally" opposing strata, will be those unemployed because of the bankruptcy of government enterprises (especially important here to note those unemployed administrators with broad connections); stockholders in bankrupt major AO, such as MMM; the ruined petty bourgeoisie.

In accordance with what has been stated, presence in the membership of parties of a ready nucleus of expert administrators ready to take on themselves the administration of the country with the coming of power moves to the background. The main thing for the political movement will be implementation of political leadership. Direction of the country will be implemented by "experts," with political control by "commissars."

To some degree the role of mass of a party is leveled out by the administrators' shift to opposition to the government. They are more effectively capable of ensuring the mass quality of the demonstrations, while the task of the party is to organize and lead them.

A possible scenario of actions of the ruling regime and its leaders across the ocean.

Judging by the actions of its representatives, the essence of the basic plan is to keep Yel'tsin in power for the maximum possible time, to lay on him all unpopular decisions and actions, and then, when it becomes obvious that he cannot hold on to his power, change "command."

In this case, there will be continued attempts to unleash either a civil war or local conflicts on Russian territory, to destabilize the situation with a catastrophe at especially important installations, etc. All these actions will most probably be conducted to ensure the continuation of Yel'tsin in power.

The possibility of carrying out this plan fully is determined by the confidence of those who implement it, primarily Yel'tsin and those surrounding him in the personal security of their possessions. This factor makes the success of implementation of this plan dependent on a multitude of chance events, in most cases on a personal level.

In the framework of the struggle to maintain the power of the present ruling political forces, there will begin in the upcoming period a move toward new ideological concealment of their actions, replacing the bankrupt ideas of "the free market." Most likely with demagogic slogans on the bankruptcy of both the communist concept and the capitalist concept, there will develop the concept of social democracy. This will make it possible to some extent to establish

grounds for open international support from the most powerful social-democratic structures, including those in power in a number of major capitalist countries, thus masking their interference in our internal affairs.

Thus, from everything that has been said, it turns out that the country has come to the culminating phase of this era of its development. It literally faces Hamlet's question: "To be or not to be?" The stage of the information-psychological struggle has ended with the defeat of patriotic forces. Foreign intervention actually looms before us. (It was worked out successfully at the Totskoye range.)

Now our country has only two ways left:

The first - final loss of statehood and colonization.

The second - dismissal from power of the criminal ruling regime and the beginning of a renaissance.

It is quite obvious that the regime has no sort of constructive program at its disposal. There is no constructive future ahead and only ruin. If the existing trends are maintained, the downfall of the state and its colonization are inevitable.

8. Tasks of the Officers' Union.

The general order of actions must be oriented toward "saddling the crest of the wave." In essence this amounts to preparing one's structures also for the moment when the social explosion in the country is ripe and the bloc of betrayal begins to carry out the transfer of power, to "saddle" the process decisively, and turn it in a favorable direction. This is possible only with a high degree of organization, a unified scenario of actions in Moscow and the regions, clear-cut coordination of actions with friendly leaders of power structures and the economy. Accordingly, two directions of work are singled out:

1. Preparing the situation. 2. Preparing one's own and interacting structures for actions in an extreme situation.

The main efforts in the first general direction to be concentrated on:

- forming a "profile of the enemy";
- forming in the populace a clear notion of what must be done;
- forming in the populace a clear notion of "who will lead,"

The main efforts in the second general direction are:

- practical elaboration of the organizational structure in key regions of Russia;
- working out a unified scenario of actions and following it precisely;

—establishing a decisive influence in key military units and labor collectives.

Taking into consideration a probable change in emphasis in the ideological struggle, the theme of a national liberation struggle will move up into one of the priority places. It should be presented in such a way as to emphasize the participation, first of all, of international social democrats in the threat to our Country. A firm concept should be formed of the enemy as an international force. In addition, without overshadowing the main propaganda theme, we must gradually reveal the connection of Zionism with the largest world financial-political centers and its role as a world political power. We must strictly measure out the doses of information on this subject, not letting the anti-Zionist struggle grow into unbridled anti-Semitism.

Under the slogans of a national liberation struggle we must disavow attempts to aid the bloc of national betrayal from within: both ideological-propagandistic and otherwise - political, financial, etc.

Power to the Soviets of workers and military representatives.

We are entering the culminating and most decisive stage of the struggle. The matter is unambiguous: either we dismiss the regime from power (by retirement or early elections, etc.) and bring about a renaissance of the country, or we turn into a colony of the West. Everyone who came here has decided this matter for himself. Now we must lead others behind us. Only thus can we gain Victory.

I am convinced that Victory will be ours!

FOR COUNTRY, HONOR, AND DIGNITY!

Officer's Union Demand Government Resign

95UM0193E Moscow POZITSIYA in Russian
No 32 (162) 3 Nov 94 p 9

[Declaration by Officers' Union demanding resignation of government and president and advance election of new administration; date and place not given; "Declaration"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Of the Officers' Union and the Power Party Regarding the Death of Militia Personnel, Violence, Extreme Permissiveness Toward Criminals, and the Criminal Helplessness of the Authorities

Recently in Moscow and other cities there has swept over us a wave of mass murders of militia personnel, of death of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers, sergeants, and privates while performing their official duties.

The Officers' Union has quite a few members of its organization who are involved with work in agencies to

preserve lawfulness. It is unbearably painful to lose comrades in peacetime, when explosions thunder in broad daylight, real battles take place on the streets of the capital, hostages are taken, and violent people mock women and children. In early October the Officers' Union lost a combat friend in Major V.A. Makarov of the militia. At almost the same time, hired killers shot several militiamen at a Moscow market. Just this year, which has not yet ended, around 300 militia personnel have perished.

—This is not just a question of brazenness and extreme permissiveness toward criminal groups or poor professional training of personnel to fight organized crime. The primary cause is found elsewhere.

The militia, like other power structures, can operate effectively only when it protects the citizens of the Great Nation, and not the interests of clannish political and economic-commercial groups. It makes no difference to these clans whether simple people feel at ease in their home town or country or whether agencies for preserving the law are supplied and provided with everything they need. The clans themselves are joining with criminal groups. Civil servants right up to the highest levels are corrupted through and through, privatizers are appropriating the property of the people, the government is stealing, businessmen are pumping billions from the country's pockets into their own. While millions of citizens are deprived of elementary social protection, the regime is spending huge amounts on forming operational police units and larger bodies to fight the opposition and suppress the coming public indignation.

For months there have been so-called "i.o.'s" [actings] in government positions, including an i.o. general prosecutor and an i.o. minister of finance so that, by hiring them in time, they can cover up the helplessness and lack of responsibility of the regime. Moral degradation, drunkenness, and trips abroad "in the cups" with cap in hand disgrace the nation and Russia.

The extreme permissiveness toward criminals with the criminal helplessness of the authorities. The helplessness of the authorities with the absence of pride and honor for the country, the Great Russian people, in the presence of personal enrichment and retention of privileges at the expense of the labor of the common citizen, military man, militia man.

THE UNION OF OFFICERS AND THE POWER PARTY declare to those holding power: We are not left indifferent either to the unpunished death of comrades or the criminal lack of responsibility of the ruling regime, nor apathetic about the fate of Russia, the salvation of the nation.

It is time to answer for the promises made to the people. It is time to ask, from president to minister, when will we live sure about tomorrow?

The time for change has come! Inept windbags must go, and criminal self-seekers must suffer punishment.

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Patriot-Power Party Members will take their place. We need a strong Great Russian Nation! Only then will we be able to protect ourselves, our loved ones, our friends, citizens, and the country from rogues, thieves, and clans that are demoralizing and destroying the Motherland.

OUR DEMAND: The government and president must retire; elections ahead of schedule - in the summer of 1995; power to the Soviets of deputies from the working people and the military.

OUR MOTTOES AND SYMBOLS: Powerism, Justice, Honor, and Dignity of the Russian and the officer.

The Provinces Demand Action

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No 32 (162) 3 Nov 94 pp 10-11

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Fedoseyenko, chief of staff of the Officers' Union; place and date not given; "The Provinces Demand Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Officers' Union and the Power Party determined that the most important task for the summer and early fall was work in the outlying areas of Russia. Our rather small delegations, made up also of deputies of the State Duma and a corps of directors visited the following cities: Volgograd (twice), Leningrad, Vyborg, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Salsk, Rostov (three times), Taganrog, Azov, Krasnodar, Anapa, Sevastopol, Voronezh, Tambov, Lipetsk, Penza, Ryazan, Saransk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Tver, Tula, Bryansk, Orel, Kursk, and Belgorod.

The object of the trips was an assessment of the situation in the provinces, elaboration on this basis of our own position, and practical help and activization of the work of our local organizations.

There were meetings with the most active members of the Officers' Union, the left patriotic forces, Cossacks, labor collectives, managers of enterprises, and also executive and representative bodies of authority. All this made it possible to become acquainted with extensive factual material and draw conclusions that were important for practical activities:

1. The scale of the developing economic catastrophe is unprecedented and the situation in the near future will continue to worsen quickly. Work is paralyzed even in production that was once highly profitable; there is a sharp reduction in personnel everywhere. Payment of many workers' salaries are being held up, the delays reaching several months. The forecasts of enterprise managers for the very near future look grave and many think that society is on the verge of a social explosion. Whereas a year ago we sometimes encounter a point of view that explained the cause of the difficulties as certain miscalculations, errors of individual managers, now at various levels of society

an absolute certainty has ripened that the chief and only cause is the fallacious political course of the country's leadership.

2. Masses of the populace are possessed with the idea of the necessity of an active political struggle for their rights. The natural causes of the summer period somewhat reduce the acuteness of political tension, but everywhere there is a powerful influx of fresh forces of activists of parties and movements, and the sympathy of the overwhelming majority of the populace is on the side of the left and state-patriotic forces. There has been a sharp change in the same direction in the orientation of a significant portion of officials and the corps of directors. The problem here that is agitating people is the unity of all wholesome forces in society, the uniting of opposition to the ruling regime. The slogans that are organizing a broad spectrum of the patriotic forces as a basis for consolidation are the following: union with the former republics of the USSR (especially the Slavic ones) and restoration of Power; a change in the political course, together with a change in political leadership, elimination of the institution of President and the unlimited personal power of B. Yeltsin; restoration of lawfulness and control of the executive structures by higher representative bodies of authority.

Along with the general conclusions, many important observations were made. The Officers' Union has support in practically all patriotic forces in the provinces and in many cases, comes forward as the center of coordination of actions. The reason for this lies in the principles that have been made the basis of its activities - principles that are traditional for the officer corps: great organization and discipline, the concreteness of questions posed and the clear-cut formulation of the present tasks and in the habits of efficient control of its and interacting forces.

Also an important point is the fact that the Officers' Union as a whole and its organizations in the provinces strictly sustain the status of the social movement, do not subordinate their activities to the interests of any political party, taking their bearings from the governmental and patriotic ideas that are common to all wholesome forces. Practical work has convinced many who doubted that strict principles of domestic relationships do not infringe on internal democracy, but only suppress excessive outpouring of emotions and internal dissensions and create a good business style and make organizations truly capable of functioning.

These observations are based on extensive factual material. In many cases the members of the regional councils of the Officers' Union are at the same time a part of the regional leadership of a party and of patriotic movements. In Voronezh Lt. Col. N. Glagolev represents the leadership of "Laboring Voronezh," Col. A. Ledygin, the leadership of the KP RF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]. Also in the Officers' Union's

regional council are members of the leadership of the FKS [National Salvation Front], the RKRK [Russian Communist Workers' Party], and other patriotic societies. In Penza, where Major V. Pervun showed himself to be an able leader, one of the leaders of the KP RF, Lt. Col. V. Nikakoshin, is a member of the council of the Officers' Union. In Lipetsk Maj. Vorobyev also represents the leadership of the KP RF. In Pyatigorsk, where Col. V. Petin leads the Stavropol Kray organization, M. Uralov is at the same time one of the leaders of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], and leaders of the KP RF are also represented. In Tambov, Chairman of the Council of the Officers' Union Lt. Col. N. Agapov has been elected a member of the city Duma with the support of the Communists of the city. Another more striking example of the support of our movement by patriotic forces is in Mordoviya. During our visit to Saransk, after the preliminary work was done, with the personal participation of the leaders of the VKP(b), N. Lityushkin; of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], Yu. Gridnev; and I. Dolgayev, a member of the leadership of the KP RF, an Officers' Union organization for the republic was created. Many examples may be cited that in the aggregate demonstrate that the movement of wholesome opposition forces to unite has already begun in the provinces.

Membership of regular servicemen in the Officers' Union, officially permitted by law, from the moment of creation of the organization, has involved unpleasantness and, ultimately, discharge to the reserve. Now public support has increased to the point that the influx of regular officers has increased sharply, and instances have occurred in which they have headed regional organizations: in Rostov Oblast, Col. V. Bozhenko and in Krasnodar Kray, Maj. N. Kravchenko. At the same time, work with regular officers has recently taken on a qualitatively new sound and now requires the concentration of the main forces of our organizations. The political leadership of Russia is taking special measures, in fact, to redirect all power structures toward police functions, and in the near future may direct them toward suppression of their own people, who have been robbed and oppressed. The experience of October 1993, the obvious economic and political failure of the regime, and the rapidly growing social tension deprive them of their last illusions on this count. The chance for them to remain politically passive and neutral has been exhausted. In this connection, there has begun to appear on a massive scale among officers of the Armed Forces, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], security agencies, and the public prosecutor's office (including so-called elite units) a desire to stimulate and support the actions of the Officers' Union that are directed toward averting such a development of events. Regional Officers' Union organizations must quickly work out forms of action that are appropriate to local conditions and that make it possible to effectively interact with this part of the officer corps. If the majority of officers will demonstrate their unity and will say a resounding "NO," mass tragedies will be

averted. This task is higher than anyone and any calculations and political sympathies. Only we can carry it out.

In the process of traveling, the very important organizational problem of creating subregional structures was resolved. This is dictated by the fact that more than 50 regional Officers' Union branches have appeared, their strength in numbers has grown, and the fact of their increased volume of activity has been the consequence of their attaining organizational maturity. Four such centers of coordination of activities have been organized and are functioning: North Caucasus (leader Col. V. Bozhenko), Northwest (leader Captain Second Rank A. Sirotinskiy), Povolzhye (leader Col. V. Litvinchuk), Chernozem (leader Col. A. Ladygin). It was possible to verify the actual improvement in their manageability in the solution of a practical problem. At the same time, in more than 30 regions on 14 and 20 July and 23 September, mass protest actions were carried out against the Main Military Prosecutor's illegal repeal of the State Duma's amnesty for Officers' Union Chairman Lt. Col. S. Terekhov with respect to the events of September and October 1993.

Keeping in mind the interests of the Power Party, the representatives of other parties, and the corps of deputies who participated in our trips, note was taken of the politically important aspect of the contacts made. During the trips, meetings were held not only with the activists of social and political organizations, but also with enterprise workers' collectives and directors and managers of structures of authority.

In all regions the representatives of the leadership of authority structures found time and the opportunity to meet with us and demonstrated a loyal attitude toward our activities and in some cases gave support. A great impression was made by the meeting with Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Mordoviya N. Biryukov, who was able to win such support from the populace and to choose a political course that enabled him to preserve Soviet power in the republic. He is a strong leader, and we found complete mutual understanding with him. The deputies of the City Duma in Tambov, where 13 of the 16 members are Communists, spoke bitterly about the complete illegality of the newly created organ of representative power. The leaders of executive structures of authority clearly felt the instability of the situation and their position and were actively interested in the point of view of the opposition, understanding the possibility that they would soon come to power.

Meetings at enterprises showed that there is still observed among workers a certain passivity, despite the gravity of their situation. At the same time the directors well understand the near prospects for the final economic collapse of their enterprises and the closing or sale to foreign or domestic, and, for the most part, criminal, capital. They are oriented toward active support of the opposition and precise coordination of actions. There is

a tendency toward creation of workers' committees that would come forth with political demands and join in the preparation for a general political strike with these demands: "Retire the Government and President! Carry out general elections ahead of schedule."

In making a general summary of impressions from the visit, one may draw this main conclusion:

The condition of the populace and the political activists in the provinces, the structures of authority and power, and the socioeconomic conditions are such that in the fall there may begin mass actions directed at changing the political and economic course of the country and replacing the political leadership through elections ahead of schedule. The main condition for their success and a guarantee against escalation into a mass tragic collision is preservation of the unity of the plan of action of all patriotic forces, reliable communication and controllability of structures both "vertically" by means of their central political organs, as well as "horizontally" at the interregional level by means of subregional coordinating organs.

Lt. Col. V.V. Fedoseyenko,
Chief of Staff, Officers' Union

Terekhov Protests Anonymous Letter

95UM0193D Moscow POZITSIIYA in Russian
No 32 (162) 3 Nov 94 pp 8, 11

[Letter from S. Terekhov, chairman of Officers' Union, to television station protesting anonymous letter; 24 Oct 1994; place not given: "OPEN LETTER to the Management of the NTV Television Company and to the Director of the "Itogi" Program, Ye. Kiselev"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

This Sunday 23 October on "Itogi," in front of millions of television viewers, there was broadcast one version of the death of Dmitriy Kholodov, military correspondent for the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS.

There was nothing surprising about this except for one "but..." This version (and there have been dozens put forth in recent days) directly concerned the Officers' Union?! The Officers' Union was presented to the eyes of a broad public as an organization that supposedly, in revenge for the events of September and October and the bloody tragedy of the 1993 overthrow of the government, had decided to get revenge on Defense Minister P. Grachev and the ministry's leadership - corrupt criminal military clans. And not only to get revenge, but (here is where there is a limit or lack of it in "democratic" mass information media) "by multifariously calculated combinations, concentrating righteous wrath and the indignation of the right and left on the personalities of Grachev and Burlakov."

The leadership of the Officers' Union asks the addressees and broadcasters of this letter:

Why, out of all the officially published versions in the press did there suddenly come up and get broadcast by an "anonymous author" on "Itogi" a version that with blasphemy insults the honor and dignity of officers of the Union and the blessed memory of Dmitriy Kholodov, whom we respect.?

Why on the eve of an aggravation of the sociopolitical situation and the crisis of power in the country does someone form the "picture of an enemy" and joyfully give the public the cheap, distracting device "anonymous author": an "honorable and, in recent decades, most outstanding" - in B. Yeltsin's word - minister of defense, as if again the want to shift the blame to "extremists and terrorists" from the Officers' Union, who will stop at nothing?

Excuse me, good gentlemen, but they are more rhetorical, and thus formulated in a lengthy manner.

The Officers' Union for the last year has dozens of times been subjected to provocations both from within and without, has been restrained, its members brutally killed and beaten unmercifully in defending the House of Soviets. The chairman of the Union, Lieutenant Colonel S. Terekhov became the first victim of the times of last year's autumn overthrow of the government, and, to this day, against and in violation of the State Duma's amnesty act, is persecuted as a criminal. With all this, the Duma deputies say nothing and evidently are expecting the fate of the Supreme Soviet.

A year ago Grachev gave a command to fire on the higher legislative authorities, and today stops at nothing. The corrupt and morally degenerate military leadership counts on "its" president. The example of Burlakov is not needed in the commentaries. And what are you hoping for Mr. Kiselev?

But we, the Officers' Union, do not intend to keep silent.

We have done and will do everything so that the truth of the criminals in the government, who are destroying the state and the army, will open the way to the people. We will fight for our honor as officers and the dignity of citizens of the Great Nation. We are law-abiding citizens.

Mr. Kiselev, "don't look for a black cat in a dark room, especially if there isn't one there." Don't touch and don't soil the Officers' Union. The time of changes is coming! You must prove the "anonymous author's" version in court and why it was given in such an intriguing thriller genre against the good name of the Officers' Union. Get your lawyers ready!

In turn, we confirm what we wrote in the letter of condolences to the editors of "MK" [MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS]: We bow our heads before the brave Dmitriy Kholodov, who uncovered corruption and crime in the highest echelons of power, came out boldly against those people who are so repugnant to every honest officer, the leaders of the destruction and plundering of the army - Generals Grachev and Burlakov and

their other "colleagues"... Mr. Kisilev, we advise you to use signed letters and not to broadcast anonymous letters to the whole country. Your "maneuvers" with them with not leave us indifferent. We operate openly. Do you have enough conscience and honor to accept the challenge? As a beginning, accept some good advice: Don't play behind-the-scenes games with the dirty hands of your puppeteers.

We have the honor, THE CENTRAL VOLUNTARY COUNCIL OF THE OFFICER'S UNION Chairman of the Officers' Union Lt. Col. S. Terekhov 24 October 1994

Yaroslavl Garrison Bribery Incident Detailed

95UM0225A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Mikhail Ovcharov, Yaroslavl: "The Military Procurator and the Military Commissar Took a Bribe From a Soldier's Mother"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Certain details have become known concerning the incident in which Major of Justice S. Pichugin, military procurator of the Yaroslavl garrison, and Colonel N. Vasyutin, rayon military commissar of the garrison, were caught red-handed by Yaroslavl counterintelligence personnel, as was reported by IZVESTIYA two days ago.

It turns out that the army procurator and the commissar took a bribe of 3 million rubles from the soldier's mother in order to get her son assigned to one of the military units in Yaroslavl Oblast. That was related by journalists by Major-General Yuriy Afonin, chief of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] for Yaroslavl Oblast.

He emphasized that, despite the rumors that have been circulating in the city, the point at issue in this instance is not Chechnya. The operation to detain Pichugin and

Vasyutin was well prepared and was successfully carried out by personnel from the FSK for Yaroslavl Oblast, jointly with FSK military counterintelligence personnel. Currently the criminal case is being accepted for processing by the procuracy of Moscow Military District. The bribe-takers (if, of course, their guilt is proven) are threatened with confinement for up to ten years.

Major-General Afonin deemed it unnecessary to give any other details concerning this case, stating that this was in the interests of the investigation that is only now beginning. He appealed to the journalists to be patient and to show fewer emotions, and promised them that he would inform them subsequently about the course of the case. But appeals are appeals, and you must agree that taking two army bribe-takers into custody is definitely no ordinary matter when such passions are raging around Chechnya and when soldiers' mothers from the ancient Russian city on the Volga fearlessly set off for Grozny in order to get their sons out of the bloody slaughter. One does not have to be particularly intelligent after that to conjecture that bribes have to be involved here.

Incidentally, according to information provided by the SEVERNYY KRAY oblast newspaper, dozens of soldiers who deserted from military units because of hazing and insults are currently serving sentences that they received at trials where military procurator Pichugin was the prosecutor. The newspaper makes the assumption that certain of those unfortunate individuals had simply been unable to buy themselves off, since they did not have any money.

It is interesting, SEVERNYY KRAY writes, that for almost 60 years there had been no arrests among the workers in the oblast procuracy. The most recent one was the sensational "procurators' case" in 1937. But at that time they were tried not for taking bribes or for having perpetrated other crimes, but because they did not want to be accomplices of those who had converted the country into a GULAG.

UKRAINE

Shmarov Interviewed on Access to Western Military Technologies

95UM0211A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
19 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Mykolayovych Shmarov by Ukrinform correspondent Oleksiy Trotsenko under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Will Ukraine Gain Civilized Access to Western Markets?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *This problem is gaining paramount significance for our young independent nation today. Why? A small historical digression will help us get the answer. Recall that during the Cold War that was declared by the Western countries on the former Soviet Union, everything possible was done to block its access to the latest technologies. And that led in turn to a slowdown in the country's economic development. Those restrictions were automatically transferred to the young independent nations—the former union republics, including Ukraine—after the breakup of the USSR.*

What is being done in our nation today to get rid of such restrictions?

A correspondent from Ukrinform posed these and other questions to Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov, who heads the Government Commission on Export Controls (UKEK).

[Trotsenko] Valeriy Mykolayovych, the latest plenary session of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was held, as you know, in Sweden at the beginning of last October. Delegations from the 25 countries that participate in the regime discussed topical problems of collaboration in controlling the non-proliferation of missiles, and exchanged information on international transfers of missile equipment and technologies. They also discussed the participation of other nations, including Ukraine, in the MTCR. Please say a few words about that.

[Shmarov] Consultations with representatives of certain nations who took part in that function were indeed held at the last plenary session of the MTCR regime, which took place on October 4-6 of last year, with regard to the prospects for expanding the circle of participants in the MTCR. The question of bringing Russia into the MTCR as soon as possible was considered in particular. The stance of the MTCR countries was more restrained with regard to the participation of other nations, including Ukraine, in the regime. The decision on the accession of Ukraine to the MTCR was linked with its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the institution of an appropriate system of export controls in Ukraine. One positive element is the recognition by all members of the MTCR of the fact that the accession of Ukraine, as a potential supplier of modern missile hardware, would foster the further development of controls

over the non-proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

The countries participating in the regime have displayed considerable interest lately in establishing direct contacts with Ukraine. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, which is chairing the MTCR at this time, advanced a proposal pertaining to the possibility of a visit to Ukraine by experts from Sweden, the United States, Canada and Germany in January-February 1995. The purpose of the visit would be to inform the Ukrainians on the rules and procedures of the MTCR prevailing at the present time, as well as to obtain from Ukraine information on its state system of export controls, including a whole set of issues connected with the presence of a regulatory and legal foundation in our country, along with the corresponding institutions and organizations involved in the monitoring of administrative and other procedures for review and decision-making in the field of controls on the non-proliferation of missile technologies.

[Trotsenko] Do the actual preconditions exist, in your opinion, for the accession of Ukraine to the MTCR?

[Shmarov] A memorandum of understanding regarding the transfer of missile hardware and technologies was signed last year between the governments of Ukraine and the United States. The parties, in accordance with that memorandum, assumed obligations pertaining to controls on the transfer of missile hardware or technologies in accordance with the guiding principles of the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR].

The government has issued the appropriate instructions to the Government Commission on Export Controls, the Expert Technical Committee (ETK) of the Cabinet of Ministers, and a number of ministries and agencies, in fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the government to bring the regulatory and legal basis of export controls into conformity with the requirements of the MTCR. Proposals for this have now been forwarded for coordination with the government of Ukraine.

The conditions have thus been created for the resolution of the issue of the entry of Ukraine into the MTCR and, in my opinion, the accession of Ukraine to the MTCR.

[Trotsenko] When they wanted to deny us acceptance for Ukraine in influential international organizations or accession to important international acts in past years, as a rule, they referred first and foremost to the fact that our country, they said, had not acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Now we have done so. Will this have any effect on the accession of Ukraine to the MTCR as well?

[Shmarov] Yes, undoubtedly, the accession of Ukraine to the NPT will further the resolution of the issue of Ukraine's accession to the MTCR. This is brought about by the fact that only an aggregate of measures to control the non-proliferation of the most unsafe types of

weapons, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as the missile means for their delivery, can actually foster a strengthening of security in the world.

[Trotsenko] I would like to hear from you, if briefly, about measures to improve the system of export controls in Ukraine, and improvements in the work of the expert technical commission.

[Shmarov] The point of improving the system of Ukrainian export controls is to ensure technical sophistication and legal support at a level such that our state will have the capability to fulfill its international obligations pertaining to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and with subsequent accession to the existing international control regimes, thereby opening up access for ourselves to markets for the sale of goods that are subject to export controls, as well as to provide access for Ukraine to contemporary technologies and attract foreign investments.

The Government Commission on Export Controls has done a great deal of work over the past year to arrange mutual understanding among the ministries and agencies that have some relation to the realization of export controls within the limits of its national system.

The Expert Technical Commission of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has been created and has started its work; as a state executive body on issues of export controls, it will simultaneously perform the functions of the working body of the UKEK.

The further development of the state system of export controls in Ukraine should be oriented toward the resolution of a few conceptual issues

This pertains primarily to the accession of Ukraine to existing international control regimes; the first step in that direction should be to consider a strengthening of the ETK, which has been given responsibility for the resolution of these issues.

The necessity of organizing analytical work, with a regard for all aspects of export controls as an integral function of an independent state, is the second problem in the gradual development of a national system of export controls.

It would be expedient, aside from the standard support for such work, to unite all of the concerned ministries and agencies into a unified information expanse as soon as possible, under the overall management of the UKEK-ETK, for the sake of the prompt exchange of information in the interests of preparing well-founded decisions based on the performance of analytical work.

The creation of a new, unified system of automation is an important constituent element of improving the system of export controls. It is expected to be structured on the basis of the use of advanced computer hardware,

electronic communications, modern means of safeguarding secrecy when processing information etc.

It should be added that prominent specialists on these issues in foreign countries had a high regard for the existing state system of export controls. Ukraine, as was demonstrated by the negotiations and an exchange of experience, is on the right road with regard to building an effective system of export controls.

[Trotsenko] How will the system of controls over the exports of our country be improved? Do you have the creation of regional branches in mind?

[Shmarov] That question is not being posed right now. Subsequent experience will show the most expedient path for the structural improvement of the system of export controls. But now, as has already been indicated, it is more important to arrange the interaction of the expert technical commission with all of the concerned ministries and agencies.

[Trotsenko] Ukraine is expected to be visited soon by both a representative from the United States of America and representatives of several of the leading Western European countries, in connection with all of the problems we have been discussing in our interview. Please say a few words about that.

[Shmarov] The question of the functioning of the state system of export controls is the focus of the leading Western countries, the more so as influential circles there are making the question of the receipt of financial and other aid by Ukraine for its accession to international control regimes dependent on the level of development of its state system of controls over the non-proliferation of all types of weapons and dual-use goods and services.

Ukraine is arranging business contacts in this area with many foreign countries.

We have cooperated with the corresponding bodies for export controls of foreign countries (the United States, Germany, Japan and Norway, among others) in order to make use of world experience in improving national systems of export controls.

A visit to Ukraine by representatives of a quadripartite group from the MTCR regime (including experts from Sweden, the United States, Canada and Germany) is expected soon (January-February) in order to familiarize Ukrainians with the regulations, procedures and norms prevailing in the MTCR, as well as to obtain information on the system of export controls in Ukraine.

The director of the Washington office of an independent union of legal scholars on world security will be coming to Kiev in the second half of January, to work jointly with Ukrainian specialists on improving the legislative foundation of the system of export controls in Ukraine.

Permanent business contacts are maintained with representatives of the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce in the United States, with regard to

granting Ukraine technical assistance for the creation of an automated system of export controls.

[Trotsenko] Thank you very much for the interview, Valeriy Mykolayovich.

Major General Palamarchuk Notes Progress to Non-Nuclear Status

95UM0224A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets: "Ukraine on the Path to Non-Nuclear Status"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Now that Ukraine has acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the START-I Treaty has finally taken effect, official Kiev has launched the practical implementation of all measures connected with nuclear disarmament and the actual gaining of non-nuclear status. That was the topic of the last briefing at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.*

The journalists were informed that the latest meeting of official delegations from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the United States was held in Kiev, and it discussed ways of utilizing the Nunn-Lugar funds most effectively. Those funds, in the amount of 185 million dollars, have to be used for the removal of nuclear warheads to Russia, as well as for the destruction of missiles and the silos in which those missiles were accommodated on the territory of Ukraine. The representatives of the Ukrainian defense department, together with the American specialists, discussed the progress of the deliveries of the special equipment to Ukraine that will be used in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. The representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense also visited Pervomaysk, where they inspected a missile launch silo, and Kharkiv, where a storage facility for the components of liquid missile fuel is being constructed in the town of Shevchenkovo using American funds.

Both delegations reached agreement during the consultations that social problems of the servicemen in the strategic forces would also be solved along with the destruction of the Ukrainian strategic weapons, since almost three thousand military of the 43rd Missile Army do not have their own housing.

The START-I Treaty, however, aside from the destruction of the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union, also envisages a considerable number of verifications with the participation of all of the countries that are part of that treaty, for the purpose of monitoring what is being cut back, where and how. That was emphasized by National Committee of Ukraine on Issues of Disarmament Deputy Chairman and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Major-General Anatoliy Palamarchuk, who was invited to the briefing. He further clarified that "The treaty provides for twelve types of inspections in all, as well as the continuous monitoring of the plant that ended production of the SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles for the RS-22

mobile missile launchers. The locations in Ukraine subject to inspection are Pavlohrad, Mykhaylsky, Khmelnytsky, Pervomaysk, Pomyrky, Sarny, Uzyn and Pryluky. The United States of America, in accordance with the treaty, established continuous monitoring by a group headed by the director of the agency for on-site inspections, U.S. Army Brigadier General Gregory Hovan, at the Pavlohrad Mechanical Plant on 12 January 1995. I would like to point out that a precedent exists for continuous oversight in Russia today. The United States has been performing such oversight at the Votkinsk plant for six years now.

The very fact of the cutbacks, that the missiles and nuclear warheads are being destroyed, is undoubtedly a sign that Ukraine is fulfilling entirely the international obligations it has assumed, as was pointed out by Major-General Anatoliy Palamarchuk.

He also indicated, however, that Ukraine itself, owing to the lack of funds, is not able to perform similar inspectional activity on the territory of other countries that are participants in the START-I treaty, even though it has the right to do so.

I asked what fate awaits the modern, solid-fuel SS-24 missiles that are now in service with the 43rd Missile Army, and which were made before the visit of the American inspectors to the Pavlohrad plant. Those missiles, after all, are proposed to be used either in the space field or for other needs. The general answered this question quite laconically by saying, "We will do everything that is envisaged by the START-I treaty. We will wait and see."

Antonets at Vinnytsya Meeting on Civil-Military Cooperation

95UM0224D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
14 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed news item from Ukrainian Air Force press center: "Collaboration With Commercial Aviation Companies Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A council of the Air Force command with representatives of the commercial aviation firms of Ukraine took place on January 12 in Vinnytsya, where the results of the joint activity over 1994 were summarized and an analysis of the effectiveness of the performance of paid air shipments and the expediency of further collaboration of the military-transport aviation with those aviation companies was made.

Air Force Commander Lieutenant-General V. Antonets indicated that even though commercial activity has never been the basis of their service activity for the fliers, contemporary life has forced the military to seek ways of escaping the difficult situation that our country, including the armed forces, is in today. The budgetary financing of the army, including military aviation, is virtually not being done. They have to count primarily

on the extrabudgetary receipt of funds. The Minister of Defense has thus given the military the task of finding those funds themselves.

This collaboration between the military fliers (and first and foremost military-transport aviation) and the commercial aviation companies of Ukraine has been going on for two years now, and has had pretty good results. Almost 1.5 million dollars and more than 900 million Russian rubles have been received by the Ministry of Defense over the last year alone, along with receipts equivalent to about 3.3 million dollars in the national currency.

The council discussed not so much the achievements as the shortcomings that are impeding the work. Quite a few of the aviation companies are not meeting their contract obligations. Only 50 of the 110 aircraft leased to them are making flights. Why are the rest not flying? The engines are not being repaired, the service lives of the aircraft are not being extended and there is no technical support. That work, after all, is unprofitable for the aviation companies. They owe such a state institution as the armed forces more than three million dollars.

The leadership of the Air Force has decided not to reach new contracts in 1995 with aviation companies that are not meeting their contract obligations. Contracts with the debtor companies will be reached only after they have paid their debts entirely.

U.S. Aided Conversion Efforts at 'Elayet Kyiv' Explored

95UM0224C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
19 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Captain Serhiy Zhurets: "This Is a New Affair, but as Needed as the Air—Said Leonid Kuchma in Answering a Question About the Enterprise 'Alliant Kiev'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On January 16 President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Valeriy Shmarov, U.S. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Ukraine William Miller, the firm of Alliant Techsystems Vice President Kenneth Jenson, and its director for demilitarization Larry Blagdon, officially opened a newly built enterprise for the comprehensive reprocessing of ordnance that is unsuitable for use.

Bearing in mind the level of entrepreneurship, it is not difficult to understand the significance that is being assigned to the activity of the Ukrainian-British-American joint venture Alliant Kiev. The consequences of the Cold War, after all, are more than the nuclear warheads that are able to destroy the plant several times over. The "cold" past is also arsenals overloaded with conventional ordnance—mines, shells and missiles. Some of them are now unsuited for combat utilization, but they have not become less dangerous

because of that. The threat of an accident with unforeseen material and ecological consequences, on the contrary, is only increasing.

The joint venture Alliant Kiev, for the salvage of conventional ordnance, was created for the purpose of eliminating that threat. It was launched two years ago, after prolonged negotiations with the Ukrainian government. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Ministry of the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] and Conversion of Ukraine, the British trading company of (Rapierbays) Ltd.—experienced in working with the CIS countries—and the American firm of Alliant Techsystems, which has been one of the largest suppliers of ordnance to the Pentagon for half a century now, became the partners in the Alliant Kiev company.

When orders for weaponry decreased after the Cold War, the company was closely occupied with the reprocessing and neutralization of ordnance and explosive devices. Specialists rejected the traditional methods of burning, blowing up and burying unsafe mines, shells and missiles. Alliant Techsystems has preferred to develop effective technologies for the comprehensive reprocessing of obsolete ordnance. Those technologies were also employed in building the plant at the Ukrainian arsenal in Ichnyansky Rayon of Chernihiv Oblast. Some of the 300,000 tonnes of munitions that are at the bases and storage dumps of the armed forces of Ukraine, and that are unsuitable for combat application and are becoming a significant accident or ecological risk, are located there.

The process complex, with a total value of 17 million dollars, includes sorting, diffusion and cutting shops. In the opinion of Alliant Techsystems Vice President Kenneth Jenson, this is the first enterprise on the territory of the CIS at which the latest technology is employed for the recovery of ordnance. He is talking about the cutting up of the munitions using high-pressure liquids. The enterprise will be able to process five tonnes of high-caliber shells a day from now on. The overall contract for Alliant Kiev envisages the reprocessing of 220,000 tonnes of munitions.

The operating plan for the Alliant Kiev joint venture is figured for five years. The total income from the sale of the reprocessed components of the ordnance (brass, steel, copper, powder and explosives) over that time on the domestic and foreign markets will be 100 million American dollars. Ukraine will receive half of the profits—that despite the fact that the Alliant Kiev venture is entirely self-financing, and will receive no funds from Ukraine for the creation of the reprocessing plants. All of the expenditures are still being made at the expense of the American partner.

Such interest, aside from the profits expected in the future, could also be explained by the fact that Alliant Techsystems, in addition to the recovery of obsolete munitions, is planning to propose to the Ukrainian government and military department a series of other demilitarization projects, and that aspect, in my

opinion, is worthy of particular attention. The discussion here, after all, concerns the appearance of a new area, a new sphere, where the capacity of the military-industrial complex and other enterprises could be utilized. A demilitarization market, so to speak, is being created—something opposite the traditional market for arms and services, but directly connected with it. Large amounts of money, after all, were spent during the Cold War by the countries participating in the military alliances for the creation of new types of weapons and ordnance, as well as their stockpiling. Those reserves today exceed the requirements of the armies considerably, on the one hand, and the munitions lose their quality and sooner or later become unsuitable for use, on the other. This problem is faced by almost all countries. As for Ukraine in particular, the quantity of ordnance at arsenals, storage dumps and bases of the armed forces unsuitable for combat use increases by 10,000—15,000 tonnes each year. Several billion karbovantsi overall are spent every year for the upkeep of arsenals that are absolutely not needed by our army. The priorities of the Ukrainian defense industry under these circumstances must be more than penetrating the world arms market alone.

But the cause of beating swords into plowshares in the fields of demilitarization remains something of a novelty for domestic firms and the enterprises in the VPK. No order for the production of this or that type of weapon has yet provided for its subsequent and mandatory recovery. The contemporary contracts of Alliant Techsystems with the Pentagon for the production of the MK-50 light torpedoes (as with other contracts, incidentally, for the manufacture of munitions), in contrast, include a section on the dismantling and recovery of the propulsion unit of that torpedo after the conclusion of its safe and reliable service life. This approach has not been employed here, and it is thus not surprising that domestic technologies for the reprocessing of munitions proposed by the Commonwealth association of enterprises, according to the findings of specialists, still permit the reprocessing of just 30 percent of the ordnance that is unsuitable for use.

This difficulty, of course, is a temporary one. But something more important than time is required for the creation of reliable reprocessing technologies: money. The strong potential financial capabilities of Alliant Techsystems allowed then to break into the Ukrainian market. All of this taken together was the basis for the fact that priority in this matter still belongs to our foreign colleagues, even though we ourselves could end up in far from last place.

Antonets, Proskurin Discuss Tu-160, Tu-95 Sales to Russia

95UM0224E Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
20 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed news item from press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Further Fate of the Strategic Bombers is Discussed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of military delegations of Russia and Ukraine was held in Kiev, at which the possibility of selling the Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers to the Russian Federation was discussed. Ukraine, as is well known, inherited those aircraft after the breakup of the former USSR.

An immediate opportunity for the sale of the aircraft was ascertained during the negotiations between the delegations, headed by Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant-General Volodymyr Antonets for Ukraine and Air Force of the Russian Federation Long-Range Aviation Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Proskurin for Russia.

Russian experts will be coming to Ukraine soon to assess the technical condition of the aircraft. They will, together with their Ukrainian colleagues, devise a uniform method for evaluating the quality of the bombers.

Major General Petrov Speaks on Air Force Combat Training

95UM0224F Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
17 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya: "Air Force Staff Conducts Exercises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new training year in the Air Force was launched with exercises to bring units and subunits to various levels of combat readiness. Theoretical classes and exercises to shift the Air Force from a peacetime to wartime footing were held the other day at the staff and directorates of this branch of the Air Force.

Air Force Chief of Staff Major-General Yuriy Petrov and the chiefs of the directorates and services spoke to the officers on organizing indoctrination work during a period of bringing the Air Force to an enhanced state of combat readiness, and on the social-psychological climate in the locations where air units are stationed.

Practical matters of notifying officers of an alarm were also rehearsed. The subordinates of Senior Warrant Officer Petro Rymysky, the commander of a platoon from the support battalion for the Air Force staff, worked in particularly fruitful fashion. The officers got to their service locations on the alarm in good time thanks to them.

T-54's, T-55's Dismantled at Lviv Plant

95UM0224B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
26 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya: "Another Lot of Battle Tanks Has Been Destroyed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of inspectors was able to be convinced of that when they visited the Lviv Mechanical Plant on January 24. Ukraine, in accordance with international agreements for cutbacks in conventional arms in Europe, is obligated to destroy a significant

quantity of combat hardware, including tanks. The aforementioned enterprise is engaged in the dismantling of armored vehicles that are being taken out of service. More than one lot of the until quite recently still fearsome tanks has already been cut into bits here. This work is being performed in systematic fashion, and under the monitoring of international inspection groups.

The first period in the third stage of the cutbacks in combat vehicles, launched on November 9 of last year, has just come to a close. This time 93 tanks—of which seventeen were T-54s and seventy nine were T-55s [as published]—were destroyed by prior agreement.

The deputy chief of the plant for the destruction work, Lieutenant-Colonel Stefan Magola, told the guests at a briefing that was held the day the inspectors arrived about the technology for dismantling and cutting up the combat vehicles, the dispositions of the shops and yards that are occupied with the destruction of the tanks, and the sequence of operations.

The head of the inspection group, James Kenneth (Dyaibili) from the United States, introduced his colleagues and talked about the aims and tasks of the group. The group included another five people from the United States, and one representative each from Italy, Netherlands and Norway.

The inspectors studied quite closely the scraps of armor that were left after the tanks were cut up, and checked the correspondence of the plant numbers etched on the hulls, turrets and guns to the lists that had been passed along to them.

The inspection group was presented with another 91 tanks that are subject to cutbacks for inspection. (Dyaibili) and his colleagues were satisfied. The inspectors had no criticism of the destruction of the tanks.

I would point out, for my part, that a considerable portion of the tanks were cut up in such a way that they could be used for the assembly of tractors.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY & CONVERSION

Glukhikh on Arms Performance in Chechnya

LD2301195395 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Now for the problems we come up against in world markets. The world arms expo will be held in Abu Dhabi in March this year, but already at this stage, work is underway in the West to discredit Russian arms, underpinned to a large extent on the performance of Russian military equipment in Chechnya. [passage omitted]

[Begin Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Industry, recording] Both sides use our arms in Chechnya; no other arms are in use there. I would like everyone to understand that both sides use our arms. Were the Americans to say that thanks to their equipment, our tanks got burned, well, then we could, in my view, have a discussion about something tangible.

The arms left in Chechnya were not state-of-the-art arms. Yes, we do have high-precision weapons; we do possess them, indeed.

Does the army now have a sufficient quantity of new equipment? No, it does not; I can say this with full responsibility; it does not, indeed. The main task, surely, is to make certain that the army has more weapons that are more modern; and the industry, the army, and the country's financial bodies alike must tackle it—this is the main thing. [end recording]

Security Council Commission Concern over Low R and D Spending

LD2101163095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1558 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 21 (Interfax)—The Security Council Commission for Scientific and Technical Issues of the Defence Industry has suggested to the government a range of measures designed to develop and produce advanced types of weapons and equipment for Russia's army, the commission's secretary Yuriy Andreyev told Interfax.

According to him, the general state of affairs in the research centers and design offices of Russia's military-industrial complex does not make it possible to reequip the armed forces in technical terms effectively. Last year the ratio between spending on research and design and on the upkeep of the personnel made up only one-fifth of the similar index in the USA (0.1 against 0.498).

"Military spending in Russia fell so low that currently it makes up only one half of military spending in such a country as Japan (last year Japan's military spending

amounted to \$40 billion), not to mention such countries as the USA, France or Germany," Andreyev said.

In the meantime, he stressed, troops in Russia number 2.2 million persons, or 1.46 percent of the country's population—almost twice as high as world standards. "In conditions of economic crisis Russia cannot afford to keep such an army," Andreyev noted.

The Security Council commission calls—with a view to equipping a smaller army with advanced arms and military equipment—for calculating Russia's military spending in a percentage of the gross national product, for involving funds from the private sector in financing research centers, for bringing the share of expenses on scientific and technical needs in the state order for defence to 15 percent, including the expenses for fundamentally new designs to 3-5 percent.

As Andreyev said, this may include the development of special ammunition on the basis of uranium-238 for firearms capable of destroying all types of armored vehicles, a tank capable of flying at the height of one or two meters and equipped with the weapons of ordinary tanks, an amphibious supertank capable of firing missiles from under water, and a new firearm capable of making up to 2000 shots a minute with the initial bullet speed of up to 2000 meters a second.

Kamov Financial Problems After Ka-50

95UM0202C Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 6 Jan 95 p 2

[Article from Maritime Kray by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Correspondent Valeriy Golovin under rubric "A Problem": "Nets for the 'Black Shark'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The fourth-generation helicopter K-50, created in a regime of strict secrecy and nicknamed "Black Shark," later won exactly as much fame as it was deprived of by fate. Having presented itself to the world only a few years ago, it already has participated in three prestigious international air shows, where authorities in the aviation field unanimously assessed the K-50 as the world's best combat helicopter. Military people from NATO countries had to sit down urgently to study the Russian helicopter's tactical performance characteristics. By the way, there it is called today none other than "Werewolf," which corresponds to the original no less accurately, so to speak.*

Later the Black Shark became the main character in a film of the same name, showing its fantastic wonders on the screen in battles against the Afghan mujaheddin. They say that after the film premiered, Arsenyev Progress Aircraft Association workers and engineers who created this helicopter were literally in shock on seeing the potential capabilities of their own creation. According to a statement by Plant Test Pilot Viktor Obrevko, while the Black Shark's involvement in Afghanistan is no more than artistic fancy, the K-50's flight and combat qualities as seen by the audience of

this picture are the very same, as they say. In short, people know about the new helicopter, they talk about it, and they openly admire it in paying tribute to domestic thought and intellect, which, despite everything, have not died and have not dissolved in the present Russian muddle.

The conclusion pronounced after an official journalistic trip to the far-eastern city of Arsenyev may seem even more unexpected to some. We do not have a Black Shark at all in Russia that gives NATO strategists a decent headache. It seemingly is here, it really exists and is fully tangible, but at the same time it does not exist, since this Russian muddle lies in the fact that in the course of several years Progress, which now is a joint-stock aircraft company with the state having the controlling block of shares, did not bring enough K-50's into the world even to form one and only one squadron. True, I was shown another seven Black Sharks in varying degrees of readiness in the final assembly shop, but there was absolutely no assembly work going on.

"There is almost R90 billion of this incomplete work here," says Progress Chief Engineer Vyacheslav Matuznyy, "and not only of the Black Shark. A half-year ago they placed a prototype of the An-74 aircraft here, but we still cannot completely master it in any way. Our new series consists of business-class helicopters on the Mi-38 skid chassis. And of course there are sports aircraft, a long-time plant monopoly. Well, in order to turn all this into finished products, into our traditional commodity, it is necessary to find R30 billion. The delivering enterprises are ready to provide constructions, parts and assemblies, but the snag is that they all demand prepayment..."

Although Progress has a rather wide subject matter of orders, combat helicopters still remain the chief one. The plant has been Russia's largest manufacturer of this class of helicopter for over 20 years now, but Arsenyev personnel put out the last combat helicopter back in 1989. It was the Mi-24, which is in the Russian Army inventory even today. After it, the plant had a state program to master the K-50. The role of the next generation of combat helicopters was set aside specifically for the Black Shark, but, as often happens with us, they approved the state program, but forgot to open its financing.

Arsenyev Mayor Yevgeniy Prikhodko, who knows the problems of Progress perfectly well, is convinced that if the Black Shark is not placed in series quickly, Russia may be left entirely without combat helicopters by the year 2000. For now, however, the aircraft builders have ended up in a desperate financial situation, essentially having a one-hundred percent state order. The state is in no hurry to repay debts for products already purchased from the plant, and the plant naturally is up to its ears in debt. Today its credit indebtedness already approaches 40 billion, and workers have not been receiving pay for several months already. It has come down to where, in

order to give people what they have earned, the heads of Progress simply are taking money from a commercial bank at 170 percent annual interest, with absolutely no idea how they will repay those credits.

Why did it happen this way? Well, because to the honor of plant personnel, they still took up the Black Shark and today this is Russia's only new combat helicopter, which has been mastered, has passed state tests and is ready for series start-up. But all this was done by incurring debt, where they were investing in the K-50's creation a large part of what was being earned from selling other military equipment. And so indeed, with us any initiative is punishable...

It would appear fully apropos to ask here: In essence, who needs the Black Shark, the plant or the native state? If it is still the native homeland, then just how can we extricate this long-suffering helicopter from the nets in which it is so hopelessly enmeshed? I was convinced in Arsenyev that there are two options for solving the problem. It is possible to sell a portion of the shares belonging to the state, but then it inevitably loses control over the plant. And it is possible to make a government-level decision on paying the plant debt and to begin full-scale production of these combat helicopters, which automatically will nudge the other production of Progress needed very much by the country. The government decision is the best option, for Black Shark is our know-how, and it would be a real gamble to sell this helicopter abroad without having it in our inventory. But the Americans, for example, who are rather attentively following the situation forming around the K-50, are ready to buy it at once if you like. Moreover, it seems they are fully suited by the difficulties which have arisen in connection with this. According to certain data, the Pentagon presently is preparing a similar program based on its Apache helicopter, intending to adopt specifically our Russian doctrine of military operations using helicopters. Just so we are not late here.

But for now seven almost ready Black Sharks stand forgotten in the Progress final assembly shop, and no one knows when they will succeed in taking them up for the first time. And for now, instead of engaging in their immediate work, Viktor Obrevko and Vladimir Klimenok, testers of the unique helicopters, take a seat more and more often in the cockpit of the plant's rather old Mi-8, which long ago was considered a patriarch helicopter, and set off on an ordinary commercial trip. You have to live on something...

Rationale for Creation of Military-Technical Policy Committee

*МК2101112095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 4*

[Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: "The Defense Industry Has Been Placed Under Lock and Key. The Key Is in Reliable Hands"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Signs are that periodic reformation of the arms export system is becoming a good tradition in Russia. At least for a second year now, on the very eve of New Year festivities, a circular has been issued by the President which drastically changes the entire weapon export system. Yet there is no way the innovations of two years ago, for all their unprecedented character (the state company Rosvooruzheniye was created which became a monopoly seller of Russian arms on the world market), can compare with the latest ones. Under the 30 December 1994 presidential edict, a new federal power body has been created: the State Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation, accountable to Boris Yeltsin in person. The state committee has been given full freedom of action in coordinating military-technical cooperation, while oversight of the new structure has predictably been entrusted to First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets.

The main reason for creating the State Committee, according to the edict's preamble, was the need to ensure Russia's interests in the sphere of military-technical cooperation. Yet these interests have been ensured over the past year by Rosvooruzheniye, created precisely for the purpose. Apparently it has been doing quite a good job: In 1994, for the first time in the nineties, Russia revived interest in its arms on the world market. Moreover, last year Rosvooruzheniye sold an estimated \$4 billion worth of arms (compared to 1993, the general volume grew by more than 30 percent). Another \$2 billion worth of agreements of intent were concluded. In other words, the president had no objective cause for concern. And yet he had decided to create the state committee.

Why? The reasons that prompted him to do so can be judged by the mere functions entrusted to the state committee. They are impressive: For the first time the entire chain—from R&D, to leading-edge arms development projects, to overseeing the use of funds received by subjects of military-technical cooperation from arms sales—has been placed under single management and control. A body with such powers could by right be called a ministry. There would be work enough even for more than just one ministry. But with such a status it would not be quite appropriate to make it subordinate to the president—if only out of respect for the government. Incidentally, one of the final provisions of Edict No. 2251 orders the latter to “bring its enforceable enactments in line with the edict on creating the state committee.” This is not owing to the fact that the government's normative base on military-technical cooperation is extremely wide, but that the new federal body will oversee, in addition to military-technical cooperation, the entire activity related to arms programs for the Russian Army, conversion of the military industrial complex, and even reutilization of arms and military equipment. In other words, the above spheres of activity and control are being taken away from the government (as an institution).

One indication of the state committee's status is the abolition of the Interdepartmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, which was created at the dawn of arms export. In its place the government will have to create a Coordinating Interdepartmental Council. It will not be an independent body, however, but a unit attached to the state committee. That is to say, although the opinion of such structures as the Defense Ministry, the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and a number of others will be taken into account in dealing with particular questions of military-technical cooperation, the final say will always be retained by the state committee chairman and its overseer.

The state committee head is Sergey Ivanovich Svechnikov. According to information in KOMMERSANT-DAILY's possession, he is no greenhorn in the arms business. Responsible sources say he has also access to large Kremlin offices and their occupants. This information is backed up by the fact that the state committee head is directly answerable to the president. Naturally, to get such a possibility, even possessing a very extensive experience, is, to put it mildly, not easy without outside help. And the range of influential people around the president today is as narrow as never before. Some even believe that it is limited to one to two figures (Ilyushin and Korzhakov).

Soskovets' appointment as state committee overseer is also indicative. The “first defense man” would hardly agree to work with a person he does not know very well. It is not ruled out that the state committee was created through the first vice premier's efforts. Especially considering that informed sources are sure that Soskovets' role in creating Rosvooruzheniye was far from the least. But the dismissal of Viktor Samoylov (generally believed to be Shumeyko's man) from the post of the company general director and the appointment in late November 1994 of Aleksandr Kotelkin (close to another vice premier: Oleg Davydov) has apparently taken the state company outside Soskovets' sphere of influence. Experts tend to attribute the unexpected birth of the new department precisely to this, especially since it now has an official overseer who is in charge of all cadre decisions. Naturally, all previous mistakes have been taken into account: Its rights have been extended considerably and its status has been upgraded.

Strangely enough, the creation of the state committee has not evoked any particular objections from the departments and organizations involved in the arms business. Even the perennial opponent of any tough centralization of arms export, Aleksey Shelunov, chairman of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises, told KOMMERSANT-DAILY that he welcomes the creation of the committee. Such an unexpected statement apparently has to do with the rights with which the new structure has been entrusted. If it is really able to control all budget expenditures on the military industrial complex and also coordinate the use of receipts from the

arms trade, this can allow the league to address at least part of its financial problems. The state committee (judging by its functions) will distribute the state arms order, including for the Defense Ministry's domestic programs.

Rosvooruzheniye declined to comment for understandable reasons. The company will most likely become a structural subdivision of the state committee, and the boss, as is known, is never criticized. The commentary by the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry also quite fits into the general picture. Its deputy chairman Gennadiy Yampolskiy told KOMMERSANT-DAILY that the appearance of the new body, headed by Sergey Svechnikov, will allow to form a more coherent structure of military-technical cooperation. Neither has the deputy chairman any fears that some of the state committee's functions trespass into his committee's purview. After all, using its right to coordinate arms programs and oversee the use of budget funds going for the needs of the military industrial complex, the new federal body can easily subordinate Viktor Glukhikh's department to itself. But, Yampolskiy believes, this will not happen: "Soon the functions will be demarcated and each department will have its scope of work."

But even if Sergey Svechnikov develops a peaceful relationship with the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, Rosvooruzheniye, and the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry (which, incidentally, has had its Main Engineering and Technical Directorate taken away from it, which was then transferred to the State Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation), he will surely have to fight a little with the Defense Ministry. Pavel Grachev's department structure has its own subdivision dealing with matters of military-technical cooperation. Although, if Grachev's long-standing dream is fulfilled and the Defense Ministry gets 10 percent of arms sales proceeds, he will have no complaints to make against the state committee and its vast prerogatives.

Procurator on Protection for Military-Industrial Enterprises

954E0463A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Valeriy Fomichev, senior procurator, department of the Russian Federation Procurator General's Office: "Dealers From Defense Are Storming the Bastions; Enterprises of Strategic Importance Becoming Private Property"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For procurators implementing supervision over implementation of the laws at enterprises of the VPK [military-industrial complex], it has long been no secret that the sector which was once elite in its economic, scientific, technical and cadre potential (in other words, the former national pride of our country) is today on the brink of stoppage.

We will leave the political and international-legal aspects of the necessity and adequate defense capability of the state to the discretion of the legislative and executive powers. The business of the procurators is to monitor the adherence to requirements of the law, to protect the interests of national and state security. And here it has turned out that we must not only protect them—but sometimes hold the defenses around them.

The absence of a clear-cut, long-term state program of conversion, transition to joint-stock ownership, and privatization of enterprises in the defense complex has given rise to numerous possibilities for utilizing federal property for personal enrichment. The investigations conducted by the procurator's office have turned up countless cases of unlawful denationalization of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. There have been a number of thwarted attempts to sell for a pittance and to buy up the most complex equipment, technology, the elemental base of unique research and design organizations and scientific centers of Russia.

For example, the world-renowned firm ANTK [Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex] imeni A. N. Tupolev was converted to joint-stock ownership at the decision of the government. However, due to the "forgetfulness" of certain persons, the charter capital was artificially underestimated (even in 1992 prices) by R239 million, which comprised over half of the entire purchase value of the complex. Only after the intervention of the procurator's office were the forgotten millions returned to the state. With the aid of measures of judicial protection of the procurator general's office, we were able to prevent the privatization of one of the structures of the Institute of High Energy Physics, which is a leading scientific center in Europe, and which has one of the largest proton accelerators.

The attempts to hand over to private ownership the Russian Scientific-Research Institute of Space Instrument Making, which develops systems of combat guidance of military spacecraft, as well as the persistent attempts of the St. Petersburg Committee on Administration of Property to privatize the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Technology, whose conversion to joint-stock ownership is prohibited by law, also do not lend themselves to understanding or simple logic.

In this situation, we cannot understand the position of the State Committee on Administration of State Property and its territorial agencies, which are called upon to stand guard over our common interests, and not only those of the dealer businessmen, and to prevent the squandering of federal property. Yet the reality testifies to quite the opposite: Quite obviously, the indicated committee has neither the strength nor the time to systematically administer and prudently manage state property, and that is why privatization has been placed at the cornerstone. Its implementation has become a goal in itself for Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee on Administration of State Property]. The problems of

preserving the country's scientific-technical potential and developing fundamental science have been cast aside. One gets the impression that the state leaders do not trouble themselves with the question: "What will happen to Russia tomorrow?"

We can cite an endless number of examples of the state committee's activity, whose unlawful decisions on privatization have been protested by the procurator's office and rescinded in judicial order. The procurator general's office was forced to appeal to the president and chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation with information on the state of affairs in the defense sectors of industry.

Even the very few attempts to drag off the public wealth and to stuff it into private pockets which were exposed and thwarted by the procurator's office do not instill optimism.

It is quite evident: Only strict control is capable of protecting from pilferage that little which is left in our country.

However, even the procurators, demanding unswerving implementation of the laws, cannot free themselves from the idea of the needlessness of the country's defense potential. And it is even more difficult to explain to the scientists and practitioners of this production: Whom does it in fact benefit to implement such a policy in the sphere of privatization? How can we evaluate the fact that the state has in fact ceased to place planned defense orders? Meanwhile, there is no demand for the manufactured high technology, scientific- and energy-intensive products, and the contractors do not pay for them for six to seven months or more....

Of course, the agencies of the procurator's office will continue to repel the attacks, remaining in the forefront of the battle for federal property and state interests. Yet is it not better, finally, for the state leaders to place the accents and define the priorities of Russia's development. Shall it be a scientific-technical power, or shall it drag along at the tail end of world progress?

Roundtable Examines Defense Industry Restructuring

95UM0115A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Nov 94 pp 4-5

[Roundtable discussion with Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises; Anatoliy Sitnov, chief of armaments of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Mikhail Maley, chairman of an interdepartmental commission of the Security Council; Gerbert Yefremov, general director of a machine building scientific production association; Igor Artyukh, general director of the "Toriy" Scientific Production Association; Oleg Bogomolov, director of the "Delfin" Central Scientific Research Institute; Givi Dzhandzhgava, president of the "Ramenskoye PKB" Joint Stock Company; Veniamin Sokolov, "Sozidaniye"

Movement; Anatoliy Breusov, chairman of the Association of Trade Unions of Defense Industry Sectors; Anatoliy Dolgolaptev, deputy chairman of the Federation Council; conducted by Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; 11 November 1994; place not given: "In the Year 2005, Only 5-7 Percent of Russia's Arms Will Meet the Requirements of the Times: By the End of the Century, the Russian Military-Industrial Complex Will Not Be Able To Reproduce Its Own Developments of the 1980's"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we already reported, on 11 November the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises [LSOP] and the editorial board of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA conducted a roundtable on the theme "Problems of Restructuring Russia's Defense Industry." Participants in the meeting were: Vladimir Alferov, executive director of LSOP; Suren Artyunov, general director of the Tushinskiy Machine Building Plant; Igor Belousov, vice president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Oleg Bogomolov, director of the "Delfin" Central Scientific Research Institute; Vladimir Bocharov (Moscow Oblast Administration); Vladimir Voskobonnikov ("PromRadtekhbank"); Vladimir Gorshenin, president of the "Technology—Industry" Corporation; Givi Dzhandzhgava, president of the "Ramenskoye PKB" Joint Stock Company; Anatoliy Dolgolaptev (Federation Council); Veniamin Yefremov, general designer of the "Antey" Concern; Gerbert Yefremov, general director of a machine building scientific production association [NPO]; Vasily Kobchenko, general designer of the "Soyuz" NPO; Yuriy Kotov, president of the Moscow TPP and deputy chairman of the Moscow Radio Parts Plant Joint Stock Company; Yuriy Kozlov (State Committee for the Defense Industry [Goskomoboronprom]); Mikhail Maley (Security Council); Valentin Matyashev, director of the NIIP; Viktor Nikitin, assistant director of the TsAGI; Anatoliy Obukhov, general designer of the "Bazalt" NPO; Yuriy Perunov, general designer of the NPO imeni Pleshakov; Boris Pitsulin, director of the Bryansk EMZ; Vladimir Rubanov (Security Council); Anatoliy Sitnov (Ministry of Defense); Aleksandr Tyumin, director of the Samara Production Association "Ekran"; Nikolay Fedorov (Russian Academy of Sciences); Aleksey Shulunov, director of the TsNIRTI and president of the LSOP; Yuriy Bodalov, general director of the "Antey" Concern; Anatoliy Breusov, chairman of the Association of Trade Unions of Defense Industry Sectors; Veniamin Sokolov, "Sozidaniye" Movement; Yevgeniy Gilbo, "Sozidaniye" Movement; Igor Artyukh, general director of the "Toriy" NPO.

Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, conducted the roundtable.

Today we are publishing an abbreviated version of the transcript of this 3-hour discussion and the appeal of the country's defense workers to the president of Russia, written by decision of the roundtable participants.

[Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] Colleagues have gathered together here today.

Everyone knows one another and are alarmed by the same problems. From what I understand, the people gathered here are serious, although with a sense of humor, but in general everyone has amassed many unpleasant words and thoughts. I hope they will be heard with utmost candor.

The main thing that we want to discuss is the problems of industrial policy in the area of military and defense developments; second, the problem of conversion and its financing and structural restructuring of the defense industry; and third, specific proposals for structural restructuring which may arise in connection with what we have today. I would like it if we record today's state of affairs in this sphere and talk about the immediate future, which follows from the fact that there are various budget proposals and, as many assert, there is vagueness in formulating Russia's interests in the area of defense and national security. A more distant future is also needed, as this gigantic military-industrial complex [VPK] must be either restructured, destroyed, curtailed, taken away to other countries, or privatized. I would like to ask all the speakers to touch upon a separate problem—organizing management of this entire large cumbersome object. Although, as I understand, the people gathered here are not big admirers of the previous system, and from talking with many of you I understood that practically no one denies that variant of managing the defense complex and military scientific developments that was in the Soviet Union. This involves that same CPSU Central Committee Commission for the Military-Industrial Complex which, again I am not an expert and am basing this on estimates of knowledgeable people, held the country's entire military-industrial policy and strategy in its hands. The staff was fairly small, but active and professional. And poorly or in poor circumstances, this entire structure was used to create what we have today and which Russia does not yet know very well how to manage.

[Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises] One of the main problems of restructuring the country's economy is reforming the military-industrial complex. I must say that in previous years, the VPK's role was significant, and, of course, labor, material, and monetary resources were directed to the military-industrial complex. We know, after the war a gigantic leap was made by the country and by the military-industrial complex, and a tremendous intellectual and industrial potential. All of us sitting here understand that prior to 1992 the economy was terribly militarized. We virtually ate up everything in the country's budget. But the people sitting here are not the ones to blame. We were carrying out the tasks which the state assigned our collectives, and we accomplished these tasks. If only the ideology would have been different, the methods would have been different, and all this would have developed differently. After detente took place, the military-industrial complex was faced with the problems of reforming in all their magnitude. But 1992 and 1993 have passed, 1994 is coming to an end, and 1995 is just

around the corner—and we are sensing an impasse. These years—1992, 1993, and 1994—were difficult for Russia, for its economy, and for the country's industry as a whole. The forecast which experts and we sitting here are giving for the years 1995-1997 says that the situation will be even worse. There cannot even be any talk of stabilization today or even any sprouts of stabilization.

We see this graphically, especially in the recent gasoline crisis, and this is far more graphic. The essence, of course, is not in the mistakes made when reforming the economy, but the main question is: just what are we building in the end, what are our objectives, what kind of methods, what means and mechanisms have been chosen for accomplishing the set tasks?

What are the time periods for implementation in achieving these goals and what is the payment for this? It is no secret that approximately 5 million people were working in the defense complex as of 1992. How are these 5 million people living now and how will they live in the future? I will give you some factual material. Production volumes for defense orders were reduced on the average to one-fifth—we asserted this earlier. Now I can say perfectly clearly that we were mistaken; I have fresher figures. Actually, the decline was more substantial; for example, the decline in volumes was more than 15-fold for ammunition production, more than 10-fold for aviation, approximately 15-fold for the radio industry, and 20-fold for electronics. I do not have precise data for missile and ship building. We absolutely precisely understand that such a huge defense potential is not needed—these 2,000 enterprises. But it is high time to determine just what the state needs. It took great pains, but a military doctrine emerged. But the military doctrine must be followed by specific obligations of the state. What will be in the year 2000, what will the Army be like, and what will the Army need from industry? Unfortunately, today we have no clarity on the future. Up to now there is no armament program. There also is no clarity in conversion, although it seems to have been proclaimed by the parliament, the president, and the government. But what is being done with our conversion? In 1992, financing of conversion began in July, but it was unclear what needed to be financed, although a union-wide beginning for conversion programs was made back in 1988-1989.

What we wanted from conversion began more or less to appear only in 1993. Fourteen federal conversion programs and a mass of regional programs were approved. It seemed that everything was clear, but the financing was weak. We calculated that during these three years a total of 120 billion rubles [R] in 1992 prices was spent on conversion, but approximately \$150 billion were needed—the difference is obvious. And this process should, first of all, be manageable and, second, should last not one year, but approximately 7-10 years. In 1993, financing of conversion began in August after our visit with Oleg Nikolayevich Soskovets. In 1994, it has been some kind of circus in general: not a single kopeck was

provided for conversion, but somehow after a struggle in the Duma and the Federation Council, R300 billion were allocated for the first quarter. Then special funds were created for income from privatization, roughly in the amount of R1.4 trillion.

As a result, they gave R300 billion in the first quarter, nothing in the second quarter, R100 billion in the third quarter, and, even for indexation, nothing in the fourth quarter. Not a single kopeck has been allocated for 1995 either. That is why conversion is not making any progress.

We continue to maintain mobilization capacities. Financing of them is also unsatisfactory. In 1994, according to the results for nine months, mobilization capacities were financed at only a 14-percent level.

Systematic delays of wages and debts for work performed. Under no circumstances do I blame the Ministry of Defense; it ended up between the devil and the deep blue sea. The Ministry of Defense is regularly short of money. In nine months, financing of the Ministry of Defense was accomplished at only the 39-percent level. Financing of military expenditures or defense order is done at the 41-percent level. These are the causes of the collapse of production. The collapse of production is absolutely the same for both civilian products and military products. I do not want to touch upon other issues, but I can say the following: We produced about 4 million televisions in 1993, and we are producing 2.2 million in 1994. Actually, I think the number will be less, and in 1995, in spite of the forecast of 2.2 million, I think that we will be virtually bankrupt and will halt television production in Russia. This is not due to fact that we are not able to make televisions, that our quality is worse, and so forth. Yes, all this is present to some degree, but this is due to the fact that there simply is no defense money. Seated among us are directors of plants producing televisions, and they can express their opinions. The most terrible thing that we are losing is that scientific potential, those production capacities, and those capabilities which we have at our disposal. Today, there is a gigantic personnel turnover; approximately 50 percent of the best specialists left the defense sector in three years. Why? Because pay is systematically delayed, and its level is roughly 1.5 times lower than in machine building. But worst of all is the lack of any policy whatsoever in the area of industry. The consequences of this are deplorable. Today, we are unable to produce equipment which we made back in the late 1980's. What awaits us tomorrow? If the state needs the defense industry, then some specific decisions must be worked out. I am not trying to put the blame on anyone. During these two or three years the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises has tried to find some solutions and tried to propose different variants to the government, but when we became convinced that we could not expect anything from the government, we were forced to sit and prepare proposals ourselves for structural restructuring the defense industry. I understand that these proposals

are imperfect, do not take into account many factors, and cannot be universal for different types of production. But at least we tried somehow to determine our positions in the approaches to reforming the defense industry. Our proposals are directed at the government and the departments and published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on 25 October—there has been no response. In conclusion, I propose to use the results of our roundtable to work out specific solutions and express them through the press, not by approaching the government. We do not defend today the rebirth of the defense sector in the form that it was, but as responsible people we want to ask: Will the state be or will our state not be?

[Yuriy Kozlov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Industry] I would like to make a few additions to what Aleksey Nikolayevich Shulunov said. If we talk about what the military-industrial complex is today, only 6 percent of it is left compared to 1991. One must remember that 1991 was no better; that was when the reductions began. The forecast for 1995 is 5.5 percent. But here it should be said that the defense complex must make those weapons that are specified by the arms program. It was always that way, but here for the first time in the Russian state there in essence has been no such program for several years. At least to date it is not clear to us on what kind of product mix plants should orient themselves, what must be maintained, and what capacities to retarget to different tasks. To date there is no such document. This is the first task. We need the state to determine its needs in the area of defense technology. A second question is fulfillment of approved financing which will or will not be provided for in the volumes which would make it possible to make these products and accomplish deliveries. It is mandatory that there be advance financing. But we have retreated here, too. In the majority of cases, advance payments were always at the 50-percent level, sometimes more. After the well-known presidential edict came out, those who prepared it gave the defense workers a big "gift"—the advance stopped at the 20-percent level. But you will not begin work today for 20 percent. The second circumstance, which is quite important, is not taken into consideration today. All capacities in the defense complex will not be occupied by state order. That means 94 percent must be filled out with civilian equipment which people need. Real implementation of conversion programs is needed. They were approved by the government, and there is a conversion law. But this law and these programs are not being observed. In 1994, as of 1 November we had received only R324.5 billion for conversion, but according to the presidential edict we were to receive R1.4 trillion. Speaking of the budget, money did not come to industry on time, and since it came in the second or third quarter, this forced many enterprises to take credits. Consequently, enterprises were deprived of working capital and ended up in a very difficult financial situation. It must be noted that the words "military industry" and "conversion" are not mentioned in the draft budget which is being discussed

today. There are no words and no problems, although Russia's defense complex today still makes 10 percent of the volumes of industry. Here this is the entire mining industry; ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy; three types of forestry industry, processing, producing, and pulp and paper, but not a word about conversion and no sound from the defense industry.

A third issue which I would like to raise is that science has ended up in a very difficult situation. For a whole series of branches of science we have lost the ability to create those results and those scientific solutions that we had in the past and, what is more, are unable to modernize a whole series of models of our equipment. Systematic non-payments on the part of the state have brought the scientific base of defense enterprises to a tragic situation. If one is to speak of our potential, today the defense complex can make everything that is required of it, everything from oil production and oil refining equipment to consumer goods. This potential today could be used, but it is necessary to observe the law on conversion and solve the problems of working capital through allocation of finances. Let these be notes or bills, but we need to begin production and put goods on the market.

[Anatoliy Sitnov, chief of armament of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense] Russia, based on the strategic position, role, and place that it occupies, is unthinkable without an army. The realities are such that given the fairly small personnel strength, the Army should be equipped with multifunctional and integrated weapon systems. This is our first and foremost responsibility. Today the world is fairly aggressively studying the experience of the Persian Gulf War, where it was graphically shown what will happen to a country that lags behind, if only by one order of magnitude in the development of arms, development of information equipment, command and control equipment, everything that we call high technology. Experience shows that the most developed countries are moving toward not a technical but a technological isolation from backward countries.

This places altogether different demands and altogether different tasks before us. It is not a question of the amount of equipment that we produce, but the scientific and technical reserve which can be realized. Unfortunately, it must be noted that there has been a slide since 1992. The decline in production volumes was 67 percent, and this decline continues. The defense sector fell below the level of profitability for all main production facilities. It is known that any army has only part modern armament. We now have modern arms amounting to just 30 percent of their total number.

This will be 10 percent modern arms by the year 2000 and 5-7 percent by the year 2005. Countries of the West have 60-80 percent modern armament. We had very good priorities in missile building, in the ammunition industry, and in small-arms armament. It must be said that by the year 2000, if we retain the existing practice of

financing the Ministry of Defense, we not only will not be able to create fifth-generation weapons but we also will not be able to reproduce second-generation equipment, although now we are producing third- and fourth-generation weapons. A country not capable of creating fifth-generation weapons automatically moves into the ranks of poorly developed states. The fire-and-forget principle is a characteristic of the fifth-generation armament which will require raising of the overall crossbar of the country's industrial level. We accomplished one task in 1992-1994—to survive in order to preserve the main scientific schools and the main production facilities. We managed to do this partially by June 1994. After the budget was adopted, the volume of orders dropped below the minimum possible technological level. The basic production facilities have begun to disintegrate, and the first to feel this were those production facilities which operated 80-90 percent for defense. These are the ammunition sectors, missile building, and so forth. Now we are financed at 56 percent for military science and 48-55 percent for production. If you take into account those decrees which the president issued (they were all positive), we were to have 20 percent for advance payment in the first month of this year, plus we were to be paid the debts from 1993. Together with science this amounts to R926 billion. That is, we were to have at least R1.5 trillion for the first quarter, then our industry and our science would start working. If the present rate of allocating funds to the Ministry of Defense (60-62 percent of planned volumes) is maintained, it will be a disaster. The treasury bonds which they gave us do not make the difference. And we are going into 1995 with a deficit volume and debts of about R2.5-3 trillion. Now, for the future. You know that 1992 and 1993 did not pass without a trace. A very large number of scientists, practical workers, and designers left the country and are working in the West. No matter how bad it is for the country, we need to support scientific schools, otherwise there will be no future at all. As far as the defense sector is concerned, I have always believed and believe that it is the cornerstone of the country's industry. If there is no defense sector, there will be no leader; that which pulls the state forward will be missing.

[Mikhail Maley, chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council] If one pays attention to the direction and tone of the speeches, one is, above all, struck by the fact that they are addressed to no one. Although everyone mentally has in mind one person who is to blame, his name is Yeltsin. Let us look at what this guilty president is doing. He held a meeting of the Security Council where he adopted virtually everything that we advised him, and the priority of science was taken into account, and the allocation of the necessary money, and the development of the domestic economy, standardization of weapon systems, and so forth. But nothing has been done, the decision of the Security Council has collapsed, and absolutely not a single presidential edict has been carried out. The prime minister said that no one needs howitzers; then he quickly

changed his opinion. Now he is traveling around to our plants for some reason, but no one knows why. If he is increasing his educational level, it is already time to put an end to this. There is only one effective leader—this is Oleg Soskovets, who increasingly more often lately is being presented in the press as expressing the interests of the VPK. But Soskovets was never in the VPK, for all practical purposes he has never been anybody, and he cannot now determine this policy and be responsible for it. How many times has Soskovets gathered the director corps together? Not once on a Russia-wide scale. The task of the best minds of the defense complex now is to: 1. Determine specifically what must be done today; 2. Demand that the president take these steps; 3. See that the negligent people who do not carry out the clearly assigned tasks, edicts, and directives are immediately dismissed. The VPK has not been given a strategic task: not for self-destruction, not for self-preservation, not for reform, not for an export orientation, and not for leadership in the national economy. We have resigned ourselves to this and do not demand to be given a task publicly. Let them set the task of self-destruction; we are capable of calculating this algorithm. But we cannot destroy with our own hands that which we have been creating all these years. The government is to determine what task is before us. Let us demand this. I do not know about you directors, but I travel throughout Russia. People are ready to work even without pay, against a receipt that the director will later repay the debts, if only they do not have to sit at home. The VPK has not been place within a new framework. We have the previous framework, and we in principle are now noticeably going beyond what is reasonable for the defense industry, both on the scale of all industry and on the scale of Russia's economy. We need to set our percentage of the gross national product at any inflation rates, say, at this stage of Russia's development, when there are not obvious enemies, when there is a mass of internal problems—here is the percentage. We are technical people, so we must demand that we be given such a task, and it must be substantiated by something and let them sign under this statement. If this is Yeltsin—let it be Yeltsin, the name of the person who terminated the defense of the Russian Federation. If this is Chernomyrdin and the many howitzers he wants—let him say how many howitzers he has to have, we will know.

We have had no time frame established for conversion; in the Russian way we decided to do everything quickly. There was such a situation in the history of our country, but another person did it and his name was Stalin. Conversion was conducted during the three years following the war, but this was a completely different situation and a completely different environment. At the same time, it would be very useful to become familiar with that technology, because the situation in Russia now is largely similar to the situation in the Soviet Union after the war with the same degree of destruction of the economy, breaking of ties, and militarization of industry. So these time frames also must be set, and they

must set for Soskovets, Chernomyrdin, and Glukhikh, but this has not been done. There exists a quite simple technology when creating any equipment, life, way of life, or transport. There are rules. For the present we are playing without rules; we are playing without limits. We put a person at the helm who has never driven either a car, a horse, or a bicycle. And we are surprised that he begins to weave or drive in a circle. I think, what would be needed for the VPK? First of all, for the president to tell the whole nation and the world that the Russian Federation's defense industry will be preserved. This is indeed now the main operational task of reform. Second, for him to appoint an individual deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, preferably a first deputy, who would be completely responsible for the situation in the VPK (let it even be Chubays). Finally, one more detail about which I want to remind you. We must not forget that in addition to the state sector, a non-state sector for creating weapons is emerging. It is beginning with gas-powered weapons and small arms, but it has already appeared. Whether we like it or not, we are already in a market economy. Hence it follows—money is ahead of everything. All the money of the "Rosvooruzheniye" GK is kept in a commercial bank. Where does this money go? There are billions of dollars there. We made a tremendous mistake when we abandoned the highest in the world Soviet technology of management and control. You see, this technology defeated fascism, and it was able to work. We lost the personnel policy. They said—nomenklatura, but we cannot get by without it. Now we are taking people off the street, random people. In order to put order in our country, we must re-create the system that was. In Russia, there is respect for outstanding people and an understanding that our scientists and designers are worth more than a politician in the grandest office. We must restore the institution of general designers and gain the right for you to go to the highest level once a week with a state task. The only person who now wishes to solve the problems of the VPK is the president. The information cocoon that is closing around him completely distorts the situation. They have convinced the president that to date the situation is not all that bad in the VPK and there is only one problem—the director corps, which rolls up the money allocated by the Duma in banks and six months later returns it. Thus, the directors are impeding conversion. I repeat, he is the only effective person. We must fight for the right of access to the "president's body."

[Vladimir Rubanov, deputy secretary of the Security Council] I would like to continue the thought about the role of policy in managing the defense complex. I have had occasion to be at measures where the military budget was discussed and the impression was created that in questions of the defense complex and other decisions being prepared associated with the country's economic development, there is present a bookkeeping approach, not a political, non-state approach. Money plays a significant role, but the monetary sphere is ancillary. It only untwists the economic process and ensures movement of

the society and the state toward the set goals. People must know where the country is going. I would like to call attention to the fact that the defense sector needs to be viewed not in an isolated manner, but in the sum total of relations of policy, economics, technologies, and culture. And it seems to me that the main thing is to determine what kind of a power we are in terms having nothing to do with ideology.

The main problem that has emerged before the country is technological modernization. This is a problem that a country with an old control mechanism no longer can accomplish a task which other countries have been accomplishing successfully. This is not just national defense, but national security, above all, the technological prospects of development of the country. It seems to me that the arms development program is something that is absolutely essential in instrumental management. But we also need nationwide goals and a system of state goal-setting and determination of the national priorities which must be the main ones. The main outcome of the policy is to set national goals. Unfortunately, this is lacking for the time being. A subject conversation about where we are moving can be held only when we have determined the goals of political development, when we present the technological make-up of the country, because it is the country's technological make-up that predetermines the structure of science, the structure of production, the nature of the economy, and economic proportions. Therefore, the point of application of efforts is determined by a clear answer to the question: What kind of a power are we? I would like to say that no country developed spontaneously; it tried to be some kind of power—aviation, electronic, or some other kind of power. A question arises: What kind of power are we, and what are we striving for? Without this we will not find our place in the world market, in the world division of labor, or even in the production of arms. The control system must, above all, support scientific-production and technological activities, and not the service sector.

We must determine the country's role in the world community and give it a vision from the historical perspective. Only on this basis can we rally the nation. We must proceed from the fact that this basis is technology. We must determine what technologies are vitally important for the country and what technologies make no sense for us to develop. On this basis we must determine Russia's technological make-up. There will be high technologies, and there will be defense.

Russia has already found itself in aviation, cosmonautics, and maritime affairs. I understand that has lagged behind on some matters, but when we quote figures here that our aviation is one of the spheres that is threatened, I believe that this threat is not so much a threat to defense as it is a threat of losing national face. I would like to direct attention to the connection between technology and politics. It seems to me that sectors such as aviation, cosmonautics, and shipbuilding need information reinforcement. I would like to call attention to

another matter which is being poorly described in the discussion. The point is that we are entering a market economy, and intellectual products are a form of commodity.

It is namely questions of the ownership of information and questions of the ownership of technological achievements that we have worked out extremely poorly. In being constantly concerned about daily bread, we forget that information and technological resources must be formalized as a commodity. This is also our national wealth; it must be correctly formalized and correctly used.

[Anatoliy Sitnov] In the Soviet Union we developed a coherent system of planning. At one time, we used this entire system fully, and now we have forgotten about it. Yes, I am against planning for stockings and socks. But the basic indicators below which the state should not fall must be planned. I am deeply convinced of this. Thus, armament should also be planned. Russia occupies a specific place in the world. Why? Because the people have a spirituality and the capability to learn. Well, this capability gives Russia the right as one of five countries of the world to have full-scale armaments, beginning with space and strategic missiles and ending with the pistol and arbalest. Even the Japanese do not have this capability. We must maintain the capability in the people to do this. I am not saying that the defense order should hold sway over everything, but we have gone down below what is reasonable; we have even gone below the level where there is stability in defense production, where technological ties are severed. We must not allow this. We are spending three rubles to destroy the defense sector, and only one ruble is needed to preserve it. Working in the start-stop mode, we are ruining all the through processes, continuous processes, and unique technology. We do not have any funds to restore what we have now. Therefore, I urge you—we must not destroy everything to the ground, but we must harness the defense sector so it works on tasks for the country. Look, the defense sector has been overloaded with consumer goods: gas stoves, microwave ovens, and so forth, but no one needs his own. In order to protect the domestic producer, everything that the country produces should not be imported into Russia from abroad. Only what is most necessary. And the defense sector needs support not only to produce weapons, but also so it can work to stabilize the country's economic situation. This is what we must fight for. You say that we have to find a body to oversee this job. I believe that a VPK commission is the most flexible and most optimum form of overseeing the entire defense potential and perhaps all of industry.

[Gerbert Yefremov, general director of a machine building NPO] I believe that the defense complex should be called a high-tech, science-intensive complex, a complex of high technologies. The defense complex can make do everything that must. The defense complex by its own definition must accomplish the main task—preserve Russia as a country of high technologies and high-tech capabilities.

This is simple, it just has to be made clear who will fight for this. But the defense complex will hardly fight for this alone. Help is needed at the highest level, from the president. If Mikhail Dmitriyevich Maley could help, it would be wonderful.

If we are to have national tasks, and I am confident that high technologies and high-tech things are such, we must have benefits. We pay taxes on land and on property, but it is state property. Now a number of tax changes are being prepared. How will it turn out? We are creative people. We possess lots of technologies that are competitive on the world market. For example, we see oil spills under snow, at night, in the rain, in the snow, whenever. But what happens—taxes are strangling us. For the time being we are paying nothing for 70 hectares of our land. I think that next year they will introduce this "benefit." We will pay for the land, but you see we are a national center. We earn a certain share of profits on high-tech products. Why can't we, conversion enterprises that have export capabilities and a competitive product, be made exempt from taxation of profits that go toward investments? They are now thinking about introducing a value-added tax [VAT] (I understand the decision has already been made) on defense scientific research and experimental design work [NIOKR]. This is nonsense! If a VAT is introduced on defense NIOKR, why do it?

[Igor Artyukh, general director of the "Toriy" NPO] Without a doubt, all VPK enterprises will not survive, and a structural restructuring is needed once this course is adopted. Money itself makes money, and not a single bank will invest a single ruble in production until it is sure of making a profit. If I bring a ruble to any bank, it will give me a minimum of 170 percent at the end of the year. If I put a ruble in industry, what will I receive? Nothing. So, these appeals for someone to invest money in our industry are senseless. Finding sponsors who will sponsor production in today's conditions is unrealistic. So, we must decide: What do we retain? Four enterprises out of 1,500. These must be those on top. You see, it is no problem to recruit highly skilled workers under capitalism. Today, any girl who leaves my place and goes to work in a bank receives a half-million rubles for the fact that we taught her to work on a computer. A professor of my NPO, working as the head of a laboratory, receives R200,000. So, why this structural restructuring? I sell my instruments to America. I signed a contract in England and am working as fast as I can with China. So, whom must we support? We must support those who can re-create everything even in those conditions which we have. Let 700 people remain of the institute of 7,000, but these 700 will be able to do everything. If the defense sector is destroyed, no president will restore it with any edict. Years and millions of dollars will be needed. Let us look at the year 2000 and see what is left of us. It is already apparent now that nothing will be left of us. Isn't this really idiocy? Belorussia orders instruments from me that are in those systems which we once made together. It ordered and the money was converted. I made them, and now they tell

me, sorry, you must have a license to supply these instruments to Belarus. I say, no questions, but what is this? They tell me to go to the "Rosvooruzheniye." But there they charge prices that are twice as high, for themselves or for whom? Now concerning the exports. If we are to talk seriously, what I work on—the firm "Variant" failed doing this, it could not take the competition with us. I won a competitive bid from the firm Thomson, creating a megawatt continuous-radiation instrument in the two-millimeter band. We do not need any handouts. The only thing I ask—do not prevent us from working! I have not paid the workers for four months. I am owed billions. Yu.A. Kozlov worked for us; he was a chief engineer. He also owes billion, which were not paid for what we did. Now I receive from Yu.A. Kozlov notification that the order is being cut in half for the last quarter of this year. Excuse me, what do I have a printing press? I already invested money in preparing production and in materials, and a month and a half before the end of the year they say: cut production in half. Is this normal? Today we are working for the motherland and taking the losses ourselves. I believe this is possible up to a certain time.

[Oleg Bogomolov, director of the "Delfin" Central Scientific Research Institute (TsNII)] Our enterprise is developing equipment for navigation, as well as air-position indicators and gravity meters based on gyroscopic instruments.

I propose to speed up the passage of a law on state defense order and status of enterprises participating in it. We need such a law, and I would ask those who can do so to help us. We began with Khasbulatov and now are harassing our Duma. No one needs this law; only we need it, only our team, defense workers, and the Ministry of Defense. Perhaps Vitaliy Toviyeovich will take a chance and publish the draft of this law in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA? Print it. Allow me one doubt, when it was said here that the president believed the betrayal of the director corps. We did not believe this. I do not believe that someone believed in betrayal of the director corps.

[Givi Dzhandzhgava, president of the "Ramenskoye PKB" Joint Stock Company] By law more, by law less, no one looks at them any longer. In adopting the budget in the middle of the year, the government knew that it would be broken. Now a similar budget is being prolonged to next year in a still more waning form. Everything is the same that was not carried out this year under the same government. Why prolong that which did not take place? Elementary planning and control have been forgotten. Such a situation cannot last very long. We cannot accept this budget even conceptually and do not have the opportunity, because it contains absolutely preposterous things. It must be admitted that the actions of the government and its monetary policy are no good at all. Let us make a shadow cabinet, write an alternative concept, and introduce indicative planning. Let all the deputies participate; there are sufficiently smart people

in the Duma and the Federation Council. Then it will be clear that some are capable of doing this and others are not, otherwise we will lose everything. To date we have lost a whole generation. Education has been destroyed completely. We have no young people. What kind of a technological complex can it be when all of its workers will retire in a few years. Has anyone analyzed the personnel situation of defense enterprises? Maybe in the year 2005 there will no longer be anything, because you must train people; generations must be replaced. A nation that cannot relay its amassed experience is doomed. If we believe that we are still responsible for something, let us create a shadow cabinet. I propose a radical step—create our own opposition. Yes, they will put us on a black list. But this will be a step for which we will not blush, at least not before ourselves. Let us create a coalition, and then we will feel one another's shoulder.

[Veniamin Sokolov, "Sozidaniye" Movement] Dear comrades, it is time to rid ourselves of illusions and understand that the policy of the present government is purposeful and deliberate. The government will not help us.

Let us look at the mechanism which led the economy to the present state. It was specially developed and introduced to destroy our economy. The mechanism is very simple—a deliberate increasing of prices and decreasing of the money supply in circulation. All this was called liberalization, fighting inflation, market relations. And now we have non-payments of nearly R140 billion, 70 percent cash circulation in the monetary system, and a completely collapsed tax policy.

The state still has resources; these resources are concentrated not in the form of concrete money, but in the form of potential. And the monetary circulation system must be transformed so that our industry does not simply come back to life, but begins to increase the production of goods. I think that today we could create an initiative group that could begin developing a realistic concept of restructuring the country's economy. We must develop a concept of structural restructuring. For the time being there is none. Within the framework of this concept we must determine the place of arms and everything associated with them.

According to our estimates, we now have resources which could be realized through the budget system, not those pathetic R120 trillion which the government plans to collect through the tax system, but significantly more, on the order of R400 trillion. Therefore, let us address specific questions, and as far as the government is concerned, it will not implement such a policy even the changed composition.

[Question] Does anyone need this concept about which you spoke? Back in 1992 we wrote this concept in the industrial policy section and gave it to Gaydar. Later, when Chernomyrdin arrived, we made corrections to it and gave it to Chernomyrdin. We can bring it up again and supplement it with today's measures, but who needs it?

[Veniamin Sokolov] Those who now head our state administration do not need this concept, because a directly opposite policy is being implemented. But there are people in the country who understand that there is Russia, that there is a country, that there is a need for its development. Therefore, it is a question of preparing a program of a new government.

We are suggesting and showing that the state's economy can be corrected through the federal budget, through the tax policy. Everyone knows perfectly well what must be done. If the political will is there, it will be done; if there is no political will, nothing will be done.

[Anatoliy Breusov, chairman of the Association of Trade Unions of Defense Industry Sectors] We noticed that when we visit government structures with these questions, everyone there is in favor of them. We arrive, they talk to us—everything is normal, everything is fine. You come to fight, but against whom do you fight? You understand there is no money, the budget is empty, and so forth. And we return from there with this. But on the other hand, I don't think that there is a single person in the hall today who would think that there are stupid people in the government. There are no stupid people in the government. Although recently I found out that in the president's administration about 15 percent of the employees working there have no higher education, and these are not cleaning women. Everything is done not out of stupidity, but deliberately, with good preparation, with good theory, with good support.

On 21 June, we picketed the Federation Council, met with Shumeyko, sat, sort of reached an understanding, and they gave us the opportunity to speak. Everything seemed fine. The Federation Council voted twice: the decision passed and was sent to the Duma. But the Duma did not react; it did not adopt our amendments for R8 trillion. But you see, it is also not done this way. Shumeyko calmed us down, slapped us on the shoulder, and said that we will live another month without a budget, we lived for half a year—this is not terrible, the Federation council voted for it. Fellows, we must not live this way; we must believe in one another, especially at such a high level. No matter what we do, nothing good comes about. On 30 March, our respected chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Industry assembled a large meeting of enterprise directors. These questions were also raised. What was the result? Zero. Before there were at least some responses, but here there was a zero result in general. That means we are doing something wrong. We calm ourselves down, we agree, yes, this is true and everyone there at the top agrees, but no one intends to do anything. What can the conclusion be?

We must force the government to work, since Russia needs this and not the government itself. Today, no one speaks for himself; everyone speaks about the country's interests. So we must force the government to work for the country's interests and not for some other interests. But the 27th gave us some confidence. On 27 October,

about 8 million people protested. The first time, SMI [expansion not given] gave information about this action without comment. The comments were always malicious. Here is my last thought. Does it not seem to you that we are assuming uncharacteristic functions: to draw up a draft law, draw up a concept, draw up a program, and so forth. This is a very advantageous position for the government. We have taken up a cause; we are creating the impression that we will not be silent, we will complain.

Those who are obligated to do this under the Constitution should be engaged in all this, from the president down to the rank-and-file deputies of the Duma. We have taken on this function, recognizing that they are powerless, so let us tell them this out loud. Let us organize; I call upon the director corps to join with the trade unions and to develop such a set of measures for influencing bodies of power that would force these bodies to do what the interests of the cause require.

[Anatoliy Dolgoplatev, deputy chairman of the Federation Council] Respected colleagues, I am constantly concerned by this question: Have we crossed the line after which all such meetings are completely senseless? We as a nation through our political institutions have not answered the main question: Do we want to develop independently or jointly with some community? It is clear to me that Russia possesses the basic resources to a sufficient degree.

On what can we rely? We can rely only on the technocrats. The well-known and respected Viktor Dmitriyevich Protasov in 1991 urged defense workers to go into politics, and immediately. Not go into politics itself, but create political structures which will bring in the necessary people who understand what was declared here. Who of us at that moment was in favor of this? The majority was categorically against involvement in politics. I adhere to the directly opposite view. It is mandatory that we study and elaborate all these questions. We must be ready not simply to convince on some principles, but to show a system of action, including structural changes in the system of administration. Undoubtedly, everything must be studied in detail. Regardless of how quickly we are able to make this political breakthrough (and it is not for the sake of the VPK, but for the sake of the nation), we today must also set another task. We must determine the set of critical paths which may exert significant influence on the end result. From this standpoint, there is a very dangerous misconception that we can leave some technologies and destroy others.

Only the sum of technologies will produce a result in the end, and it is not known in advance what technology and how it will start working. It is namely the sum of technologies that will make it possible to create something. From this standpoint, let us look at our VPK and what it can give us today. Here we must state clearly and say that we need foreign economic freedom, state support of Russian machinery and equipment exports,

support of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the FSK [expansion not given], the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They all must work for the defense sector. We must go to western markets with world-level technologies. But it is useless without support. I think that the question must be stated this way today: the price for our disarmament must be in state support of our products by the "Seven" in the markets of the West, products which they need in the full meaning of the word.

Today in the structures of the Security Council there is an understanding of the problem, but it is completely obvious that no correct decisions will pass without political support from the outside. This was demonstrated again on 27 October. It was not for nothing that Shumeyko supported this action; he also understands the country. These are not all random things. Everyone must work with the Duma, and there is someone to work with today. And there is someone to work with in the Federation Council. Yes, we must work with the same government today. They understand that after the vote on 27 October, failure of the budget will create a situation of a self-inflicted wound. We have created a few groups of people oriented on the path of independent development. They are preparing proposals. But I remember March 1994; Vaynberg, Zagaynov, the trade unions, and Dzhandzhgava met and sort of reached an agreement. Again, everything is at a standstill. Is there no leader? Let us nominate a leader. The league is a league. We must not simply sit and unsystematically draw one law, then plan some action. We are past that stage.

[Aleksey Shulunov] We will sum up the results. Maybe we made a mistake in 1992 when we created the league and recorded in the charter that we are not a political organization. But the decision was made that in the final analysis each member of the presidium, each member of the league chooses his own political movement which he will join. Indeed, the time has probably come to look at this matter somewhat differently. This is the first part of the question. The second part, I believe, is that M.D. Maley is right, and today we must make a serious statement on behalf of the presidium of the league. The statement has nothing to do with the fact that we are frightening someone, but we simply must publish our statement in connection with the fact that we have reached the end of our rope.

We will record our position in the statement and appeal to the government and to the president. And if they do not hear us, then we will consider that the government assumes full responsibility for the future of Russia. And it is answerable to history. It seems to me that such a statement must be made. Second, we must prepare another paper for the president on behalf of general designers and state that we are relieving ourselves of responsibility for the condition of the combat equipment which is in service in our Army.

[Vitaliy Tretyakov] I can only thank everyone and promise that unless you remove your critical statements from this transcript, all of this will be published.

Statement of the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises

The League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises calls the attention of the Government of the Russian Federation, all responsible political forces of Russia, and public organizations and trends to the fact that the state of affairs at enterprises of the defense complex has reached a critical state.

Industrial production continues to decline continuously. The volume of industrial production during nine months of 1994 declined 41.8 percent compared to the corresponding period last year.

Financing of the state defense order is unsatisfactory. The Law on Federal Budget for 1994, calling for quarterly financing of the defense order, is not being observed. Monthly irregular financing at a level of not more than 60 percent of planned level continues. The indebtedness of the Ministry of Defense to enterprises of the defense complex during the first six months was more than 2.3 trillion rubles.

The total volume of production of armament and military equipment today is approximately six percent of the 1991 level. A massive suspension of production has begun, and a breakup of the defense industry is taking place. Today the country is not able to produce certain types of armament put into production by domestic industry in the 1980's. A majority of mobilization capacities have been lost. Approved conversion programs are not being financed.

The military-industrial complex in Russia is a high-technology complex. Its loss is equivalent to the loss of a modern industry for the country and turning it into a backward Third World nation.

The league supports the economic reforms being conducted and understands the need to decrease defense spending. We understand that preserving the existing structure and composition of the VPK today is not feasible and is too much for the Russian state. Therefore, we propose, for the sake of preserving the high-technology nucleus in Russian industry, to optimize the composition of enterprises engaged in fulfilling defense orders by substantially reducing their numbers and simultaneously transferring production from enterprises with low loads to enterprises having a high percentage of capacity. In doing so, it is necessary to increase substantially the proportion of scientific research and experimental development work in the defense order. Our proposals for restructuring the defense sectors of industry are directed to the government of the Russian Federation, to the departments concerned, and to committees of the Federation Council and the State Duma

and were published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on 25 October 1994. However, a favorable decision has not yet been made.

What is more, the draft budget of the Russian Federation for 1995 prolongs the budget shortages of the previous year. The funds being allocated under the section "National Defense" will make it possible to pay off Ministry of Defense debts for 1994, maintain production of some of the simplest types of weapons, and ensure maintaining nuclear security and author's industry surveillance of armament and military equipment located in the troops.

Taking into account the acuteness and nature of the problems and realizing that the Russian Federation government's failure to take effective measures is leading to the financial failure of the majority of Russia's defense enterprises and self-liquidation of high-technology industry and intellectual personnel potential, the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises demands:

1. The immediate preparation of a edict of the Russian Federation Government on restructuring of the defense sectors of industry.
2. Changes to the draft budget for 1995 ensuring the preservation of a nucleus of defense industry high technologies and an increase in appropriations for scientific research and experimental development work. The introduction of indicative indicators for determining the amount of defense spending.
3. Elaboration and implementation of a set of measures before the end of 1994 for eliminating the state's indebtedness to enterprises of the defense complex, writing off unfinished production in connection with the reduction of the defense order, financing of approved federal conversion programs, and social protection of defense complex workers.

Further failure to take steps to localize these phenomena affects the interests of Russia's national security and means that the president and the chairman of the Russian Federation government assume personal responsibility to history and our descendants for the destruction of the country's industrial potential and the basis of Russia's prosperity and might.

Presidium of the League of Assistance to Defense Enterprises

22 November 1994

Kvasha's Views on Problems of Lazurit KB, Defense Industries

95UM0200B Moscow SLUZHBA in Russian
20 Dec 94 p 4

[Interview with Submarine Designer Nikolay Iosifovich Kvasha, hero of Russia, by Vladimir Petrov: "Stars To Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Submarine Designer Nikolay Iosifovich Kvasha was the first native shipbuilder to become a Hero of Russia. In order to no longer build the best ships in the world?

During his 63 years, Nikolay Iosifovich Kvasha has managed to do more than enough for an ordinary man: he built no less than a flotilla of nuclear and diesel submarines for the domestic Navy, among which is one of the best nuclear submarines in the world, the "Barakuda". He has been nominated for the State Prize three times, but he has not yet become a laureate. But then again he was the first among designers to be awarded the title of Hero of Russia. Alas, the Hero's Star on the lapel of his jacket—this is currently nothing more than a consolation prize: a belated recompense for timely invaluable contributions and a pill that sweetened the conversion ordeals that put an end to unique production.

Lazurit TsKB [Central Design Bureau], one of the three "whales" of domestic deep water design and nuclear submarine building, will no longer be in Nizhniy Novgorod where it was conveniently located next to Krasnoye Sormovo Plant. The construction of diesel submarines for the Russian Navy is also open to question—the last boat is being completed at the plant and that submarine will be sold to China.

"During the 41 years of my work at the TsKB," said Nikolay Iosifovich Kvasha, "we did not lose a single design competition. Conversion compelled us to seek new forms of management, the KB became a joint stock company, having rid the state of a portion of the expenditures. However, we did not rid ourselves of state dependence."

Lazurit de facto remains dependent on many state structures that have, figuratively speaking, a monopoly right to the keys to the doors that open not only access to the world arms market but also a way out of stagnation for native industries. Give Rosvooruzheniye five percent, another five percent for a license for the right to sell your own intellectual property, you found a client abroad—"report" to the monopolists whose duty it is to find these clients and not take a bribe for work done without them. You have reported—and the state KB goes to your client with a similar but cheaper proposal, knocks down the price and essentially steals the client.

In general, this is already industrial espionage that has been raised to the level of state policy. For example, this is how design competitions are conducted in the new way: they have assigned the task, they have compared the results and.. they have been returned. Allegedly for the finishing touches. But during the next review it turns out that the competitors from the state design bureaus have included innovations in their design that were carefully thought out by the joint stock design bureau. State concern about a state enterprise is understandable but not using that method. And what does it provide? An alien idea provided free of charge that is not so easy to realize. Well they obtained the order under the "alien"

idea and they made a mess of it. And everyone ends up losing. This is an long-standing, unsound practice—while helping some, drown others. Can't we get out from under the vain attempts at reform in the defense industry?

"I wrote to Moscow several times and I said to Premier Chernomyrdin during a personal meeting: 'You can only get so much from a producer—forty four taxes!' And he told me in response: 'That can't be, my advisors report something else.' 'How can it not be if in Nizhniy individual production associations pay everything earned in the form of taxes! Here are the documents, here are the people from whom you are taking their last shirt.' And in response more of the same: 'That can't be.' I'm not surprised that the government does not know what is happening locally."

The leapfrog with laws and taxes is dooming Russian industry and science, the concentration of which was the defense complex, to a pitiful existence—to a slow and tortuous death. With our taxes, one can only be surprised that enterprises are still attempting to thrash about, hoping for salvation. As a consequence—they are increasing prices for their products so much that the purchase of a similar product anywhere abroad will be cheaper.

Much has been said for a long time about the fact that financial-production groups, transactions within which are conducted based upon production cost and profits are divided in accordance with the investment of each partner, are first of all needed for the salvation of domestic industry and its defense component. So far there are no such groups. And the enterprises that have not yet been shut down are resorting to purchases of cheaper raw materials, semimanufactures and also goods beyond Russia's borders. What to do in order not to expire.

But how do you justify the other when the state begins to resort to such purchases? Here's a "classic" example of that policy—without taking the native peasant into account, for a long time the government purchased grain abroad. A rejection of such purchases in the future caused a storm of indignation among our traditional exporters: concern about the welfare of their farmers that was largely provided by Russia fell on the shoulders of their governments.

But not only grain is being purchased abroad. And the producers themselves remain without a market.

Having terminated work on the design of nuclear submarines, Lazurit remained without work. High-technology civilian models of equipment, which should rightfully have a future in exploring the wealth of the World Ocean, were developed here in previous years. Underwater production devices to explore the ocean shelf could literally make a revolution in oil and gas production. There will no longer be drilling platforms, the maintenance of which is associated with various

dangers—geologists and oil workers and the main pipelines laid by them will travel under water where we propose creating entire cities. Rosshelf, Gazprom, and a number of other organizations are interested in this direction of development of their sectors. But when the matter reaches the issuance of an order to Lazurit (another domestic firm could be in its place with any other development), voices begin to be heard in the leadership of the interested companies in favor of purchases of these technologies abroad. And the "patriots of their own pocket" decide the outcome of the matter—it has already not been a secret for a long time that the stockholders of their Western competitors sit on the boards of many native firms.

And designers have been compelled to go begging to Western customers, offering their developments for pennies. That same submarine that is being finished at Krasnoye Sormovo Plant was sold to China for nearly an order of magnitude less than a similar product of a number of Western firms, although it also does not lag behind them and even exceeds them based upon a number of indicators. Why? Well because of something not only the Chinese know: the Russians will be happy with that amount. Actually, God knows that this money will nevertheless help the plant to hold out for approximately another two years.

But then again we purchase abroad everything that comes along, at times without thinking about our national interests or about the near-term and strategic consequences.

"If I were in the government's place, I would categorically prohibit purchasing abroad what can be built here in Russia. This is not only my personal interest," stated Nikolay Iosifovich Kvasha. "Tens, hundreds of enterprises and design bureaus are being driven to the wall by the one-sided terms of 'international cooperation'."

I will clarify through an example what the Lazurit general designer had in mind. Norwegian firms are asking for \$6-9 to repair one tonne of hull structure from us. And they are offering Russian ship builders the opportunity to build the hulls of future ships with Western filling at our wharves. But they will pay us not nine "repair" bucks to do this and no more as should be paid during the development of a new steel structure—they plan to pay us a total of one dollar for this product, the proportion of which in the cost of the future ship is more than 50%! Some plants in the north of Russia have taken the bait. And what now? The stupidest situation. The need arises to repair one cargo ship in Norway but, for that amount with the repairmen, you can build and sell nine (!) hulls of that same displacement!

One more example of Russia's "unequal marriage" with the West. Our openness to our new partners has already managed to become the talk of the town: they say, not one secret has remained, there's nothing more to sell. And what have we received in exchange? In the West, specifically in the United States, they personally know

the general designer of the best nuclear submarine in Russia. He was not only there but quite a few foreign guests are drawn to him at Lazurit. But Kvasha has not yet become acquainted with a single American designer. And all of the visitors try to grasp the essence of the idea and leave with that just as the receiving side begins to timidly hint at the desirability of concluding contracts on cooperation. Why do they come? Because there is no such thing as our "hopeless" lagging behind the West. We do actually lag behind in many things. But we outstrip them in many things, and not only in tonnes of steel per capita. For example, the United States lags 15-20 years behind in titanium production.

Alongside Lazurit is Volga OKB [Experimental Design Bureau], the world leader in wing-in-ground effect vehicle production. And here the lagging behind of the Americans is more than obvious. But will they really order the construction of titanium ships and wing-in-ground effect vehicles from us, thereby promoting the strengthening of the positions of Russian ship builders on the domestic and world markets? No, there national interests are above everything. And if someone attempts to ignore them for the sake of his own pocket—it will not turn out well for him even if he is the country's president.

In postwar Germany, its submarine building survived precisely due to foreign orders. Having become impoverished "against its will", no one intends to help Russia to attain competitiveness. There are no fools in the world. On the contrary, there are very many hunters removing the latter. And that is our leading technologies.

Alas, in N.I. Kvasha's opinion, not only the Americans have succeeded in this activity. The riches of Russian design and technological thought are being sold at bargain basement prices not in idle bragging or a demonstration of the breadth of the Russian spirit.

Nikolay Iosifovich's belated laurels do not provide much comfort. He is a designer, as they say, from God (and I need to say God be kind to Russia in this regard). But how can it happen that there is no demand for his talent in the Homeland. They are inventing an underwater super tanker for Japan and an underwater restaurant for the over-saturated land of an Arab sheik in the bowels of the design bureau.

Of course, Kvasha will not sell his Star. But you can't call the situation in which he along with the unique design collective has been placed anything other than degrading.

In Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast alone, the defense industry provides nearly 90% of the budget. If it comes to a stop—there will be nothing, not only for the heroes, but for the entire region. Alas, they know that better in Washington, Berlin, Seoul and Beijing than in Moscow. They know it and they are taking advantage of it.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops Chief Views Russia-Turkmenistan Military Cooperation

95UM0196A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Georgiy Smolnikov under "Border" rubric: "Russian Border Troops Under the Flag of Turkmenistan: Has the Model of the Joint Guarding of the Borders of the CIS Been Justified?"; second part is interview with Lt. Gen. Gritsan, chief of Russian border troops in Turkmenistan, by Georgiy Smolnikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] A year has passed since the day when an operational group of the border troops of the Russian Federation was incorporated in the border troops of Turkmenistan. In the opinion of the chief of the operational group, the Russian Lt. Gen. Vitaliy Gritsan, who is also first deputy commander of the border troops of Turkmenistan, the sides were able to find the most nearly optimum form of cooperation of the border troops of the two countries under the situation existing after the disintegration of the Union, in which some had too transparent borders in this sector and others are still unable to guarantee the reliable guarding of their borders independently. (Information from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: the length of the external border of the CIS in the sector of Turkmenistan is 2,472 km, including 1,629 km with Iran and 843 km with Afghanistan Russian officers head 32 of the 140 border troop subunits).

A little past history. The USSR went into oblivion. After some confusion, Turkmenistan, just as the other former "brothers," proclaimed its unexpected sovereignty. Month after month it formed a new state but its borders continued to be guarded mainly by fair-headed boys wearing service caps and campaign hats. Their service in the stable and relatively well-fed republic was much easier than in other—hot—regions and therefore the change of the sign at the staff of the Central Asian Border District based here and the appearance of representatives of the native nationality in the highest command positions essentially changed nothing at first. The problems began with the end of the service term of the boys called from other regions of the former power and with the beginning of the departure of officer cadres. It is simpler with the soldiers—local youths came to the border posts. But who was supposed to command? There were only 13 Turkmen among the officers of the border troops at the time of the achievement of independence. The anecdotal saying "don't understand mine as yours" best sketched the problem. At the border, however, where the mission must be presented and explained in a matter of minutes, there is clearly no place for anecdotes.

The hasty training of junior officers in three-month and then in six-month courses did not change the situation much: not certain about their future and encountering for the first time delays in the receipt of their pay—for a time no manats were paid to them and rubles from

Moscow did not reach them—the Russians with stars on their shoulder boards got in line for containers. The outflow of professional personnel was reduced to a natural level under the present conditions only after the signing of a treaty last December on the joint guarding of the national border of Turkmenistan and on the status of the servicemen of the border troops of the Russian Federation in the territory of Turkmenistan.

"Today our operational group has about 2,000 men, including 1,500 officers and warrant officers," says Vitaliy Gritsan. "The overwhelming majority of them are Russians but there are also people of Turkmen nationality with Russian citizenship. I can say that all the problems that have arisen here are understood by the government and are being resolved in a timely manner. Recently our commander in chief came once again to Ashgabat and it was possible to reach mutually acceptable decisions on all of the matters discussed with the leadership of Turkmenistan. In particular, an agreement has been reached on the joint guarding of the 446-km sea sector of the border with Iran. This service will be accomplished by two patrol ships with mixed Turkmen-Russian crews. Russia will help to repair one of these ships at Astrakhan. The threat of the stoppage of our equipment has also been removed: the necessary funds have been allocated for its repair and for spare parts. Agreement has been reached on the retraining of Turkmen pilots in Stavropol practically free of charge. The government has also established a preferential system for the transport of all kinds of cargo for the operational group of the border troops of the Russian Federation through the territory of the republic."

[Interview with Gritsan by Georgiy Smolnikov]

[Smolnikov] Your narrative pretty well explains the division of responsibility and the participation of the sides. Still, could you be more specific...?

[Gritsan] To make it brief, Russia is the primary provider of the needs of the personnel of our force with respect to financing. It pays them, clothes them, and feeds them. Turkmen is responsible for matters having to do with material-technical supply, such matters as the allocation and repair of buildings and structures and expenditures for the support of communications, roads, electric lines, and other lines. Various state and commercial structures as well as local authorities give us a great deal of help: they provide the border posts with everything needed for normal life and give food support. The climate with respect to morale is also quite important: it is more pleasant to serve when you continually hear from the leadership of the country, in particular from President Niyazov, words of gratitude addressed to Russian officers for their role in the formation of the national border troops and for their help in the preparation and training of local personnel.

[Smolnikov] How would you assess the dependability of the guarding of the external border of the CIS in the Turkmen sector today in comparison, say, with 1991?

[Gritsan] Just as everywhere else, certainly, there has been a notable loss of dependability and operational readiness. To the honor of both countries, to be sure, it has not by any means fallen to the level, say, of Azerbaijan. The weakening of order is a natural result of the disintegration of power. On the other hand, there is no longer any need for an iron curtain over the border, especially with Iran. After all, Turkmenistan is actively developing trade and economic ties with this state and has opened seven border crossings. For this reason, the role and the tasks of our service have changed fundamentally precisely in this sector. The most complex situation is on the Turkmen-Afghan border, primarily because essentially it is unguarded from the adjacent side.

[Smolnikov] What gives the chief of the operational group the biggest headache?

[Gritsan] Above all the increased activity of smugglers. All of the armed confrontations over the last year have had to do with attempts to send narcotics and weapons to the territory of the CIS. The task of stopping such occurrences is complicated by the lack of officer cadres, especially at remote border posts (Information from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: As of the middle of this year, the manning of the border troops of Turkmenistan with officers does not exceed 75 percent of the required strength level). I will not hide the fact that many are striving to be transferred to Russia. And this is natural, although the pay is even higher here. We reached an agreement to review the requests for a transfer only after each officer trains a worthy replacement in his border troops subunit.

[Smolnikov] Does this mean that the fate of the operational group of the border troops of the Russian Federation in Turkmenistan is not a permanent one?

[Gritsan] It is hard to make long-term forecasts in our time. I am sure about the main thing: if we do gradually leave from here, it will be in a civilized and dignified manner, with mutual agreement. But I am also convinced that we definitely must continue to cooperate both on account of the strategic interests of Russia and in the interests of the dependable guarding of our common southern boundaries. After all, there are still many problems here: there is the smuggling from Afghanistan and the poaching on the Caspian and there is the need to improve the operational readiness of the national border troops. According to our information, by the way, it is quite possible that in the near future subdivisions analogous to the Turkmenistan operational group of Russian border troops will also appear in Uzbekistan and in Belarus.

Nine Border Guards Killed on Tajik Border

95UM0205B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 95 p 1

[ITAR-TASS article: "Nine Russian Border Guards Were Killed in a Bloody Incident on the Tajik-Afghan Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This occurred on the Kalaikhumskiy Sector of the border on January 2 in a clash with the Tajik Mujaheddin.

Members of the official commission, who were visiting the area of the armed clash between Islamic opposition guerrillas and Russian border guards, assessed this incident as an impudent armed provocation of the Tajik opposition guerrillas that was directed at disrupting a political settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict and also as a violation of the cease fire agreement. The commission's conclusions were disseminated to the leadership of Tajikistan and to the UN Permanent Observer Mission.

The commission consisted of representatives of the republic government, UN military observers for monitoring compliance of the inter-Tajik cease fire agreement, General-Lieutenant Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of the Russian Border Guards in Tajikistan, and also Micheslav Senkevich, Russian Federation ambassador to the republic.

A funeral procession and civil funeral service for the deceased Russian border guards of the Kalaikhumskiy Border Outpost will occur on January 6 on the territory of a military unit. The bodies of the deceased were taken from Gornyy Badakhshan to Dushanbe. These are the names of the border guards:

Senior Lieutenant Anton Zlobin, Sergeant Sergey Krotov, Junior Sergeant Mikhail Vorobyev, and Privates: Ruslan Bikbulatov, Nikolay Yurkin, Sergey Savin, Yevgeniy Fedorov, Raushan Salikhov, and Oleg Rimutis.

Rear Adm Skalinov Assesses Situation on Russia's Sea Borders

95UM0210A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Rear Admiral Sergey Aleksandrovich Skalinov, chief of staff and first deputy commander of the RF Border Troops Naval Forces, by Nikolay Plotnikov, under the rubric: "Society": "Our People Are Superb..." Rear Admiral Sergey Skalinov, Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the RF Border Troops Naval Forces, Is Convinced of That"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Firsthand

[Plotnikov] Sergey Aleksandrovich, what missions have been assigned to the border troops naval forces and what are these troops?

[Skalinov] As you know, the total length of our country's state border is 60,983 kilometers. Of them, 46,423 km traverse seas, lakes and rivers. That is more than 70% of the total length.

Not so long ago, we practically guarded only the state border within the territorial waters. Since the 1980's,

additional missions have been assigned to the border troops naval forces. They are: guarding the exclusive economic zone, the area of which is approximately nine million square kilometers; protection of Russia's interests in convention areas; and, assistance in guarding the country's continental shelf. Right now, a new mission has appeared—guarding the external borders of the Commonwealth.

Organizationally, the naval forces consist of border ship formations and independent units, including classification one ship formations with an aircraft system, ice breaker and coastal units, subunits and institutions, specialist training centers, and ship repair enterprises. The naval units consist of a total of approximately 1,000 ships and boats.

[Plotnikov] In contrast with other countries, is this many or a few? And isn't the state paying a pretty penny to maintain this armada?

[Skalinov] There is such a concept as the density coefficient per 100,000 square kilometers of ships that participate in guarding the state border and economic zone. In the United State, it totals 3.2 and in Japan—8.2. In our country, it is a total of 2.1.

As for expenses for the maintenance of the border troops naval forces, I will cite only two figures. In my view, they speak volumes. A total of approximately 2.5 billion rubles and U.S. \$91 million worth of confiscated seafood were entered on the credit side of the state's income as a result of the "Zaslon", "Putina" and "Rubezh" border operations that were conducted in 1994.

[Plotnikov] As far as I know, these operations were conducted for the first time. Discuss them in greater detail.

[Skalinov] Yes, you are correct. These border operations were essentially conducted for the first time. An analysis of the situation that is developing on the state border indicated that extremely negative trends began to be manifested on the border and in the exclusive economic zone. The problem of the illegal migration of citizens of third countries across the Russian border and the settlement of foreigners in our border areas had worsened. Cases of arms and narcotics smuggling and attempts to export non-ferrous metals, industrial raw materials, and other material assets became more frequent. We noticed that commercial fishermen from Japan, China, Poland, Lithuania, Taiwan, and a number of other countries were pursuing destructive and unregulated fishing for seafood in our territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. Corrupt circles began to aggressively undertake attempts to compromise the activities of the border troops that were directed at strengthening law and order and legality on the state border.

The "Zaslon" and "Putina" operations were conducted with the authorization of the country's leadership. The

fact that they encompassed the sectors of several border districts was a distinctive feature of them.

[Plotnikov] Did only the border troops participate in the operations or were other men and equipment involved?

[Skalinov] Besides our forces, the ministries and departments that accomplish missions for the defense of state interests on the border and in the areas adjacent to it were also involved in the conduct of these operations. Border troops of the Northwestern, Caucasus Special, Transbaykal, Far Eastern, Pacific Ocean, and Northeastern border districts and the Kaliningrad and Western Groups of Border Troops were involved. Participants from other federal organs included—men and equipment from the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], the RF Ministry of Defense, the State Customs Committee, the RF Committee on Fishing, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources.

The border troops naval forces have assumed responsibility for monitoring the fishing activities of approximately 19,000 boats on the ocean and river sectors of the border. We, jointly with representatives of the RF Committee on Fishing, have inspected 1,968 vessels, including 423 foreign vessels. We have detained 174 vessels for illegal activity. The amount of the fines and the value of the detained contraband during the course of the operations totaled more than R100 billion and \$420,000. During the course of joint operations, we managed to thwart massive poaching of seafood in prohibited areas and in the country's exclusive economic zone and to prevent the unsanctioned export of seafood across the border. The poachers were compelled to cease their destructive activity in the water areas and on the coasts of the Black and Caspian Seas and the Sea of Azov and foreign vessels that were fishing illegally in the Barents Sea hurriedly terminated their fishing activities and headed out into the Norwegian Sea. Russian vessels that are engaged in illegal fishing have been compelled to remain in the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

There has been a drastic reduction of the number of Japanese fishermen who violate the state border on the Southern Kuriles axis. The number of ships that fish in the open area of the Sea of Okhotsk has also been substantially reduced.

[Plotnikov] Is the conduct of such operations being planned for next year?

[Skalinov] Yes, that is being planned. The "Putina" and "Zaslon" operations and the practice of official military activities of the border troops indicate that the direction of the surge of potential violators of Russian law are increasingly being displaced to Russia's maritime areas. The trend of development of the situation is alarming—the maritime channel is becoming one of the primary channels in the activities of criminal elements to deliver contraband, arms and narcotics into the country and to export them out of the country.

[Plotnikov] In what directions is the most complicated situation developing?

[Skalinov] We can expect the most complex situation in the exclusive economic zone of the Northeastern, Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean border districts. The Pacific Ocean region causes special alarm. The United States has toughened the protection regime of its exclusive economic zone. This has resulted in an increase of the activities of vessels from Japan, China, South Korea, the DPRK, Poland, Vietnam, Panama and Taiwan to penetrate our country's exclusive economic zone to extract seafood.

[Plotnikov] Are the activities of the border guards finding support among the local organs of power?

[Skalinov] There can be no doubt here. Border operations received a positive assessment and support from the heads of administration, cooperating federal organs of executive power, the organs of local self-rule, public organizations and citizens of the country's border regions. But if the border troops naval forces can still manage to confront violators of the state border in 1995, a breakdown situation may be created in the future in the basing, supply and ship repair system and in the construction of new ships under this residual financing. And that, in turn, will result in the impossibility of guarding the maritime sectors of the country's border and the economic zone.

[Plotnikov] Therefore, not only the Ministry of Defense but also the border guards are essentially conducting a struggle for survival?

[Skalinov] The average service period of border ships totals 20 years. At the present time, one third of the ships and boats have already served the prescribed time periods and are subject to replacement. But a drastic decline of the construction of ships for the border troops has occurred due to inadequate financing. In recent years, state orders are being approximately 60% fulfilled. The debt to ship builders and ship repair plants for work that has been accomplished is increasing due to interruptions in financing. It already totals several tens of billions of rubles.

What will that lead to? Enterprises don't have anything with which to purchase materials, components and weapons. This increases the construction time for ships and is leading to cost increases, a reduction of the volumes of production, and the departure of skilled cadres from plants. A total of 25% of the planned financial resources to support ship repair have been received.

I do not want to draw too gloomy a picture but our state leaders finally need to direct serious attention to the state of the structures that support the country's national security.

[Plotnikov] And the last question, Sergey Aleksandrovich. What is the mood among naval border guards?

[Skalinov] Despite the current extremely difficult conditions and a mass of all kinds of problems, the officers, warrant officers and seamen are honestly performing their military duty. I am not afraid to say that they are manifesting real heroism.

The seamen's wives deserve the kindest words. The border ships brigade on the island of Shikotan suffered greatly during the recent earthquake in the Southern Kuriles. Eighty percent of all of the available housing and barracks and the berthing facilities turned out to be destroyed. At first, people lived in tents and in life rafts. Nevertheless, the border was guarded just like it was prior to the natural disaster. The initial restoration work is being completed but we will have to build quite a bit over again. What is remarkable: the servicemen's wives have begun to return in spite of the difficulties. They took the children to their grandmothers and grandfathers and they themselves returned to their husbands. What can you say here...

Arctic Border Commander Pleshko Interviewed

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[Interview with Lt-Gen Konstantin K. Pleshko, Commander of the Arctic Group of the Border Troops, by Vladimir Kalinin; place and date not given: "Russia's 'Ozone' Hole. Will the 'Arctic Group' Be Able To Close It?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As it should, this unprotected space began to form in the polar region of the Earth. The enormous Arctic spaces of Russia, as a result of the "reform" in the army and navy, have begun to lose the minimal force protection from air, land and sea that had been created over decades. But however great the press of the confused transformations, the men in uniform still recognize their responsibility to the people for the security of the country. And in places where the troops were forced to weaken their presence, the border guards come in to replace them. But is this replacement their equal?

On October 28, 1994, LT-GEN OF BORDER TROOPS KONSTANTIN KONSTANTINOVICH PLESHKO was appointed the commanding general of the Arctic Group of Border Troops. Our correspondent talks with him.

[Kalinin] Konstantin Konstantinovich, as you know, anything new provokes questions: What is it for, and what is it?

[Pleshko] The Arctic Group was formed in August 1994. It is an operational formation which includes tactical formations and units of the border troops protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the Polar and Arctic regions from Alakurtti to Khatanga. The Alakurtti, Nickel, Murmansk, Archangel and the former separate Arctic border detachments, a brigade of border

patrol ships, a separate Arctic aviation regiment, as well as support and maintenance subunits are part of the group.

A program for further construction and development of the border troops of the Arctic region has been devised and approved. Provision has been made for the formation of a brigade of border patrol ships at Linakhamari, a separate division of border patrol ships at Archangel, a separate air squadron of transport aviation and a separate signal battalion, as well as for the creation of the corresponding system of rear-service support.

In the near future, based on the nature and volume of the tasks to be accomplished, plans are to expand the Arctic Group into the Northern Border District. With allowance for this prospect, the command and control elements are forming now.

The Arctic Group is not unique. Similar formations have been created in the Kaliningrad oblast, in Tajikistan and Kirgizia, and on the border with Ukraine.

[Kalinin] Reinforcement of the grouping of border troops in the North simultaneously with the start of development of northern deposits of oil and natural gas—accident or design?

[Pleshko] There is some design there. It is associated not only with the discovery of oil deposits on the shelf of the Barents Sea. An American oil corporation is preparing to develop oil in the Archangel oblast and in the Nenets Autonomous District. What is more, the Northern Sea Route is becoming more and more international. In the future there will be more foreign vessels in our Arctic seas than Russian. In this regard, it is necessary to take the situation under control in the regions in order to prevent illegal study, development or smuggling of valuable materials, strategic raw materials and natural resources of Russia. There have already been some efforts. I can say that our recent measures to protect state interests in the economic zone of Russia, conducted jointly with the Federal Counterintelligence Service and other structures, such as "Putina-94," "Zaslon," "Rubezh" and others, brought exceptional results. (Overall throughout Russia, resources worth more than 2.3 trillion rubles were saved.) We saw more than once that the smuggling of valuable materials increasingly is assuming a "legalized" appearance, since documents are filled out that at first glance do not contradict the letter and spirit of the law.

[Kalinin] You have enumerated many structures, including power structures, which participate in protecting the interests of Russia in the North. At the same time, the situation remains tense on the southern border. In this regard, a question arises—Is it so necessary to reinforce the group of border troops in the North, where the situation on the border has always been calm?

[Pleshko] In the North a number of complex situations arise. Now at times there is no one to coordinate with.

The army is leaving the North, and air defenses are being rolled back. Radar coverage of the country from the Arctic is being virtually curtailed. Planes of the Northern Fleet, even in the close-in zone, are rarely scrambled, ships set out to the open sea more and more rarely, and the situation is examined less. So someone will have to fill the gaps. Reinforcement of the grouping of Border Troops will at least partially compensate for this situation.

One other reason for the formation of the Arctic group, and in the future, of the Northern Border District, is that equipping of the new border with the countries of the Baltic and simultaneously with this, the maintenance of the border in the North is not within the capabilities of the Northwest Border District alone.

[Kalinin] What units will be given preference during the formation of the district: ground, sea, or air?

[Pleshko] If we approach it from the scientific viewpoint, and calculate everything well—and I was engaged in this just recently in the main staff of the Border Troops—the situation with respect to coverage of the naval surface situation is developing largely in favor of coastal posts. The naval forces of the Border Troops are allocated 11-13 percent. This is associated with the large areas, technical capabilities, and number of border naval troops. But considering the maritime nature of the State Border in the Arctic, the naval forces have greater advantages in covering the situation. For this reason, in the maritime sector the advantage in development will be with the naval units.

[Kalinin] Does this mean that the function of guarding territorial waters will be removed from the Northern Fleet?

[Pleshko] The Northern Fleet, despite its reorganization, remains a powerful fleet, and no one can replace it. The Law "On the State Border of the Russian Federation" assigned to the Ministry of Defense the task of guarding the air space and underwater medium. And we will do our tasks in close coordination with the fleet.

[Kalinin] Does the reinforcement of the grouping of Border Troops not mean the creation of a new curtain, even if not an "iron" one, which not only protects the border of Russia, but also separates it to some degree from the West?

[Pleshko] Certainly not. The Arctic group will further the expansion and development of ties with neighboring states. I have in mind, in particular, organization of an admission system through the state border. We are following a path of integration of all services that have an interest in protection of the border into a unified border service of the Russian Federation.

At present in the Murmansk and Archangel oblasts they are putting the finishing touches on the rules for the border system. Supplements and amendments in the rules will be accepted by agreement with the command and control

elements of the Border Troops not in the interests of individual personalities, but in the interests of society, preservation of the natural resources of the country and the ecology of the regions. I believe that there will not be any fundamental changes in the border system.

[Kalinin] Konstantin Konstantinovich, how do you feel about the widening of contacts and development of working cooperation with the border services of the neighboring states of Finland and Norway?

[Pleshko] The border representation apparatus maintains such contacts. An agreement has been signed with Finland regarding coordination in a number of areas. A similar agreement was signed with Norway. We will develop cooperation with the border services of these

countries, proceeding from the interests of safeguarding security of each state, the creation of favorable conditions for personal interaction, and development of economic, political and other relations. Recently our ship, under the flag of the commander of naval forces of the Northwest Border District, visited Norway, where questions of development of coordination with the coast guard of that country were resolved.

The creation of an Arctic group does not mean military strengthening of the border with Norway and Finland. The change in the grouping on the Kolsk Peninsula will take place not through an increase in the numerical strength of the border troops, but through redistribution of our manpower and resources.

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